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Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) has traditionally been viewed through the lens of his 
poetic masterpiece, the Commedia. While his so-called “minor” works, including the 
overtly political book four of Convivio and the treatise Monarchia, have been studied, 
much of this work tends to read Dante through the theologized, over-determined 
hermeneutic of the narrative of his poetic journey through the afterlife.  Also, because of 
the overwhelming temptation to associate Dante’s place in intellectual history with his 
clerical contemporaries in Paris and Bologna, a similar trend (often combined with the 
first) reads Dante as merely an idiosyncratic but minor epigone of the scholastics in his 
non-poetic work. The latter vein of interpretation is very common and tends to generate 
interpretations of Dante’s political thought which see it as a predominantly abstract 
encounter with scholastic theology and philosophy in the context of the high medieval 
church-state conflicts, particularly in the contentious age of Popes Boniface VIII, 
Clement V, and John XXII and their bloody disputes with claimants to the Holy Roman 
throne and French and Aragonese monarchies over political control of northern Italian 
territories. 
  
  While this kind of reading is not unwarranted—for Dante’s Monarchia does make 
strong claims in the late medieval church-state conflict and deploys a philosophical 
lexicon current with scholastic intellectuals of the time—many scholars have read 
Dante’s monarchical theory in Convivio and Monarchia exclusively as a response to and 
 
 
dialogue with the major scholastic and juridical writers, particularly of the “mirrors of 
princes genre,” on both sides of these political conflicts between Church-State claims to 
authority. This is not completely wrong, but in so doing many have, conversely, failed to 
understand that Dante is making a coherent and unique normative argument. Such 
readings fail to read Dante 1) as a real Florentine politician, 2) as an enthusiastic 
follower of Aristotelian paradigms (not merely a scholastic Aristotelian), 3) as a 
committed political secularist, and 4) as contextualized within the rich municipal, social, 
economic, and political histories of Florence and Medieval Italy. 
  
This study thus moves away from previous approaches to Dante’s political 
thought and does a close re-reading of Convivio and Monarchia in a properly 
historicized framework, inspired by the work of Ernst Curtius and modern historicist 
methodology, contextualizing it in 13th and 14th century history. In particular, the study 
departs from Dante’s denunciation of greed in his lyrics, Commedia, Convivio, and 
Monarchia to establish the fact —through extensive research in economic history, 
commercial development, economic thought, political history, social history in medieval 
Italy etc.— that far from being a merely abstract denunciation of mammon or usury, like 
that found in the Bible and other theological writings, it is a unique and acerbic 
response to broad changes that can only be construed, on the basis of historical 
scholarship, in terms of the emergence of early capitalism in Florentine society around 
the early to mid 13th century. During Dante’s life, greed became a serious object of social 
discourse, with voices expressing both approbation and disapprobation, because of the 
monetization, urbanization, and commercialization of northern Italy. Moreover, during 
this period the Florentine state is effectively transformed from a bourgeois merchants’ 
 
 
republic to an oligarchy of the wealthy. The rise of a mega-wealthy, nouveau riche 
economic elite resulted in many social dislocations and factional conflicts. Through an 
examination of the economic and social development of the Florentine state and the role 
its powerful banks and firms played in it—from its early popolo governments, 
ordinances of justice, white and black Ghibelline crises, through the early 14th century 
Mercanzia—I thus adjust the typical church-empire historiographical binary to show 
that Dante’s monarchical theory is in fact a meaningful response not only to the broader 
ideological claims of the church-empire (spiritual-secular) conflict, but in fact, is also a 
response to the latter’s imbrication within the political and economic development of 
early capitalism. My investigation includes extensive research on the relationship 
between banking, commerce, and papal and Florentine-state political phenomena. 
  
         Thus, having pointed out the existence of a historical object we might call medieval 
Italian “political economy” as interlaced with traditional historiographies of Church-
Imperial-City-State politics in 13th and 14th century Italy (chapters 2 and 3), and the 
history of the historiography of capitalism during the same period (chapter 4), I 
carefully examine Aristotle in terms of Dante (chapter 5). In particular, I show that 
Aristotle’s conception of justice, chrematistic wealth-getting and monetary 
accumulation (natural vs. unnatural), and the moral teloi of the human being and state 
in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics moor and inform Dante’s main claims and 
denunciations of greed in regards to his own time: Aristotle presents an alternative 
model to his contemporary status quo.  By understanding Dante’s political works as an 
Aristotelian inspired critique of political economy (Dante cites “the philosopher” 
hundreds of times) I show that Dante is responding to emergent capitalism as an 
 
 
institutionalization of greed which leads to infinite and unsolvable regressions of 
conflict which only one universal monarchical authority can stop, provided that such a 
monarch acts according to properly Aristotelian philosophical conceptions. 
  
Chapter 1 serves as an initial overview of the whole study, also positioning it in 
relation to debates within the field of Dante studies; chapter 2 examines the 
international and political situation of Florence and Italy during Dante’s time; chapter 3 
proposes a new historiography of this history and examines it as the development of 
“political economy”; chapter 4 explores the emergence of capitalism in Florence and 
Italy in the 13th and 14th centuries (also motioning to debates about the nature and 
definition of “political economy” and “capitalism”); finally, chapter 5 examines 
Aristotle’s critique of political economy in the Ethics and Politics, then pivots to Dante’s 
deployment of such Aristotle’s paradigms in Convivio and Monarchia to both denounce 
the injustices generated by the intertwinement of politics and acquisitive monetary 
wealth-getting and to articulate a monarchical political model for stopping the 
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Chapter 1. Dante's Political Thought as Political Economic Thought: 





1. Introduction: Greed, Wealth, and Political Economy 
 
Throughout the Commedia, Dante condemns greed and the accumulation of wealth 
as directly intertwined with the political dysfunction and injustice of the Italy of his 
time. In conversation with Forese Donati in Purgatorio, Florence is the place that “day 
by day [is] deprived of good and seems along the way to wretched ruin” (di giorno in 
giorno più di ben si spolpa, / e a trista ruina par disposto).1 In the canto of Brunetto 
Latini—in which Dante also evokes an unmistakable linkage between sodomy and 
usury—we see that while Florence was once great, it has become a “nest of wickedness” 
(nido di malizia) where  “[there is] a people presumptuous, avaricious, envious” (gent’è 
avara, invidiosa e superba).2  Indeed, we learn in Inferno 16 a sentiment reiterated in 
Paradiso 15-18: that “the newcomers to the city and quick gains” (la gente nuova e i 
sùbiti guadagni) have infected Florence with “excess” (dismisura).3  
 
                                                       
1 Purg. 24.80-81; Text and translations of the Commedia (Mandelbaum) and Convivio 
 
2 Inf. 15.78; Inf. 15.68 
 
3 Inf. 16.73-74; For an investigation into the Aristotelian valence of the term misura and 
how it fits into Dante’s larger courtly, sociological, and ethical framework in the 
Commedia and in his lyric poetry, see Teodolinda Barolini, "Sociology of the Brigata: 
Gendered Groups in Dante, Forese, Folgore, Boccaccio-From 'Guido, I' vorrei' to 
Griselda,” Italian Studies 67, no. 1 (2012): 4-22 and Teodolinda Barolini, "Aristotle's 
Mezzo, Courtly Misura, and Dante's Canzone Le Dolci Rime: Humanism, Ethics, and 
Social Anxiety," in Dante and the Greeks, ed. Jan M Ziolkowski (Washington, DC: 
Dumbarton Oaks, 2014). For a close to complete catalogue of greed and monetary 
corruption in the Commedia, see Leonid M. Batkin, Dante e la società italiana del '300 




In his encounter with Sordello, before vituperating the corruption of Florence, Dante 
cries out for a monarch—a Caesar—capable of restoring peace and order to an Italy that 
is “[an] abject…inn of sorrows…[a] ship without a helmsman in harsh seas” (serva, di 
dolore ostello, / sanza nocchiere in gran tempesta) and devoid of peace.4 Everywhere, 
“all flee from [virtue] as if it were an enemy” (virtù così per nimica si fuga) and 
throughout Italy, there is not a single government imbued with philosophical 
authority—invoking the words of Ecclesiastes— “whose king is noble and whose princes 
devote their time to the people’s needs and not to their own wantonness” (lo cui re è 
nobile e li cui principi usano il suo tempo a bisogno, e non a lussuria).5 In Paradiso, 
where corrupt church and state governance is contrasted to the divine governance of the 
cosmos, Beatrice decries the “greediness…who—within your depths—cause mortals to 
sink so, that none is left able to lift his eyes above your waves!” (cupidigia che i mortali 
affonde / sì sotto te, che nessuno ha podere / di trarre li occhi fuori delle tue onde!).6 
And, when hailing the possible coming of “alto Arrigo”—Henry VII of Luxembourg, who 
Dante once believed might begin to restore just political order — Beatrice declares that 
Italy is incapable of accepting this monarchical rule because “the blind greediness 
bewitching you, has made you like the child who dies of hunger and drives off his nurse” 
(la cieca cupidigia che v'ammalia / simili fatti v'ha al fantolino / che muor per fame e 
caccia via la balia).7  
                                                       
4 Purg. 6.127-151; Purg. 6.76-77 
 
5 Purg. 14.37; Conv. 4.6.16 
 
6 Par. 27.121-123 
 
7 Par. 30.139-141; Dante, of course, sees greed, whether as cupidigia or avarizia (Lat. 




The Commedia’s intense focus on the strong connection between greed and political 
corruption are also the major drivers of Dante’s political thought in Convivio and 
Monarchia, where he underscores the political dysfunction, wars, and social maladies of 
his time as a consequence of capital accumulation and an overlapping of politics and 
economics; the former as a superstructure in-nested in and representative of the 
church-imperial contests over which and to which even smaller party interests and 
municipal sovereignties bend. In Monarchia, the end of the universal polity is justice, 
which—in stopping the endless onslaught of greed— results in peace and aims to the 
intellectual development and fulfillment of all human beings. But, as I will show, 
chrematistic polities (or wealth-getting states)—that is, in Dante’s time, early capitalistic 
states and international capitalist power—thwart the achievement of that goal and make 
Dante’s new theory of the state and empire and political project necessary.8 Thus Dante 
is perhaps one of political economy’s first critics in the Latin west, for he truly 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
knowledge, mastery, and all forms of folle volere. Of course, it links to traditional topoi 
from the Christian tradition too. On the former see, Teodolinda Barolini, "Guittone’s 
Ora Parrà, Dante’s Doglia Mi Reca, and the Commedia’s Anatomy of Desire," in Dante 
and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2006), and on the latter see Richard Newhauser, The Early History of Greed the Sin of 
Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). But Dante’s linkage of greed with the entire complex of insatiable desire 
for money, political power, and domination—within the theological and moral 
condemnation of deadly sins and vices generally—is not merely an abstract reflection on 
the perennial pondus amoris and Dante’s moral investigation of multivalent 
incontinenza, but also a recognition, as I will show, of actual monetary greed stratified 
within and enabled by political power and corporate-private enterprise. 
 
8 Much has been written on Dante’s theory of the state and imperium, about which there 
is a vast literature and many controversies. For a philosophically rich and accurate 
picture of Dante’s theory of the empire and state, see the preeminently coherent work of 
Bruno Nardi, "Il concetto dell'Impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco," in Saggi 




understood Aristotle’s critique of chrematistics and political economy in the Politics and 
Nicomachean Ethics.9  
                                                       
9 “Political Economy” is a term most often associated with the field of study that 
emerged starting with the French physiocrats and took form in its eighteenth and 
nineteenth century “classical” exemplars, such as Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill.  
The phrase “Critique of Political Economy” of course is taken from Karl Marx, Capital: 
A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin in association 
with New Left Review, 1976); Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (New York: International Publishers, 1981); Karl Marx, Grundrisse: 
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus 
(London: Penguin Books, 1993), who made its critique his primary objective. In this 
study, however, I intend political economy in its purely classical-antique—and by 
extension ‘medieval’—formulation, that is, as derived from Aristotle’s arguments 
regarding the difference between politics and household management (oikonomia or 
oikonomike), natural and unnatural wealth-getting (chrematistike), and pursuit of 
monetary accumulation, exchange (kapelike), and its relationship to justice, which are 
examined especially (but not exclusively) in his Politics (Book 1) and Nicomachean 
Ethics (Book 5). Here below, I give a brief overview for understanding how Aristotle 
conceptualizes it and as it relates to Dante’s political thought and by “critique” I mean a 
moral-philosophical claim against a union of state power, holders of monetary interests, 
and the pursuit of the bad sort of wealth-getting. For political economy in the 
Aristotleian vein see, Spencer J. Pack, Aristotle, Adam Smith and Karl Marx on Some 
Fundamental Issues in 21st Century Political Economy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2010); Ricardo F. Crespo, A Re-assessment of Aristotle’s Economic Thought 
(New York: Routledge, 2013); Odd Langholm, Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian 
Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 
1983); Scott Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995); Nicolas J. Theocarakis, "Nicomachean Ethics in Political Economy: The 
Trajectory of the Problem of Value", History of Economic Ideas 14, no. 1 (2006): 9.; and 
M. I. Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis", Past & Present , no. 47 (1970): 
doi:10.2307/650446. On the relationship between the latter and modern theories of 
economy and political economy, see Spencer J. Pack, "Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship 
with Modern Economic Theory,” Foundations of Science 13, no. 3-4 (2008): 
doi:10.1007/s10699-008-9135-x; Ricardo F. Crespo, Philosophy of the Economy: An 
Aristotelian Approach (New York: Springer, 2013); Cornelius Castoriadis, "Value, 
Equality, Justice, Politics: From Marx to Aristotle and From Aristotle to Ourselves," in 
Crossroads in the Labyrinth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954); 
Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," in Trade and Market in the Early 
Empires (The Free Press Glencoe, IL, 1957); and Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy. While there is a vast literature on medieval economics, for the centrality of 
Aristotle in its development see Odd Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools: 
Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological 




In this study, I will demonstrate the existence of “political economy” in Dante’s 
Florence and Italy, namely as a historically undeniable phenomenon of the nearly 
complete entanglement of the political and the economic in the time of Dante. Indeed, 
eminent historians have already laid the framework for such a study.10 A new 
perspective on the economic and political history of Dante’s time allows us to 
understand his use of Aristotle in Monarchia and to explain how his normative political 
theory depends in part upon a critique of political economy.11 Such a critique, we shall 
see, is not only consistent with understanding what motivates Dante’s stringent 
denunciations of greed and political dysfunction throughout the Commedia, but is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth 
Century: Money, Market Exchange and the Emergence of Scientific Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Joel Kaye, A History of Balance, 
1250-1375: The Emergence of a New Model of Equilibrium and Its Impact on Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 
10 The main historians who have called attention to this total overlapping of politics and 
economics in the history of the northern Italian city-states and Florence in the age of 
Dante are Davidsohn, Salvemini, Ottokar, Rubinstein, Brucker, and Najemy among 
others. Nicolai Rubinstein, in "Studies on the Political History of the Age of Dante," in 
Atti del congresso internazionale di studi danteschi (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1965), 237, 
remarks that it is “difficult…to draw a line between economic history and political and 
social history” during this period. 
 
11 In paving the way for this analysis on political economy, I am indebted to Joan M. 
Ferrante, The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 41, for her work demonstrating the true centrality of 
“commerce” within the nexus of “the independent city-state, the claims of empire, and 
the church,” the dominant forces which drive Dante’s political thought, and to Justin 
Steinberg, whose work in Accounting for Dante: Urban Readers and Writers in Late 
Medieval Italy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) on 
“accounting” for the circulation of Dante’s lyric within merchant and bourgeois spaces, 
inspired me to make further investigations into historicizing other socio-economic 




crucial to the project of historicizing Dante as a unique, consistent political theorist in 
all his works, especially the Monarchia.12  
 
We can therefore rest assured that our researches into Dante as a critic of political 
economy, and hence early capitalism, is not an anachronism. In the opening of his 
famous essay, Dante come personaggio-poeta della Commedia, Gianfranco Contini 
remarks that “ogni storia è storia contemporanea, suona un famoso teorema crociano. 
Se questa impostazione è corretta, non cadrà necessariamente nell’anacronismo ogni 
tentativo di richiamarsi all’attualità per illuminare eventi di culture sospite o remote.”13  
For a Dantista concerned with our very own attualità, there is no more relevant 
contemporary history with regards to a real factual history of the time of Dante’s real life 
(1265-1321) than that of capitalism.  As Marx observed in Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy, in a chapter on primitive accumulation, “capitalist production developed 
earliest” in medieval Italy.14 In thinking about Dante’s political thought and articulating 
                                                       
12 On the cause of “historicism” in Dante studies see below, Ch.1 section 3, and cf. 
Teodolinda Barolini, "Only Historicize": History, Material Culture (Food, Clothes, 
Books), and the Future of Dante Studies,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the 
Dante Society, no. 127 (2009): 37-54. In regards to Dante’s fundamental coherency (this 
is not to say he is not an eclectic and idiosyncratic) as a thinker, I also agree with Bruno 
Nardi’s view in, "Le rime filosofiche e il «Convivio»," in Dal "Convivio" alla 
"Commedia." (Sei Saggi Danteschi) (Roma: Nella sede dell'Istituto Palazzo Borromini, 
1992), 35, “che la dottrina di Dante sulla Monarchia era ormai saldamente costituita in 
tutti i suoi elementi essenziali” from his early lyrics, like Doglia mi reca and Le dolci 
rime to the Convivio and Commedia. 
 
13 Gianfranco Contini, "Dante come personaggio-poeta della Commedia," in Un'idea di 
Dante (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 33. 
 
14 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 876; Sombart, a colleague of Max 
Weber, in Der moderne Kapitalismus: historisch-systematische Darstellung des 
gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Die 
Genesis des Kapitalismus, 1 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1902) and Der moderne 
 
 8 
the grounds upon which he can be said to “critique” political economy, it is clear that in 
late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth century Italy, despite the nuances of particular 
academic debates regarding the origins of capitalism, we are talking about early or 
“proto” capitalism (see below, chapter 4).15  Capitalism has long been known to have its 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Kapitalismus: historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen 
Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Die Theorie der 
kapitalistischen Entwicklung, 2 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1902) identifies 
Northern Italy as prototypically capitalistic. See also his extensive treatment of medieval 
Florence in The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of 
the Modern Business Man, trans. Mordecai Epstein (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915). It 
should also be noted that, contemporaneously with Sombart, it was the judgment of 
Robert Davidsohn, in the Storia di Firenze, Vol. II, Pt. 1. Guelfi e Ghibellini (Firenze: 
Sansoni, 1972), 538, in the tenth chapter on the “Ordinamenti di Giustizia e la caduta di 
Giano della Bella,” with the label “La Genesi del Capitalismo” (Die Entstehung des 
Kapitalismus [The origin of Capitalism]), that “nel secolo decimoterzo in tutte le grandi 
città dell’Alta e Media Italia la società assunse un nuovo assetto economico, come a 
Firenze, dove però le conseguenze politiche del mutato regime economico furono più 
manifeste che altrove. Lo sviluppo del capitalismo, di cui nei tempi moderni la scienza si 
è affaticata a scoprire le origini, fu quello che dette la sua impronta a quell’epoca.” 
 
15 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Volume III: The 
Perspective of the World, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 57; 
Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 8-40; Philip J. Jones, The Italian City-state: 
From Commune to Signoria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 186. While it has since 
been vociferously debated whether or not it is appropriate to refer to “Capitalism” in the 
thirteenth century, many intelligent critics identify enough features of mercantile, 
financial, commercial, world-economy, and political development in the period’s history 
to permit me to insist in a qualified sense that in Dante’s Florence and northern Italy of 
the mid-thirteenth through early fourteenth centuries, we are at least witnessing an 
early form capitalism, so to speak, with a lower-case ‘c’, even if many wish to restrict the 
origins of Capitalism to post-sixteenth century Europe. It remains to be sufficiently 
proven what is at stake in denying its existence in earlier forms. On this vast discussion 
and debate regarding the origins of capitalism in medieval Italy—and its status as 
“capitalism”—see the above, and among so many innumerable others; Immanuel 
Maurice Wallerstein, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Fernand Braudel, 
Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Volume I: The Structures of Everyday 
Life, the Limits of the Possible, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1981); 
Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th - 18th Century. Volume II: The 
Wheels of Commerce, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London: Verso, 2002); 
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roots in the bourgeois revolution that ushered in the end of “feudalism”—disputed term 
it may be—and, as we shall see later, it can be said that the institutions of feudalism as 
culminating from the “parcellized sovereignty” of the late Roman Empire and the 
Christian dualisms of church and empire resulted in a complex patchwork of institutions 
and political concepts that nourished the emergence of markets and political economic 
institutions recognized today and labeled with the term capitalism and clearly bearing 
the marks of what created it.16 In any case, there is no doubt that the central formations 
were there during the period of Dante's life.17  
 
Moreover, the further one investigates into its roots, the more one sees that an 
interest in Dante’s political thought, historicized and contextualized in this context of 
early capitalism, is far from running any risk of anachronism, and on the contrary, 
corresponds to the historical reality in medieval Italy. As Gaetano Salvemini puts it, “it 
was Dante’s fate to be living just at a time when society had come under the control of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Martha C. Howell, Commerce Before Capitalism in Europe, 1300-1600 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); and William Caferro, "Economy: Hard Times or Prosperity?", 
in Contesting the Renaissance (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
 
16 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political 
Thought From Antiquity to the Middle Ages (London: Verso, 2008), 164-167, et passim; 
Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (New York: Verso, 2013), 148.ff. 
 
17 Eric Mielants, following the analysis of Wallerstein and Abu-Lughod, remarks in his 
important work on the topic, The Origins of Capitalism and the "Rise of the West" 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 31-32, regarding what he calls “Inter-
City-State System of the Middle Ages,” that “capitalistic features became more and more 
apparent in Europe after A.D. 1100 and the mutual existence of feudalism and 
capitalism was entirely possible up until about 1350. All of this took place within an 
inter-city-state system, before any sort of crisis caused one type of logic (the capitalist 




moneyed merchants.”18  According to John Larner, “In 1300 the Italians were the 
principal heirs of a revolution, which, beginning in the eleventh, and reaching its peak in 
the second half of the thirteenth century, had given to the whole of Europe a new 
prosperity, and to Italy the supremacy of the medieval world.”19  For George Holmes, in 
1300 Rome, about to cease being the ecclesiastical capital of Europe, was the home of 
“symbolic vestiges” of power and civilization while “Florence…was a city with no 
civilized past but an apparently infinite capacity for expansion fed by its industrial 
workshops and its mastery of international finance.”20 
 
                                                       
18 Gaetano Salvemini, "Florence in the Time of Dante", Speculum 11, no. 03 (1936): 317-
326. 
 
19 John Larner, Culture and Society in Italy, 1290-1420 (New York: Scribner, 1971), 22. 
 
20 George Holmes, Florence, Rome, and the Origins of the Renaissance (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 3; Jones, in The Italian City-state: From Commune to 
Signoria, 179, notes that this is truly not merely an “industrial” capitalism (industrial in 
a medieval, not modern sense) but a financial one with a “ connection formed between 
trade and finance. Both in origin and development in fact it is difficult to differentiate 
from commerce the operations and institutions of money-changing, banking, and 
credit—of mercatores, campsores, bancherii. By mere effect of their commercial 
expansion and dispersal overseas, their demand and accumulation of capital, their 
dealings in different currencies, Italian merchants were early impelled to contract and 
organize all kinds of credit and exchange transactions, not only among themselves or in 
relationships of business, but also in time with clients and society at large. Among 
themselves for commercial purposes, beside various forms of partnership, investment 
and shareholding, they evolved from the late twelfth century a whole new machinery of 
credit payments at home and abroad: at home by encouraging cambiatores (then 
followed by merchants themselves) to engage in banking, by accepting deposits, 
advancing credit, and transferring payments between clients and their own or other 
bancherii; abroad by devising instruments (bills) of loan and exchange (ex causa 
cambii), advancing funds repayable in different or distant currencies and markets.” For 
a perspective on medieval “industry,” see Jean Gimpel, The Medieval Machine: The 





As John Najemy states, the transformation from older feudal nobility to a new class 
of urban nouveaux riches is reflected in Dante’s Paradiso 16, where Cacciaguida 
fetishizes with nostalgia the great families of the “more virtuous” Florence of the mid-
twelfth century. In agreement with Davis, he points out that “Dante wrote at the height 
of Florentine economic power and demographic expansion in the early fourteenth 
century, and in the aftermath of one of the greatest explosions of violence perpetrated by 
elite factions. His purpose in fashioning the myth of an earlier, simpler, more tranquil 
Florence was to highlight the corruption and devastation that great wealth and political 
rivalries had inflicted on the city.”21 However, the fact that few of the elite families of 
Cacciaguida’s day were still politically active by the end of the thirteenth century (ex. 
Donati, Della Bella, Visdomini, Tosinghi, Lamberti, and Admiari), shows that “in little 
more than a century, economic growth and political turbulence had consigned much of 
the elite to oblivion and generated a new one,” the new class that Dante decries 
acerbically to the three noble Florentines in Inferno, when they ask if “cortesia e valor” 
remain in the city as it once did: “La gente nuova e i sùbiti guadagni / orgoglio e 
dismisura han generata / Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piagni.”22 This “gente nuova” 
which took shape in the mid-thirteenth century, “made Florence the economic giant of 
Europe, and dominated the life of the republic for the next two centuries and more.”23 
Najemy puts it succinctly: Florence’s history was dominated by a competition between 
                                                       
21 John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575 (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), 6.; On this also see Davis’s classic essay Il buon tempo antico in 
Charles Till Davis, Dante's Italy, and Other Essays (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 71-93. 
 
22 Inf. 16:73-75; Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575, 6. 
 




“two distinct but overlapping political cultures and classes: an elite of powerful, wealthy 
families of international bankers, traders, and landowners organized as agnatic lineages; 
and a larger community of economically more modest local merchants, artisans, and 
professional groups organized in guilds and called the popolo.”24 
 
In the eyes of Charles Till Davis, Villani’s “pious moralizing" about "factionalism and 
civil war" was "often borrowed from Dante," but not that of wealth. He writes correctly,  
 
it was precisely these characteristics of Florentine development which excited his 
imagination and moved him to write his history. His description of the rough 
clothes and frugal life of the Primo Popolo seems forced when we compare it with 
the inscription which that same popolo placed on their new town hall, celebrating 
the power and victories of their city. Its first line asserted: 'Florence is full of all 
imaginable wealth.' This note, also struck by Villani in many passages, gives a 
truer impression of the spirit of early Florentine historiography than the 
borrowings from Dante with which he tried to ornament his Chronicle.25 
 
 
The legacy of the post-1250 life of Florence is one and the same with the history of 
early capitalism or political economy in Italy. Florentine banks like the Mozzi, Spini, 
Bardi, and Peruzzi—to name just a handful— had branches and dealings, not just in 
Italy, but throughout Europe and the Middle East.26 Much of this activity was what we 
would easily identify as financialized, not merely industrial-productive, capitalism in 
                                                       
24 Ibid., 5. 
 
25 Davis, Dante's Italy, and Other Essays, 93; Davis notes that this is from the partial 
translation of the inscription as transcribed in Nicolai Rubinstein, "The Beginnings of 
Political Thought in Florence. A Study in Mediaeval Historiography,” Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 5 (1942): 198-227. 
 
26 Edwin S. Hunt, The Medieval Super-companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of 
Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 38-75; Jones, The Italian 




collusion with multiple layers of state and ecclesiastical powers: these banks lent huge 
amounts of money to the kings, feudal nobles, convents, bishops, popes, and 
municipalities—and of course, to private enterprises—of Europe at rates of interest 
between 36 and 262%.27 This lending led to massive profits. According to Salvemini, at 
the end of the thirteenth century the firm of the Florentine Cerchi was regarded as 
among the most powerful in the world and was believed to possess a capital of 900,000 
florins.28  Vieri de’ Cerchi was said to be personally worth over 600,000 florins. Other 
powerful firms, like the Bardi and the Peruzzi, also had massive amounts of capital: in 
1319 the annual turnover in the public books of the Bardi firm was 873,638 florins and 
merely the war debts owed mostly to these two Italian banks by Edward III of England 
had risen to 1,365,000 florins in 1339.29 How much is 900,000 to 1.5 million florins of 
capital? To put that into rough perspective, around 1300, 8000 florins was considered a 
large fortune, in 1268 Florence bought the town of Poggibonsi for 20,000 florins, and in 
1348 the entire city of Avignon sold to the pope for 80,000 florins.30 When talking about 
Florentine firms between 1260 until the financial crisis of the 1340s (the period that 
overlaps with Dante’s lifetime), we are literally talking about capital assets that rival 
today’s multinational industrial corporations and investment banking complexes 
(Haliburtons, Citibanks, GEs, Goldman Sachs, Koch Industries, etc.). The capital of 
                                                       
27 Salvemini, "Florence in the Time of Dante,” 319. 
 
28 Ibid., 319. 
 
29 On the accounting data, organization, operations and power of the Peruzzi company 
in the historical context of the 13th and 14th centuries, see the important and 
indispensable study of Hunt, The Medieval Super-companies: A Study of the Peruzzi 
Company of Florence. 
 




some single firms was greater than the sovereign wealth of entire kingdoms, and merely 
the amount of debts— “among capital, fees, and interest” (tra di capitale e provisioni e 
riguardi) owed some of them by England, as Villani puts it, “were worth an entire 
kingdom” (valeano un reame).31 From their first appearance in the 1230s, the chief 
campsores papae were Tuscan mercatores, most conspicuously Florentines, and they 
both monopolized the management and swelled the coffers of papal finances at great 
profit to themselves.32  
 
Indeed, to quote the eminent historian Philip Jones, author of monumental works on 
the history of medieval Italian society and economy: 
between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the era of Western expansion, 
Italy—and more especially now the North and Centre—became indelibly 
identified, to contemporaries and for posterity, with two subversive, ‘anti-feudal’ 
forces, republicanism and capitalism: of liberty and civility, ‘political man’, civic 
ethic, and polis-mindedness (libertas in Italia sedem principalem eligit), and of 
commerce (mercatura), ‘economic man’, business ethic, and the 
embourgeoisement of civil and political society (in Italia regnat populus). Trade 
and freedom drew together in creative but tense combination: from political and 
economic developed also cultural renaissance and deviation—Italy’s unmedieval 
culture, practical, secular, humanist—while from the relationship between them 
resulted all the innermost history of the Italian city-states, of progress, crisis, and 
revolution from commune to signoria.33 
 
                                                       
31 Giovanni Villani, Giovanni Villani: Nuova Cronica, ed. Giulio Cura Curà (Roma: 
Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2002), 856; Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-
1575, 133; Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and 
Economy, 1000-1700 (New York: Norton, 1976), 200. 
 
32 Gino Arias, "I banchieri italiani e la S. Sede nel XIII secolo: linee della storia esterna," 
in Studi e documenti di storia del diritto (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902); Jones, The 
Italian City-state: from Commune to Signoria, 192-197. 
 




Jones also writes, according to the judgment of modern and previous scholars, that 
the biggest invention of this urban landscape was “la creazione, unica per quel tempo, di 
una società fatta di città, repubblicane e commericali, città-Stati e città mercantili, che 
riunivano i due principi politici ed economici del ‘vivere civile’ (antifeudale e 
antimonarchico) e della ‘practica della mercatura’ (‘capitalistica’, ‘borghese’).”34   
 
 Thus, regarding Dante's political thought, we simply cannot interpret the split 
between the Church and Empire, Guelf and Ghibelline, and the later White Guelph and 
Black Guelf rift, without already seeing undergirding this superstructure a vast, 
functioning system of international capital and commercial interest determining not 
only the broader ideological contests, but also the actual internal structure of politics 
within Florence itself.35  In this political economy not only do state interests bend to 
financial interests, the powers of the state act also in unison with oligarchies and 
formations of power centered around networks of allied and competing capitalist 
interests, and increasingly become one. The history of Florentine political changes and 
“popular revolutions,” which culminates in the anti-magnate “ordinamenti di giustizia” 
legislation of 1293, were nonetheless all revolutions involving capitalist interests 
                                                       
34 Philip J. Jones, Economia e società nell'Italia medievale (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1980), 
4. 
 
35 Sergio Raveggi et al., Ghibellini, guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere politico 
a Firenze nella seconda metà del dugento, ed. Sergio Raveggi (Firenze: La nuova Italia, 
1978). Gino Masi, "I banchieri fiorentini nella vita politica della città", Archivio 
Giuridico "Filippo Serafini" 9 (1931): 57-89.; Gino Masi, Il nome delle fazioni fiorentine 
de'bianchi e de' neri (Aquila: Officine grafiche Vecchioni, 1927).; Gino Arias, "Il 
fondamento economico delle fazioni fiorentine de’ guelfi bianchi e de’ guelfi neri e le 
origini dell'ufficio della Mercanzia in Firenze," in Studi e documenti di storia del diritto 




(popolani, popolo grasso, grandi); anti-magnate, but not anti-capitalist or anti-
oligarchical.36 Starting with the primo popolo (1250-1260), its rule was “not a social 
revolution” but rather emerged from a disagreement within the elite between those 
dedicated to “factions and those who saw such alliances as damaging to the economic 
interests of their class and city."37 In fact, through Florentine history we see the 
unification of capitalist interests, and its most powerful guilds (arti maggiori) Calimala, 
Lana, and Cambio—which represented the most powerful banking and industrial-trade 
firms—with restricted-access state power, culminating in Florence’s “guild 
republicanism."38 The most overt and open institutional example of the latter, of course, 
is seen in Florence’s 1308 mercanzia or universitas mercantorum—a unification of the 
most powerful guilds of Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and Medici, 
Speziali, Merciai, into a governing state power.39 Authority and power are often directly 
related to the possession or demands of capital accumulation or access to markets.40 As 
Jones points out, the distribution of power in the Italian city-states was directly linked 
to “wealth and migrated with movements of wealth, and through all revolutions of 
                                                       
36 Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575, 68-69; Robert Davidsohn, Storia di 
Firenze. Vol. II, Pt. 2. (Firenze: Sansoni, 1972), 537ff.  
 
37 Ibid., 68. 
 
38 John M. Najemy, "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and 
Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics,” The American Historical Review (1979): 53-71. 
 
39 Antonella Astorri, La Mercanzia a Firenze nella prima metà del trecento: il potere 
dei grandi mercanti (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1998). 
 
40 For the still definitive work regarding the history of the Florentine guilds, see Alfred 
Doren, Le Arti Fiorentine, 2 Vols (Florence: Le Monnier, 1940). See also Antony Black, 
Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought From the Twelfth Century to 




political and economic regime, oligarchy, in fact or law, was the predominant form of 
government."41 The tight linkage between economic interest and state power causes the 
state to become unjust for several reasons, which we will explore with Dante (and 
Aristotle), and requires a monarchial form of government to stop the injustices of capital 
accumulation and wealth-getting. 
  
                                                       
41 Philip J. Jones, "Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy,” 




2. Dante's Political Thought 
 
Notwithstanding the trend of making Dante a receptacle and representative for 
almost any position or content area,42 Dante has been widely recognized as a unique 
political thinker who was passionate about the idea of Monarchy and hoped that a 
monarchy might restore peace and justice to his society.43 Dante’s Convivio and 
Monarchia, recognized as Dante’s most explicitly political works (especially the latter), 
rely heavily on direct interaction with Aristotle—particularly since Aristotle’s detailed 
conceptions of metaphysics (first philosophy), ethics, and politics provide a clear and 
consistent notion of justice and the common good in a time when historical, economic, 
and political factors left the justice of states and goods quite doubtful and when other 
intellectual claims to truth were advocating for what he considered misguided imperial 
or church arguments over temporal affairs.44 Aristotle provided Dante a particularly 
serviceable integration of the latter matters with the ethical, providing the closest 
comprehensive and systematic theory of ethical-political compass of individuals in 
relation to goods, other individuals, society as a whole, and “the highest good,” that 
                                                       
42 For a searing polemic on this very problem, see Francesco Benozzo, Appello 
all'UNESCO per liberare Dante dai Dantisti (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2013).  
 
43 In this vast body of literature, see the focused and illuminating studies of Nardi, "Il 
concetto dell'Impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco" and "Le rime filosofiche e 
il «Convivio»"; Francesco Mazzoni, "Teoresi e prassi in Dante politico," in Monarchia; 
Epistole Politiche (Torino: Edizioni RAI radiotelevisione italiana, 1966); Davis, Dante's 
Italy, and Other Essays, and Hans Kelsen, La Teoria Dello Stato in Dante, trans. 
Vittorio Frosini (Bologna: M. Boni, 1974). 
 
44 For a catalogue of Dante’s use of Aristotle see Edward Moore, Studies in Dante. First 
Series. Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896). 
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Dante had access to—particularly as the censorship bans of Aristotle began to end in the 
late duecento.45 
 
 We see the pervasiveness of Aristotle not only in the dozens of commentaries of 
Dante, but in direct references within the texts of Dante themselves—signaled by 
invocation of the “filosofo.” In Convivio, a standard concordance shows sixty-nine 
invocations of the philosopher: “Sì come dice lo Filosofo…”.46 In both Convivio and 
Monarchia, however, what is particularly striking is that reference to Aristotle as 
guiding principle not only rivals biblical citations, but completely trumps and 
overpowers the latter in terms of structural primacy and intellectual priority—such that 
we clearly see that Biblical revelation, as opposed to what is popularly claimed, is not 
truly the first source of ‘Truth’ for Dante, but rather that which supports what can be 
rationally and philosophically observed in nature and society.47  We see this in that 
Dante starts his Convivio by invoking Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1, emphasizing the 
                                                       
45 For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and deployment of Aristotelian thought 
as it was progressively translated and circulated in the 13th century see Stephen 
Gaukroger, "Augustinian Synthesis to Aristotelian Amalgam," in The Emergence of a 
Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1210-1685 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2006); Janet Coleman, "Some Relations Between the Study of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Ethics and Politics in Late Thirteenth-and Early Fourteenth-century 
University Arts Courses and the Justification of Contemporary Civic Activities (Italy and 
France)," in Political Thought and the Realities of Power in the Middle Ages, ed. Joseph 
Canning and Otto Gerhard Oexle (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998); and 
Cary J. Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits: Classical Traditions in 




47 As Gaukroger, op. cit, 78-79, has examined, this is the opposite of the predominant 
strands of scholastic approaches to epistemology and the ontology of truth that, while 
maintaining that first philosophy (metaphysics in the Greek sense) starts with sensory 
observation, nonetheless it is truly undergired by revelation and revealed-theology 
(metaphysics is often translated as theology, but its meaning is different). 
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universality of Truth and access to it--hence the metaphor of the “banquet” of “food” for 
all and emphasis on its vernacular dissemination:  
Sì come dice lo Filosofo nel principio de la Prima Filosofia, tutti li uomini 
naturalmente desiderano di sapere. La ragione di che puote essere ed è che 
ciascuna cosa, da providenza di propria natura impinta è inclinabile a la sua 
propria perfezione; onde, acciò che la scienza è ultima perfezione de la nostra 
anima, ne la quale sta la nostra ultima felicitade, tutti naturalmente al suo 
desiderio semo subietti (As the Philosopher says at the beginning of the First 
Philosophy, all men by nature desire to know. The reason for this can be and is 
that each thing, impelled by a force provided by its own nature, inclines towards 
its own perfection. Since knowledge is the ultimate perfection of our soul, in 
which resides our ultimate happiness, we are all therefore by nature subject to a 
desire for it.) 48 
Though his advocacy for monarchy as the best form of state certainly shares an 
overlap of concerns and context with the main political theorists of his era, like Thomas 
Aquinas, Ptolemy of Lucca, Giles of Rome, John of Paris, Remigio de’ Girolami and 
Marsilius of Padua, it is mistaken—as has been the fashion of some scholars of current 
and previous generations—to reduce Dante to the caricature of a sort of epigone of "real" 
professional political theorists, the scholastics and jurists, or as merely their minor 
interlocutor.49 When Dante does cite another medieval authority, as he does in his 
                                                       
48 Conv. 1.1 
 
49 This is the unfortunate procedure many traditional intellectual historians. See Dante’s 
treatment for example by J. A. Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," in The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought C. 350-c. 1450, ed. J. H. Burns 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), which though technically correct in 
many aspects, tends to treat Dante as a minor figure in relation to supposedly bigger, 
trend setting political ideas, which is to ignore everything that makes Dante’s thought 
unique in a properly historicized mode. Watt cannot help but make unwarranted value 
judgments—and hence from forwarding a skewed historiography— remarking that 
Dante’s Monarchia is “naive in its optimism,” “credulous,” “bizarre in its theology” and 
“under-researched in that its attempts to refute hierocratic arguments…are elementary 
as compared with professional theologians such as John of Paris and Remigio de’ 
Girolami or indeed as compared with those very canonists whom Dante affected to 
despise for their lack of theological and philosophical expertise.” The present study 
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Convivio, such citation must be examined in its particular context and content and must 
not be viewed as automatic evidence of Dante’s inferiority or obeisance to other writers. 
Not only do the political theories of the canon lawyers and medieval political theorists 
vary greatly amongst themselves in their technical details—some being on the 'secular' 
and others on the 'spiritual' side of the prototypical church/empire conflict (and 
Marsilius of Padua’s work post-dates the Monarchy)—but they inherently represent and 
explicitly express different political concerns and presuppose different teleologies (from 
very different intellectual and subjective positions) than those of Dante's Monarchia.50  
If at all, Dante is only “responding” to these texts in Convivio and Monarchia in a very 
weak sense, and his articulation of his own ethical and political perspective should be 
seen primarily as a reaction to his lived world and experience. Dante’s citation of 
Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles in Convivio, for example, in its context—to anyone 
who has read Aquinas’ work—clearly has almost nothing to do with the latter and the 
work of Convivio generally demonstrates an opposite epistemological stance in 
repristinating the primary value of knowledge as it comes through the material channels 
of the senses—not revelation—even if mediated by separated substances.  While we 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
seeks to refute such views by recontextualizing Dante’s political thought within a more 
precise historical framework.  
 
50 Though it pertains to a previous generation of scholars, the legacy of “scholastifying” 
Dante’s thought in all regards, including political thought, still bears upon the field. Of a 
generation ago, Nardi, as a scholastically trained Italian scholar excels at careful 
intellectual history regarding Dante and scholasticism/Averroism. In my view, Michele 
Maccarrone, "Il Terzo Libro Della «Monarchia»,” Studi Danteschi XXXIII, fasc. I 
(1955): 5-142, and Gustavo Vinay, Interpretazione della "Monarchia" di Dante (Firenze: 
F. Le Monnier, 1962) represent over-determining tendencies to make Dante a follower 
or either Aquinas, Averroes, or other scholastic authorities while entirely ignoring 
Dante’s unique and systematic understanding of Aristotle, and indeed the historical 




certainly should not deny that there are valid and noteworthy avenues of research open 
to intellectual historians in drawing important connections between certain topical 
areas amongst the canon of scholastic and other political, scientific, philosophical, and 
theological writers of the era with the work of Dante and others,51 it is imperative to 
insist that Dante’s thought is a unique, idiosyncratic, and incredibly learned deployment 
of Aristotelian philosophy. If also imbued with many elements that characterize 
medieval learning of the time, it must be read against the politics of his situation and 
time and deserves this scholarly attention without the undue interference that the onus 
of an expansive discourse of intellectual history of medieval political thought presents in 
the space a study like this.  In other words, I this study I leave aside anxieties about 
Dante’s possible influences and anxieties of influence. 
 
 How can Dante then be said to relate to the other philosophical, theological, and 
publicist/juridical writers and theorists of his time—that is, to his place in medieval 
                                                       
51 For excellent examples of intellectual historians doing careful work on the consonance 
and dissonance of certain concepts and themes across an array of 13th-14th century 
thinkers in the areas of theology, philosophy, law, politics, and economics see Kaye, 
Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange and the 
Emergence of Scientific Thought; Joel Kaye, A History of Balance, 1250-1375: The 
Emergence of a New Model of Equilibrium and Its Impact on Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools: 
Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological 
Tradition, 1200-1350; Giacomo Todeschini, Il prezzo della salvezza: lessici medievali 
del pensiero economico (Roma: Nuova Italia scientifica, 1994); Giacomo Todeschini, 
Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society, trans. Donatella 
Melucci (Franciscan Institute, Saint Bonaventure University, 2009); Stephen 
Gaukroger, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity 1210-1685 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006); Ian P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in 
Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, C.1100-1330 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Cary J. Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought: 
Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide From John of Salisbury to Hegel 




political thought?  The majority of writing on Dante’s political thought in the context of 
medieval political thought generally has taken place either within the context of Dante 
studies or by intellectual historians. Many studies exist, as a subfield of Dante studies 
comparing or examining Dante to or with respect to particular medieval political 
theorists,52 or a basket of them,53 and there are a plethora of extensive manuals on the 
topic of medieval political thought written by intellectual historians which more or less 
touch on Dante vis-a-vis the canon of thinkers of the time.54  If historicized, such studies 
tend towards broader political history of a monumental nature—with the notable 
                                                       
52 For example, on Dante and Aquinas (a truly massive field of its own!), see, for 
starters, Michele Maccarrone, "Il Terzo Libro Della «Monarchia»", Studi Danteschi 
XXXIII, fasc. I (1955): 5-142; Vinay, Interpretazione della "Monarchia" di Dante; 
Etienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949); Dino 
Bigongiari, Essays on Dante and Medieval Culture (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1964). On 
Dante and Remigio see Davis, Dante's Italy, and Other Essays and Antonio Sarubbi, 
Chiesa e stato comunale nel pensiero di Remigio de' Girolami (Napoli: Morano, 1971).  
 
53 For synthetic treatments of Dante’s political thought with a primary focus on Dante 
with an aim to compare, contrast and contextualize it with other thinkers and traditions 
see the exhaustive works of Bruno Nardi, "Le Rime filosofiche e il «Convivio»," in Dal 
"Convivio" alla "Commedia." (Sei Saggi Danteschi) (Roma: Nella sede dell'Istituto 
Palazzo Borromini, 1992); Bruno Nardi, Saggi di filosofia dantesca (La Nuova Italia, 
1967); Gilson, Dante the Philosopher; Francesco Ercole, Il pensiero politico di Dante 
(Milano: Alpes, 1927); Arrigo Solmi, Il pensiero politico di Dante: studi storici (Firenze: 
La Voce, 1922); and John Robert Woodhouse ed., Dante and Governance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
54 In preparing this study I have consulted a variety of standard manuals old and new, 
including James Henderson Burns, The Cambridge History of Medieval Political 
Thought C. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge University Press, 1988); Ewart Lewis, Medieval 
Political Ideas (New York: Knopf, 1954); Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959); Janet 
Coleman, A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); Joseph Canning, A History of Medieval 
Political Thought, 300-1450 (London; New York: Routledge, 1996); Walter Ullmann, A 
History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); 
Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); and Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western 




exception of Ellen Wood’s study of medieval political thought—and largely neglect to 
integrate their intellectual historiographies with detailed economic and social history. 
While I will make the case for new historicism in this study in section 1.3, as 
comprehensive treatment of this topic has been done elsewhere, I here offer my reader 
my analysis of Dante’s core commitments and refer the reader interested in this other 
discourse to other sources which have done this exhaustively and are noted here in the 
bibliography. A careful examination of Dante’s critique of political economy in terms of 
the ideological commitments demonstrated by other medieval political writers of the 
period is a worthy cause, yet beyond the limited focus of the present study.  
 
That said, it is also a complete mistake, in my estimation, to prepare a hermeneutical 
key for reading Dante's political works in Convivio and Monarchia by means of an 
overdetermining insistence that Dante's chief concern is maintaining the forma mentis 
and qualifying the discourse, for the sake of mere novelty, of the other big "medieval" 
publicist treatises, philosophical and theological commentators, and Fürstenspiegel of 
the time.55 This is the procedure of Gustavo Vinay, whose opinions that Dante’s political 
work was inspired by other treatises, that Dante was an epigone of Aquinas, and that he 
had never read Aristotle’s Politics are problematic.56 Unfortunately, at least two 
                                                       
55 For an excellent study on the narrative pretensions and use of fiction in the rhetorical 
construction of the medieval Fürstenspiegel, see Larry Scanlon, Narrative, Authority, 
and Power: The Medieval Exemplum and the Chaucerian Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
56 Of course, Gustavo Vinay, "Introduzione," in Monarchia (Firenze: Sansoni, 1950), vi-
vii, acknowlegdes that Dante’s entire experience informed his real life political work, but 
remarks, in a seemingly arbitrary manner (other than his imaginary vision of Dante’s 
work table) that “San Tommaso ha ispirato la Monarchia, forse Giacomo da Viterbo, 
non Giovanni da Parigi, non l’Aristotele della Politica, tanto meno i glossatori, le 
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contemporary scholars have suggested that Dante was really a much better poet and 
actually a "bad" political theorist57 ; another that Dante is guilty of innumerable 
scholastic errors and wilts under the justified criticism of Guido Vernani;58 and another 
that Dante’s statements regarding politics and political thought are mostly 
contradictory, but can be interpreted most successfully through the lens of his encounter 
with authority and the framework of the Commedia.59 
 
This study maintains that Dante's political voice is, in fact, unique and coherent, and 
that a historicizing account of it best shows this quality when furnished with the 
Aristotelian paradigm upon which Dante builds his political theory. In order to 
understand where the current study stands in relation to the critical reception of Dante 
as a political thinker (see 1.3 below) it is therefore necessary to attempt an unbiased 
answer to the question, namely, what does Dante say about politics? I therefore attempt 
a contained primary reading of Dante's Monarchia and Convivio to illustrate the main 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
parentesi politiche del Decretum, e delle Decretali…quando Dante scrisse la Monarchia 
aveva sul tavolo la Summa contra gentiles e alcuni commenti aristotelici di S. 
Tommaso…” It is clear that Aristotle’s Politics was already in circulation by the time of 
Dante’s birth and that Dante knows the Politics, insisting on the Aquinas filter is 
unwarranted even if readings of Aquinas’ Aristotle in terms of Dante might also be 
interesting.  
 
57 Richard Kay, "Introduction," in Dante's Monarchia, auth. Dante Alighieri (Toronto, 
1998).; Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi, "La «Monarchia» di Dante alla luce della 
«Commedia»," in Studi medievali, 3a serie, XVIII, Fasc. II (Torino: Giovanni 
Chiantore, 1977). 
 
58 Anthony Kimber Cassell, "Dante's Monarchia and Vernani's Refutation in Context," in 
The Monarchia Controversy: An Historical Study with Accompanying Translations of 
Dante Alighieri's Monarchia, Guido Vernani's Refutation of the Monarchia Composed 
by Dante and Pope John 22.'s Bull Si Fratrum (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2004). 
 
59 Ascoli, Dante and the Making of a Modern Author. 
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argument of Dante's political thought. This is necessary to examine not only the critical 
reception hinted to above in more detail, but for explaining the rationale behind 
exploring Dante's political thought as political economic thought and justify the need to 
re-historicize it.  
  
*           *           * 
 
Dante develops his political thought and particularly his vision of universal empire in 
Convivio 4 and Monarchia, also given special expression in Purgatorio 6. The core of 
Dante’s thought turns on the unique nature of the human species as a philosphical one 
with a special teleology that is not, contrary to common conceptions, entirely displaced 
to the afterlife and beatific vision.60 Starting in Convivio with Arisotle's maxim (Sì come 
dice lo Filosofo) cited above, Dante sees the act of understanding (nous) as our ultimate 
goal—in line with the schema and teloi of the human sciences as articulated in book 6 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics—and the activity, philosophizing, as that which most defines 
our species.61  In a passage that is often characterized as Dante's "Averroism," Dante 
says that philosophy is a collective activity that can only be carried out properly by the 
human race as a unit: 
…opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam 
intellectus possibilis per prius ad speculandum et secundario propter hoc ad 
operandum per suam extensionem (the activity proper to mankind considered as 
a whole is constantly to actualize the full intellectual potential of humanity, 
                                                       
60 The end of all laws (eternal, divine, human, and natural) for Aquinas, in the treatise of 
laws, is the beatific vision in the afterlife. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, Prima 
secundae, §90-108. 
 




primarily through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and 
extension of thought). 62  
 
 For Dante the goal that the empire seeks to secure is ultimately the good life 
through the rule of the monarch (vita felice) to “bring man happiness, for this is the end 
for which he is born” (l’uomo viva felicemente: che è quello per che esso è nato).63 
Accomplishing the teleological happiness of humankind writ large is the reason for 
human civilization: “the root foundation underlying the Imperial Majesty is, in truth, 
man’s need for human society, which is established for a single end: namely, a life of 
happiness” (lo fondamento radicale della imperiale maiestade, secondo lo vero, è la 
necessità della umana civiltade, che a uno fine è ordinata, cioè a vita felice).64 Indeed, 
invoking Aristotle’s Politics and the principle of the superiority of unity in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Dante even suggests within this view of teleology that we see when “when 
many are directed to a single end, one of them should be a governor or a ruler, and all 
the rest should be ruled or governed” (più cose ad uno fine sono ordinate, una di quelle 
conviene essere regolante o vero reggente, e tutte l’altre rette e regulate)—bringing up 
the example of the order and regulation of a ship, where the captain sees that  “the 
different offices and objectives are directed to a single end: namely, that of reaching the 
desired port by a safe route” (diversi offici e diversi fini di quella a uno solo fine sono 
ordinati, cioè a prendere loro desiderato porto per salutevole via).65 Likewise, in 
religions, armies, and other organizations ordered to ends, namely the “human species” 
                                                       
62 Mon. 4.1-2 
 
63 Conv. 4.4.4 
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(umana specie),66 there must be one authority. Almost hailing a sort of secular 
humanism, Dante insists that it is obvious (manifestamente vedere si può) that there 
must be one emperor, like a captain, that acts on the best interests of and for the proper 
ends of the entire human race, which Dante phrases provocatively—with an almost neo-
Pelagian tinge to it—as the “perfection…[of]… the universal social order of the human 
species” (universale religione della umana spezie).67  
 
 Dante sees this secular human happiness, that is happiness in this life as 
something achievable and of key importance—evoking the images the earthly paradise 
of Purgatorio68 —as not in conflict with that of the eternal life of the Christian in 
salvation. The monarch is enlightened by philosophy in achieving this earthly task, not 
theology: 
 
Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit intendendos: 
beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis constitit et per 
terrestrem paradisum figuraturò et beatitudinem vite ecterne, qui consistit, in 
fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi 
lumine divino adiuta, que paradisum celestem intelligi datur. Ad has quidem 
beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet. 
Nam ad primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa seuqamur 
secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero per 
documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa 
sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas operando (Ineffable providence has 
thus set before us two goals to aim at: i.e. happiness in this life, which consists in 
the exercise of our own powers and is figured in the earthly paradise; and 
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68 For a reading of Dante’s notion of earthly paradise, see the famous essay by Ernst H. 
Kantorowicz, “Man-Centered Kingship: Dante,” in The King's Two Bodies: A Study in 





happiness in the eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of God 
(to which our own powers cannot raise us except with the help of God’s light) and 
which is signified by the heavenly paradise. Now these two kinds of happiness 
must be reached by different means, as representing different ends. For we attain 
the first through the teachings of philosophy, provided that we follow them 
putting into practice the moral and intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the 
second through spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, provided that 




This is why Dante stresses here that there are two guides that correspond, respectively, 
to the two goals, and he is unambiguous about which one is the true political authority, 
the one that guides temporal things: 
 
Propter quod opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum duplicem finem: 
scilicet summo Pontifice, qui secundum revelata humanum genus perduceret ad 
vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, qui secundum phylosophica documenta genus 
humanum ad tempralem felicitatem dirigeret. (It is for this reason that man had 
need of two guides corresponding to his twofold goal: that is to say the supreme 
Pontiff, to lead manking to eternal life in conformity with revealed truth, and the 
emperor, to guide mankind to temporal happiness in conformity with the 
teachings of philosophy.)  
 
 Dante, moreover, goes to significant lengths to debunk the argument of those who 
assert that “the authority of the empire is dependent on the authority of the church in 
the same way as a builder is dependent on the architect” (auctoritatem imperii ab 
auctoritate Ecclesie dependere velut artifex inferior dependet ab architector). 70 This 
argument, Dante says, depends on a reading of Genesis (1.16) and the story that God 
greated “two great lights” (duo magna luminaria) which they take allegorically 
(allegorice dicta) to mean the two powers, spiritual and temporal. Leaving aside Dante’s 
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logical deconstruction of the argument throughout book 3—which truly deserves a new, 
careful study in its own right to rescue its understanding from the damage inflicted 
upon it by Dante scholars—his conclusion is very clear: “thus I say that the temporal 
realm does not owe its existence to the spiritual realm, nor its power (which is its 
authority), and not even its function in an absolute sense; but it does receive from it the 
capacity to operate more efficaciously through the light of grace which in heaven and on 
earth the blessing of the supreme Pontiff infuses into it” (sic ergo dico quod regnum 
temporale non recipit esse a spirituali, nec virtutem que est eius auctoritas, nec etiam 
operationem simpliciter; sed bene ab eo recipit ut virtuosius operetur per lucem gratie 
quam in celo et in terra benedictio summi Pontificis infundit illi).71 Peter, on the basis of 
spiritual authority, simply cannot “loose or bind the decrees or laws of the empire” 
(solvere seu ligare decreta Imperii sive leges). 72  It goes without saying: there should be 
no surprise that Dante’s Monarchia, besides being popular amongst Protestant 
reformers, was included on the index of prohibited books in Catholic countries until 
1888.73 
 
 If Dante's political orientation is fundamentally secular and he believes that man's 
highest activity is in this world and that the good life consists in socially instantiated 
actualization of the philosophical-contemplative intellect, a process brought about by 
collective species action, Dante is also concerned here with with the debilitating power 
                                                       
71 Mon. 3.4.20-21 
 
72 Mon. 3.8.11 
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of greed because it is most contrary to justice: fulfilling of the teloi of human 
contemplation requires monarchical curbs against greed, which is to say justice or 
“equitade.” Dante advocates for strong monarchical leadership because otherwise 
“human greed would cast these ends and means aside if men, prompted to wander by 
their animal natures, were not held in check ‘with bit and bridle’ in their journey” 
(humana cupiditas postergaret nisi hominest, tanquam equi, sua bestialitate vagantes 
‘in camo et freno’ compescerentur in via).74 
 
 Dante shows in Monarchia 1 and Convivio 4 that this role is best left to the 
emperor who can bring about this peace through justice: 
 
Et cum ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci, et hii com difficultate nimia, pervenire 
possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pacis 
tranquilitate quiescat, hoc est illud signum ad quod maxime debet intendere 
curator orbis, qui dicitur romanus Princepts, ut scilicet in areola ista mortalium 
libere cum pace vivatur (And since none can reach this harbour (or few, and these 
few with great difficulty) unless the waves of seductive greed are calmed and the 
human race rests free in the tranquility of peace, this is the goal which the 
protector of the world, who is called the Roman Prince, must strive with all his 
might to bring about: i.e. that life on this threshing-floor of mortals may be live 
freely and in peace). 75 
 
 Going back to humanity, the “religione della umana spezie," the human community 
for Dante is a universal whole (humana univeritas est quoddam totum).76 Because of 
this, individual cities and kingdoms do not fulfill this community’s political destiny, 
which must conform with a single principle—just as all of nature is governed by god who 
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is monarch over nature. Thus "world monarchy is necessary for the well-being of the 
world" (monarchiam necessariam mundo ut bene sit).77 In Monarchia 1.5, the 
formulation is similar: “there must therefore be one person who directs and rules 
mankind, and he is properly called ‘Monarch’ or ‘Emperor.' And thus it is apparent that 
the well-being of the world requires that there be a monarchy or empire” (…unum 
oportet esse regulans sive regens, et hoc ‘Monarcha’ sive ‘Imperator’ dici debet. Et sic 
patet quod ad bene esse mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse sive Imperium).78 
 
 For Dante, imperial authority is truly limitless. In Epistola 7 (composed 17 April 
1311) to Henry VII—in a passage that mirrors many of the arguments of Monarchia 2 
(esp. Mon. 2.10) and Dante’s assertion that the world monarch’s jurisdiction is limited 
only by the ocean (Mon 1.9.12)—writing out of exasperation that after victories in the Po 
valley, Henry forgets Tuscany (as if he thinks that the imperial rights to preserve Roman 
territory were confined by the borders of Liguria), Dante states that “the glorious power 
of the Romans cannot be held in check either within the boundaries of Italy or within 
the three sides of Europe itself. For although it has been subjected to violence and has 
drawn back its governance within narrower confines, nonetheless it stretches out 
everywhere, by uninfringible right, as far as at the waves of Amphitrite, and the 
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78 Mon. 1.5.9-10; Also from letter VI, March 31 1311  “…the Eternal King, whose 
goodness sustains the heavenly things above…has ordained that human affairs should 
be governed by the Holy Roman Empire, in order that human beings should enjoy the 
peace that only the stability of such a government can guarantee, and should live in 
citizenship with one another throughout the world, in accordance with the will of 
nature”; Translations of the letters are adapted from Claire E. Honess, Dante Alighieri: 
Four Political Letters, wiitten by Dante Alighieri (London: Modern Humanities 




inadequate waters of the ocean can scarcely contain it” (Romanorum gloriosa potestas 
nec metis Ytalie nec tricornis Europe margine coartatur. Nam etsi vim passa in 
angustum gubernacula sua contraxerit, undique tame de inviolabili iure fluctus 
Amphitritis attingens vix ab inutili unda Occeani se circumcingi dignatur).79 For Dante, 
going against the grain of the ascendant real political impeti of his day, which were 
moving towards national sovereignty and localized-national conceptions of political 
community and identity, these competing authorites were a multiheaded hydra.80 Italy 
was quite literarlly for him, “wretched…left alone, at the mercy of private decisions and 
devoid of any public control…[and] so battered and buffeted by gales and floods that 
words cannot describe it.”81   
 
 In his post-exilic years, Dante clearly evolved his political thought as against 
muncipialism or nationalism in favor of universalism, as he put it in the De vulgari 
eloquentia: “To me, however, the whole world is a homeland, like the sea to fish - 
though I drank from the Arno before cutting my teeth, and love Florence so much that, 
because I loved her, I suffer exile unjustly — and I will weight the balance of my 
judgement more with reason than with sentiment” (Nos autem, cui mundus est patria 
velut piscibus equor, quanquam Sarnum biberimus ante dentes et Florentiam adeo 
diligamus ut, quia dileximus, exilium patiamur iniuste, rationi magis quam sensui 
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spatulas nostri iudicii podiamus).82 Dante, raging at the Florentine authorities cutting 
deals between Clement V and the papal court at Avignon and Robert of Anjou against 
Henry, scoffs at the “voracity of [the Florentines’] cupidity” (6.2; 6.3) that causes them 
to neglect what is to the “advantage of everybody” by claiming proscriptive terriorial 
rights and causing public authority to sink into oblivion.83 Dante vigourously disputes 
the notion (implicit in their actions) that “the politics of Florence were one thing and 
that of Rome something quite different.”84  
 
 As we can clearly gather from Dante’s genealogy of correct philosophy according to 
the Aristotelian and perpiatetic schools,85 human beings require peace, unity, and 
concord make to this uniquely human philosophical fulfillment possible; for philosophy 
to properly be fruitful.  The polity is to seek such an end, namely that  
opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam 
intellectus possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secundario propter hoc ad 
operandum per sum extensionem …patet quod genus humanum in quiete sive 
tranquilitate pacis ad proprium suum opus …liberrime atque facillime se havet. 
Unde manifestum est quod pax universalis est optium eorum que ad nostram 
beatitudinem ordinatur (the activity proper to mankind considered as a whole is 
constantly to actualize the full intellectual potential of humanity, primarily 
through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and extension of 
thought)…it is apparent that mankind most freely and readily attends to this 
activity…in the calm or tranquility of peace. Hence it is clear that universal preace 
is the best of those things which are ordained for our human happiness.).86  
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 Dante invokes monism—also derived from Aristotle’s metaphysics—to argue that 
political unity requires the rule of a single individual.87 Peace and concord, necessary for 
human happiness, as Dante says, require a political unity based also on a “unity of 
human wills” and this can only come to fruition if there is a single will governing.88 This 
depends on an Aristotelian conception of the proper governing of the soul by the 
rational element, in which one both does just acts but acts justly and freely from a firm 
disposition (NE 2) and from habits that are the product of good laws and a good 
lawgiver (NE 10) such that human beings can choose concord freely and rationally (cf. 
Purg. 16.16-21). A philosophically grounded monarch is necessary:  
 
…omnis condordia dependet ab unitate que est in voluntatibus; genus humanum 
optime se habens est quedam concordia; nam, sicut unus homo optime se habens 
et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus est conrodia quedam, et dimiliter 
domus, civitas et regnum, sic totum genus humanum; ergo genus humanum 
optime se habens ab unitate que est in voluntatibus dependet. Sed hoc esse non 
potest nisi sit voluntas una, domina et regulatrix omnium aliarum in unum, cum 
mortalium voluntates propter blandas adolescentie delectatione indigeant 
directivo, ut in ultimis ad Nicomacum docet Phylosophus. Nec ista una potest 
esse, nisi sit princeps unus omnium, cuius voluntas domina et regulatrix aliarum 
omnium esse possit. Quod si omnes consequentie superiores vere sunt, quod 
sunt, necesse est ad optime se habere humanum genus esse in mundo 
Monarcham, et per consequens Monarchia ad bene esse mundi (all concord 
depends on the unity which is in wills; mankind in its ideal state represents a 
kind of concord; for just as one man in his ideal state spiritually and physically is 
a kind of concord (and the same holds true of a household, a city, and a 
kingdom), so is the whole of mankind; this the whole of mankid in its ideal state 
depends on the unity which is in men’s wills. But this cannot be unless there is 
one will which controls and directs all the others towards one goal, since the wills 
of mortals require guidance on account of the seductive pleasures of youth, as 
Aristotle teaches at the end of the Ethics. Nor can such a single will exist, unless 
there is one ruler who rules over everybody, whose will can control and guide all 
the other wills. Now if all the above conclusions are true—as they are—for 
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mankind to be in its ideal state there must be a monarch in the world, and 
consequently the well-being of the world requires a monarchy).89 
 
 This squares with what Dante says about the emperor being, “the one who rides in 
the saddle of the human will” (lo cavalcatore de la umana volontade).90 But he cannot be 
so if he is not really acting by making laws with the authority over human wills properly. 
To achieve this, we absolutely need authoritative philosophy: “therefore having 
discussed the imperial authority, I must continue my digression and take up the subject 
of the authority of the Philosopher” (ragionato della [autoritade] imperiale, procedere 
oltre si conviene…a vedere di quella del Filosofo).91 What he means in this section, as his 
etymological prologue confirms, is that that from this word autentin derives the word 
‘autore’ and ‘autoritade,’ but the important part is that it means “worthy of faith and 
obedience” (degno di fede e d’obedienza) and the most authoritative person above all is 
Aristotle, for the philosophy that will inform the imperial role, is “most worthy of faith 
and obedience” (dignissimo di fede e d’obedienza) and whose words are the “supreme 
and highest authority” (sono soma e altissima autoritade).92  In other words, Aristotle’s 
authority in political and ethical matters is the supreme paradigm for good government: 
E però che tutte l’umane operazioni domandano uno fine, cioè quello dell’umana 
vita, al quale l’uomo è ordinato in quanto elli è uomo, lo maestro e l’artefice che 
quello ne dimostra e considera, massimamente obedire e credere si dee. Questi è 
Aristotile: dunque esso è dignissimo di fede e d’obedienza. E a vedere come 
Aristotile è maestro e duca della ragione umana in quanto intende alla sua finale 
operazione, si convene sapere che questo nostro fine, che ciascuno disia 
naturalmente, antichissimamente fu per li savi cercato (Since all human activities 
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require a final end, namely the end of human life to which man is directed insofar 
as he is human, the master or the craftsman who studies this and reveals it to us 
should be obeyed and trusted above all others. That man is Aristotle: he therefore 
is the most worthy of faith and obedience. In order to perceive how Aristotle is 
the master and leader of human reason, insofar as it is directed to man’s final 
activity, we must know that this end of ours, which everyone by nature desires, 
was sought out in very early times by the sages).93 
 
 
 There are many philosophies and ideological justifications, which Dante surveys 
here, that can put the emphasis on the wrong ends, and end up causing, as he says in 
Monarchia so succinctly, a sickness of intellects (practical and theoretical).94 These can 
lead to the emperor stepping outside the bounds of his authority and trying to define 
goods outside the bounds of his his authority, outside of philosophical truth. The only 
way to preserve justice, therefore, is through the making and enforcement of laws 
crafted with proper philosophical conceptions regarding matters that pertain to our 
wills: 
 
Sono anche operazioni che la nostra [ragione] considera ne l’atto de la volontade, 
sì come offendere e giovare, sì come star fermo e fuggire a la battaglia, sì come 
stare casto e lussuriare, e queste del tutto soggiacciono a la nostra volontade; e 
però semo detti da loro buoni e rei perch’elle sono proprie nostre del tutto, 
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94 Mon. 1.16.4-5: “O genus humanum, quantis procellis atque iacturis quantique 
naufragiis agitari te necesse est dum, bellua multorum capitum factum, in diversa 
conaris! Intellectu egrotas utroque, similiter affectu: rationibus irrefragabilibus 
intellectum superiorem non curas, nec experientie vultu inferirum, sed nec affectum 
dulcedine divine suasionis, cum per tubam Sancti Spiritus tibi efflectur: ‘Ecce quam 
bonum et quam iocundum, habitare fratres in unum” (O human race, how many storms 
and misfortune and shipwrecks must toss you about while, transformed into a many-
headed beast, you strive after conflicting things. You are sick in your intellects, both of 
them, andand in your affections; you do not nurture your higher intellect with inviolable 
priciples, nor your lower intellect with the lessons of experience, nor your affections 
with the sweetness of divine counsel, when it is breathed into you by the trumpet of the 





perché, quanto la nostra volontade ottenere puote, tanto le nostre operazioni si 
stendono. E con ciò sia cosa che in tutte queste volontarie operazioni sia equitade 
alcuna da conservare e iniquitade da fuggire (la quale equitade per due cagioni si 
può perdere, o per non sapere quale essa si sia o per non volere quella seguitare), 
trovata fu la Ragione scritta, e per mostrarla e per comandarla. Onde dice 
Augustino: «Se questa - cioè equitade - li uomini la conoscessero, e conosciuta 
servassero, la Ragione scritta non sarebbe mestiere»; e però è scritto nel 
principio del Vecchio Digesto: «La ragione scritta è arte di bene e d’equitade». A 
questa scrivere, mostrare e comandare, è questo officiale posto di cui si parla, 
cioè lo Imperadore, al quale tanto quanto le nostre operazioni proprie, che dette 
sono, si stendono, siamo subietti; e più oltre no (There are also activities which 
our reason contemplates as an act of the will, as for instance giving offense or 
assistance, standing ground or fleeing in battle, and remaining chaste or yielding 
to lust. These are completely subject to our will, and therefore we are considered 
good or evil, because they are completely of our own making; for as far as our will 
can reach, so far do our activities extend. Since in all of these voluntary activities 
justice must be preserved and injustice avoided, and this justice may be lost in 
two ways (either through not knowing what it is, or through not willing to follow 
it), written Law was invented in order both to establish it and to administer it. So 
Augustine says, “If men had known it (namely justice) and, when known, had 
observed it, there would have been no need of written Law.” Therefore it is 
written in the beginning of the Old Digest that “Written law is the art of well-
doing and justice.” The official of whom we are speaking, namely the Emperor, is 
appointed to formulate, demonstrate, and enforce precisely this Law, and to him 
we are subject as far as our own activities extend, which have already been 
described, and no further).95 
 
 
 This is why for Dante, linking the authority of Aristotle with the emperor’s 
authority and good law making is so key. As he writes, “e non repugna [la filosofica] 
autoritade alla imperiale; ma quella sanza questa è pericolosa, e a questa sanza quella è 
quasi debile, non per sé ma per la disorinanza della gente: sì che l’una coll’altra 
congiunta ultilissime e pienissime sono d’ogni vigore” ([Aristotle’s] authority is not 
opposed to the imperial authority; but the latter authority without the former creates a 
danger, and the former authority without the latter creates a weakness, not inherently, 
                                                       




but as a result of the lack of harmony among the people). 96  As Dante explains, this 
philosophical infusion is necessary because there are some areas in which the emperor 
cannot make valid laws, because they lack the Aristotelian authority and since it may 
concern something that he cannot really will to define:  
 
Queste cose simigliantemente, che dell'altre arti sono ragionate, vedere si 
possono nell'arte imperiale: ché regole sono in quella che sono pure arti, sì come 
sono le leggi de’ matrimonii, de li servi, de le milizie, de li successori in dignitade, 
e di queste in tutto siamo a lo Imperadore subietti, sanza dubbio e sospetto 
alcuno. Altre leggi sono che sono quasi seguitatrici di natura, sì come constituire 
l’uomo d’etade sofficiente a ministrare, e di queste non semo in tutto subietti. 
Altre molte sono che paiono avere alcuna parentela con l’arte imperiale - e qui fu 
ingannato ed è chi crede che la sentenza imperiale sia in questa parte autentica -: 
sì come [diffinire] giovinezza e gentilezza, sovra le quali nullo imperiale giudicio è 
da consentire, in quanto elli è imperadore: però, quello che è di [Cesare sia 
renduto a Cesare, e quello che è di] Dio sia renduto a Dio” (In like manner what 
we have discussed with regard to the other arts may be seen to hold true for the 
art of imperial rule. For in the art of imperial rule there are certain spheres of 
regulation which are pure arts, such as laws pertaining to marriage, slavery, 
military service, succession in office, in which matters we are entirely subject to 
the Emperor without any possible doubt or question. There are other laws which 
in a sense follow from the forces of nature, such as determining at what age a 
man is sufficiently prepared to manage his own affairs, and in these we are not 
entirely subject. There are many others which seem to be associated with the art 
of imperial rule, and anyone believing the imperial judgment in such matters to 
be authoritative was, and still is, deceived. For example, regarding the definitions 
of maturity and of nobility, the imperial judgment cannot compel assent simply 




 We will see this more later, but if the ruler does not rule according to justice and 
tries to make definitions outside of justice, philosphically defined, this behavior causes 
mal governo.98  A key example of this, which will be explored in chapter 5, is the 
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attempt to define nobility as the possession of wealth rather than as virtuous behavior in 
regard to giving or taking wealth. Furthermore, an imperial pronouncement that “greed 
is good,” for example, would simply be illegitimate on the grounds that any rational law 
would condemn vicious behavior that in and of itself is opposed to the paradigm of 
justice that must be embodied in the state and, for the individual, which violates the 
properly calculated ethical mean. The emperor has no authority to define certain things, 
and should he perversely legislate without philosophical authority, such laws would be 
corrupt and unjust.  
 
 Imperial authority and the authority of Aristotle, as Dante makes exceedingly clear, 
need to be joined together. Dante’s discourse on this point is anything but an abstract 
desire to “authorize” himself in regards to more prestigious authors. For Dante, the 
joining of Aristoteleian concepts of philosophy to imperial power is the only way to 
effectuate justice. In Monarchia 1.10 Dante argues that the monarch is necessary to 
adjudicate disputes related to greed and pleonexia, which create impossibly endless 
regressions of contested authority without a universal emperor: 
 
Et ubicunque potest esse litigium, ibi debet esse iudicium; aliter esset 
inperfectum sine proprio prefectivo: quod est inpossibile, cum Deus et natura in 
necessariis non deficiat. Inter omnes duos principes, quorum alter alteri minime 
subiectus est, potest esse litigium vel culpa ipsorum vel etiam subditorum—quod 
de se patet—: ergo inter tales oportet esse iudicium. Et cum alter de altero 
cognoscere non possit ex quo alter alteri non subditur—nam par in parem non 
habet imperium—oportet esse tertium iurisdictionis amplioris qui ambitu sui 
iuris ambobus principetur. Et hic aut erit Monarcha aut non. Si sic, habetur 
propositum; si non, iterum habebit sibi coqeualem extra ambitum sue 
iurisdictionis:tunc iterum necessarius erit teritus alius. Et sic aut erit processus in 
infinitum, quod esse non potest, aut oportebit devenire ad iudicem primum et 
summum, de cuius iudicio cuncta litigia dirimantur sive mediate sive inmediate: 
et hic erit Monarcha sive imperator (Now wherever there can be conflict there 
must be judgment to resolve it, otherwise there would be an imperfection without 
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its proper corrective; and this is impossible, since God and nature never fail in 
their provision of what is necessary. There is always the possibility of conflict 
between two rulers where one is not subject to the other's control; such conflict 
may come about either through their own fault or the fault of their subjects (the 
point is self-evident); therefore there must be judgment between them. And 
since neither can judge the other (since neither is under the other's control, and 
an equal has no power over an equal) there must be a third party of wider 
jurisdiction who rules over both of them by right. And this person will either be 
the monarch or not. If he is, then our point is proved; if he is not, he in his turn 
will have an equal who is outside the sphere of his jurisdiction, and then it will  
once again be necessary to have recourse to a third party. And so either this 
procedure will continue ad infinitum, which is not possible, or else we must come 
to a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves all disputes either directly 
or indirectly; and this man will be the monarch or emperor).99    
 
 
 For Dante, to stop such an infinite regression of querelles because of competing 
authorities, justice will be greatest when it is joined to power and the proper will to act. 
But note, with the invocation of the will here, Dante articulates a version of power 
conceived both in terms of political authority and political control as well as in 
philosophical terms. Dante’s definition of justice, which closely traces that given in 
Convivio and depends on Aristotle’s in the Nicomachean Ethics, particularly book five, 
is articulated in Monarchia 1.11 in reference to the NE 5.1: “justice, considered in itself 
and in its own nature, is a kind of rectitude or rule which spurns deviation from the 
straight path to either side; and thus it does not admit of a more and a less - just like 
whiteness considered in the abstract” (iustitia, de se et in propria natura considerata, est 
quedam rectitudo sive regula obliquum hinc inde abiciens: et sic non recipit magis et 
minus, quemadmodum albedo in suo abstracto considerate).100  It is present more or 
                                                       
99 Mon. 1.10.1-5 
 
100 Mon. 1.11.3-4; Shaw’s note, in Dante: Monarchy, edited by Prue Shaw (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23, n. 4. is important: “Concepts such as 'justice' 
and 'whiteness', considered in themselves (i.e. in the abstract), consist of a simple and 
unvarying essence; in practice such abstractions are observable in our world only in 
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less in relation to the absence of injustice “both in the disposition and in the actions of 
an agent” (quantum ad habitum et quantum ad operationem).101  When there is the least 
amount of injustice justice is “strongest” (potissima). But it can be impeded, either in 
relation to habit and disposition or in regards to the power to do actions when “the will 
is not entirely free of all greed” (voluntas ab omni cupiditate sincera non est). Dante 
repeats Aristotle’s point that justice is doing something in relation to other people and 
giving them their due.102  Accordingly, the presense of greed represents the most 
contrary thing to just relations with others and is the most destructive vice to justice 
broadly conceived. For Dante, therefore,  
 
 
…iustitia potissima est in mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto 
inest; huiusmodi solus Monarcha est: ergo soli Monarche insistens iustitia in 
mundo potessima est…notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut 
innuit Aristotlies in quinto ad Nicomacum. Remota cupiditate omnino, nichil 
iustitie restate adversum; unde sententia Phylosophi est ut que lege determinari 
possunt nullo modo iudici relinquantur. Et hoc metu cupiditatis fiere oportet, de 
facili mentes hominum detorquentis. Ubi ero non est quod possit optari, 
inpossibile est ibi cupiditatem esse: destructis enim obiectis, passiones esse non 
possunt. Sed Monarcha non habet quod possit optare: sua nanque iurisdictio 
terminatur Occeano solum… (justice is at its strongest in the world when it 
resides in a subject who has in the highest degree possible the will and the power 
to act; only the monarch is such a subject; therefore justice is at its strongest in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
concrete 'subjects' (the individual who enacts justice, the thing which is white) and the 
nature of the subject in any given instance will determine how 'pure' or 'impure' they 
are, i.e. to what degree they are 'mixed' with or 'contaminated' by what is opposed to 
them. What is opposed to justice, Dante will now go on to explain, takes two forms: it 
may be in the disposition of the subject, i.e. in his will, which can be incapacitated by 
greed, which is self-serving (egotistical) and thus in conflict with justice itself which is 
altruistic [ad alterum], concerned with the welfare of others and the common good; 
or it may be in action, if the subject lacks the power to act in relation to what 
he perceives to be just and wishes to do.” 
 
101 Mon. 1.11. 
 




the world when it is located in the monarch alone… it must be noted that the 
thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the 
Ethics. When greed is entirely eliminated, nothing remains which is opposed to 
justice; hence Aristotle's opinion that those things which can be resolved by law 
should in no way be left to the judge's discretion. And it is fear of greed which 
makes this necessary, for greed easily leads men's minds astray. But where there 
is nothing which can be coveted, it is impossible for greed to exist, for emotions 
cannot exist where their objects have been destroyed. But there is nothing the 
monarch could covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean).103 
 
 The problem of greed and the need for universal authority against is so central to 
Dante’s thought: it is repeated in Convivio when Dante says “the human mind does not 
rest content with limited possession of land but always seeks to achieve glory through 
further conquest” (l’animo umano in terminata possessione di terra non si queti, ma 
sempre desideri gloria d’aquistare)104 and in Monarchia, where Dante claims that “since 
the monarch can have no occasion for greed (or in any event of all men the very least 
occasion), as we saw earlier (and this is not  the case with other rulers), and since it is 
greed alone which perverts judgment and obstructs justice, it follows that he alone, or he 
more than anyone else, can be well disposed to rule, since of all men he can have 
judgment and justice in the highest degree” (cum ergo Monarcha nullam cupiditatis 
occasionem habere possit vel saltem minimam inter mortales…quod ceteris principibus 
non contingit, et cupiditas ipsa sola sit corruptiva iudicii et iustitie prepeditiva, 
consequens est quod ipse vel omnino vel maxime bene dispositus ad regendum esse 
potest, quia inter ceteros iudicium et iustitiam potissime habere potest). 105 
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 Thus with this conception of justice we can begin to unravel some of Dante’s other 
central arguments. One of the major points in Monarchia 1.10, as we have seen, is 
Dante’s assertion that the monarch must be free of greed and that the good monarch— 
through his upright will in habits and proper power to act—will stamp out greed which 
he sees as a cancer on justice and the proper rule of the state.  Both Law and Aristotle’s 
philosophy, without this monarch and law enforcer who makes good laws, are impotent. 
Italy is lawless, as Dante says, full of mal governo and like a ship without a captain, and 
this is because of the absence of a true emperor and the preponderance of greed, which 
is opposed to justice. For Dante, the empire will bring freedom and just government.106 
In his capacity of ruling the whole world with justice the ruler, however, would literally 
“love” the people rightly in so far as he is the intermediary between all men and other 
princes and free of greed. For Dante, “recta dilictio” or “karitas” is the only just 
disposition of a ruler because with love and not greed, the true good, the telos of man, is 
sought above all else, a good that as Dante has made clear is a good actualized by the 
community together in just reciprocity and friendship, following Aristotle: 
Preterea, quemadmodum cupiditas habitualem iustitiam quodammodo, 
quantumcunque pauca, obnubilat, sic karitas seu recta dilectio illam acuit atque 
dilucidat. Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo 
potest habere iustitia; huiusmodi est Monarcha: ergo, eo existente, iustitia 
potissima est vel esse potest. Quod autem recta dilectio faciat quod dictum est, 
hinc haberi potest: cupiditas nanque, perseitatie hominem spreta, querit alia; 
karitas vero, spretis aliis omnibus, querit Deum et hominem, et per consequens 
bonum honimis (just as greed, however slight, dulls the habit of justice in some 
way, so charity or rightly ordered love makes it sharper and brighter. So the man 
in whom rightly ordered love can be strongest is the one in whom justice can have 
its principal abode; the monarch is such a man; therefore justice is or can be at its 
strongest when he exists. That rightly ordered love does what has been stated can 
be deduced from this: greed, scorning the intrinsic nature of man, seeks other 
                                                       




things; whereas love, scorning all other things, seeks God and man, and hence the 
true good of man).107 
 
 With this rightly ordered love (surely this is a Dantean derivative of Augustine’s 
concept of rightly ordered desire amalgamated with Aristotelian conceptions), people 
will not exist as means to another’s end but an end for themselves. To be able to have a 
freedom of will means living in the sort of society that forms people well with laws such 
that people freely choose the right ends. Recapitulating the classical schemata from 
Aristotle's Politics, in which regimes are structured around base or virtuous desires of 
one, many, or few, Dante does not merely make an analogy between states of souls and 
states of regimes, he seems to truly believe that monarchy, of all the forms of 
government, most truly enables such freedom because it removes the perverted forms of 
government, which Aristotle characterizes as despotic and governed by selfish interests 
that set mankind into slavery according to the ends of that regime: 
 
Genus humanum solum imperante Monarcha sui et non alterius gratia est: tunc 
enim solum politie diriguntur oblique—democratie scilicet, oligarchie atque 
tyrampnides—que in servitutem cogunt genus humanum, ut patet discurrenti per 
omnes, et politizant reges, aristocratici quos optimates vocant, et populi libertatis 
zelatores; quia cum Monarcha maxime diligat homines, ut iam tactum est, vult 
omnes honines bonos fieri: quod esse non potest apud oblique politizantes. Unde 
Phylosophus in suis Politicis ait quod in politia obliqua bonus homo est malus 
civis, in recta vero bonus homo et civis bonus convertuntur. Et huiusmodi politie 
recte libertatem intendunt, scilicet ut homines propter se sint. Non enim cives 
propter consules nec gens propter regem, se e converso sonsules propter cives et 
rex propter gentem; quia quemadmodum non politia ad leges, quinymo leges ad 
politiam ponuntur, sed magis ille ad hos, ut etiam Pylosopho placet in hiis que de 
presenti materia nobis ab eo relicat sunt (Mankind exists for its own sake 
and not for the sake of something else only when it is under the monarch, for only 
then are perverted forms of government (i.e. democracies, oligarchies and 
tyrannies), which force mankind into slavery, set right - as is clear to anyone who 
examines them all; only then do kings, aristocrats (known as the great and the 
                                                       




good) and those zealous for the freedom of the people govern justly; for since the 
monarch loves men most, as we have already noted,  he wants all men to become 
good; and this cannot happen under perverted forms of government. Hence 
Aristotle in the Politics says that in bad government the good man is a bad 
citizen, whereas in good government the good man and the good citizen are one 
and the same thing. And these just forms of government aim at freedom, i.e. that 
men should exist for their own sake. For citizens do not exist for the sake of 
consuls, nor the people for the sake of the king, but on the contrary consuls exist 
for the sake of the citizens and the king for the people; for just as a political 
community is not formed for the sake of the laws, but the laws are framed for the 
benefit of the political community, in the same way those whose lives are 
governed by the law are not there for the sake of the legislator, but rather he is 
there for their sake, as Aristotle says in those writings he left to us on this 
subject).108 
 
 For Dante there is a strong connection between the sort of regime one lives onder 
and the kinds of liberty it endows through the habit formation. Dante is not talking 
about liberty in any sense of modern liberalism’s conception of rights and freedoms 
from government intervention, or freedom to engage in self-motivated or self-interested 
behavior.  Also conspicuous here, at least in Monarchia, is his lack of concern for the 
classic Christian tropes of fallen state of nature because of original sin being an 
impediment to just government that so dominate the writings of his scholastic 
contemporaries, and of course looms in the tradition since Augustine. To be truly free is 
to live in a just society—and part of the entire argument of this thesis will be to examine 
how Dante views his own society as lacking in justice and how his response to what I call 
medieval political economy makes sense of this state of affairs.  
 
 Finally, Dante connects this philosophical and just state derived conception of 
political liberty (highest under the just monarch) and links to it the Roman theme of 
republican liberty, so as to push it in the direction of linking his own conception of 
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world-wide monarchy with divine providence and the historical example of the Roman 
empire and pax romana.109 Here Dante spends great energy showing that the Roman 
Empire was achieved not “by force of arms” (violentia) but “by right” (de iure). His 
description of right in this instance is extremely important. Interspersing a more clearly 
philosophical argument with a historical argument related to miracles and providence 
derived from scripture and Roman literature, Dante comes to argue starting in 
Monarchia 2.5 that “right” or the “law” is the common good of the people: good law 
preserves liberty and the Roman people had divine favor because it was God’s 
providential intention intention to extend this common good across the whole world.  
Returning to the exact conception of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics 5.5-6, a 
conception that we shall see later is so key for articulating an argument against the 
mixture of economic greed and political governance, that it is proportional reciprocity 
(see below: “ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportio”) that holds the 
city together—Dante claims that his conception of right is this precisely Aristotelian 
one.110  In fact, Dante recognizes that justice, properly concieved, is opposed to a merely 
arithmetical (or rectifactory) justice that seeks to balance exchanges or claims in terms 
of the restitution of money or equalization of damage and, rather, consists in a sort of 
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110 NE 5.3.1131b17-1131b23: “This, then, is what the just is—the proportional; the unjust 
is what violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too small, 
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who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good. In the case of evil the reverse is true; 
for the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser 
evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and 




proportion that recognizes a priority of the common good. Dante weaves these concepts 
together in this passage from Monarchia 2:  
 
Quicunque preterea bonum rei publice intendit, finem iuris intendit. Quodque ita 
sequatur sic ostenditur: ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem 
proportio, que servata hominum servat sotietatem, et corrupta corrumpit - nam 
illa Digestorum descriptio non dicit quod quid est iuris, sed describit illud per 
notitiam utendi illo; si ergo definitio ista bene 'quid est' et 'quare' comprehendit, 
et cuiuslibet sotietatis finis est comune sotiorum bonum, necesse est finem 
cuiusque iuris bonum comune esse; et inpossibile est ius esse, bonum comune 
non intendens. Propter quod bene Tullius in Prima rethorica: semper - inquit - ad 
utilitatem rei publice leges interpretande sunt.Quod si ad utilitatem eorum qui 
sunt sub lege leges directe non sunt, leges nomine solo sunt, re autem leges esse 
non possunt: leges enim oportet homines devincire ad invicem propter comunem 
utilitatem. Propter quod bene Seneca de lege cum in libro De quatuor virtutibus, 
"legem vinculum" dicat "humane sotietatis.” Patet igitur quod quicunque bonum 
rei publice intendit finem iuris intendit. Si ergo Romani bonum rei publice 
intenderunt, verum erit dicere finem iuris intendisse. Quod autem romanus 
populus bonum prefatum intenderit subiciendo sibi orbem terrarum, gesta sua 
declarant, in quibus, omni cupiditate summota que rei publice semper adversa 
est, et universali pace cum libertate dilecta, populus ille sanctus pius et gloriosus 
propria commoda neglexisse videtur, ut publica pro salute humani generis 
procuraret (Moreover, whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the 
achievement of right as his goal. That the one necessarily follows from the other 
can be show in this way: right is a relationship between one individual and 
another in respect of things and people; when it is respected it preserves human 
society and when it is violated it destroys it. For the description of it given in the 
Digests does not say what right is, but describes it in terms of its practical 
application. If therefore our definition correctly embraces both the essence and 
the purpose of right, and if the goal of any society is the common good of its 
members, it necessarily follows that the purpose of every right is the common 
good; and it is impossible that there can be a right which does not aim at the 
common good. Hence Cicero is correct when he says in the De inventione that 
laws are always to be interpreted for the benefit of the community. For if laws are 
not framed for the benefit of those who are subject to the law, they are laws in 
name only, but in reality they cannot be laws; for laws must bind men together 
for their mutual beneit. For this reason Seneca speaks appositely of the law when 
he says in De quattor virtutibus that “law is the bond of human society.” Thus it 
is clear that whoever has the good of the community as his goal, it will be true to 
say that the achievement of right was their goal. That the Roman people in 
conquering the world did have the good of which we have spoken as their goal is 
whown by their deeds, for, having repressed all greed (which is always harmful to 
the community) and cherishing universal peace and freedom, that holy dutiful 
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and glorious people can be seen to have disregarded personal advantage in order 
to promote the public interest for the benefit of mankind).111 
 
 
 While we can leave extended analysis of book 2 for elsewhere, we here have a 
functional understanding of Dante’s normative political commitments.  As mentioned 
before, for Dante, the emperor’s authority is limited in scope: the emperor has no 
authority over philosophical truth—that is the emperor cannot declare that wealth-
getting is the way to civic peace and thus make it so philosophically, as philosophy 
shows that it is not so. The emperor’s authority presides over matters involving human 
choice, provided that he has proper philosophical formation in moral philosophy, but 
not in actions prescribed by nature. The emperor acts only as last authority: the 
principle of subsidiarity is in effect and municipalities keep their authority provided it is 
legitimate.112  
 
*       *       * 
 
 A coda on this discussion poses the question: how does Dante see himself in 
regards to other voices writing on the topic of spirtual and temporal power and 
proffering political theories of monarchy? The answer to this is ascertained by paying 
close attention to his deployment of Aristotle—which, in ways that I cannot overstate, is 
subversive of most of the intellectual and political grain of the time. We can illustrate 
this subversion in terms of politics then where Dante starts an explicit battle against 
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theologians, scholastics, and canon lawyers: we see he is distingushing himself from 
writers in the scholastic-juridical vein, like Aquinas, Ptolemy of Lucca, and Giles of 
Rome, and certainly qualifying the secular-slanted analyses of John of Paris.  
 
This happens most acerbically in Book 3 of Monarchia, where Dante gets to the  
 
Questio igitur presens, de qua inquisition future est, inter duo luminaria 
magna versatur: romanum scilicet Pontificem et romanum Principem; et 
queriter utrum auctoritas Monarche romani, que de iure Monarcha mundi 
est, ut in secondo libro probatum est, inmediate a Deo dependeat an ab 
aliquot Dei vicario vel ministro, quem Petri successorem intelligo, qui vere 
claviger est regni celorum (the present question, therefore, which we are 
now to investigate, concerns the 'two great lights,’ that is the Roman Pope 
and the Roman Prince; and the point at issue is whether the authority of 
the Roman monarch, who is monarch of the world by right, as was proved 
in the second book, derives directly from God or else from some vicar or 
minister of God, by which I mean Peter's successor, who assuredly holds 
the keys to the kingdom of heaven…).113  
 
 
Here, Dante wields Aristotle (first principles) from the very beginning to combat 
the claim of the pope or of principalities generally (who do the same in secularized 
sacralizations of law etc.) that Christian revelation—to which the prince/pope/church 
has supposedly been granted access to as “Truth” by god and divine privileges—justifies 
various claims of authority. He also strongly rejects the Platonized notion that the king 
is a sort of living law or demigod—in its more than figural aspect—and that by divine 
election has an unquestionable right to the office and privileges of such to undertake 
mesaures without necessarily following the prescriptions of human goods as concieved 
in the Aristotelian sense (as seen above in this chapter). As Ullman shows, the papal or 
secular sovereign “emerges in the laws as the lex animata, the personified law. In a 
                                                       




word, the emperor as depicted in the Code (and the Novellae) approached the essence of 
“l'etat c'est moi.”114 Aristotle is so central here, as Kantorowicz and Kenneth Pennington 
point out in their works in detail, because this canonical legitimation of power and 
authority (indeed the entire notion of the corpus mysticum and king’s “two bodies”) 
from Frederick II to Innocent III and Boniface VIII etc. depends on this notion of the 
sovereign being a lex animata.115 The textual support for the abstract lex animata that 
enters the vast mix of heterogeneous elements of medieval political writing on soverign 
right derives – unmistakably—from the 13th century Aristoteles Latinus Nicomachean 
Ethics, book 5, in the discussion of whether justice is best understood as proportional or 
rectifactory.116 A major point to take away from Dante’s response to the divine right 
argument in book 3 of Monarchia is that Dante—in attacking the absolutist claims of the 
prince or pope as lex animata—is, in effect, attacking the official juridical superstructure 
of political economy.  As such, it also attacks the major enabling ideology that would be 
necessary to justify the idea that the emperor or pope’s authority, as opposed to Dante’s 
arguments seen above, extends into even those things which are subject to nature, not 
merely to human wills. The argument that god directly or indirectly grants absolute 
authority and power to the holder of an office leads very quickly that his actions or 
pronouncements are beyond reproach, even if false or moraly vile. For Dante this is 
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perverse and he seeks to exit this political discourse (which he sees as sophistic 
casuistry), so prominent in the genre of medieval publicist tracts, almost entirely by 
meticulously deconstructing it.117 
 
  From the start of the most pointed argument against the authoritarian claims of 
the papacy and abusive secular rulers, Dante claims Aristotle as source of truth in 
tandem with scripture, even to its expense, in battling decretalists, theologians, and 
perverse philosophers who pervert common and social goods with intellect and arbitrary 
declaration of justice. In Monarchia 3, 1 for example, he makes reference to Aristotle’s 
Ethics and critique of Platonic forms as a means of justifying any sort of causality (and 
in fact, the root of mythological conceptions of authoritarian and hierocratic political 
order as per the Republic—and echoed in the Somnium Scipionis), thus grounding the 
critique along Aristotelian principles.  
 
Echoing the Aristotelian passage,  
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we had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is 
meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the 
Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be 
thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth 
even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers; for, 
while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends. The 
men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they 
recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not 
maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers)…118 
 
Dante proceeds to reveal the truth that cannot be treated  
 
Sine rubore aliquorum emergere…fortisan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit. 
Sed quia de trono inmutabili suo Veritas deprecatur, Saloman etiam silvam 
Proverbiorum ingrediens meditandam veritatem, impium detestandum in se 
facturo nos docet, ac preceptor morum Phylosophus familiaria destruenda pro 
veritate suadet… (without putting certain people to shame, and will therefore 
perhaps be a cause of some resentment against me. But since truth from its 
unchangeable throne implores us, and Solomon too, entering the forest of 
Proverbs, teaches us by his own example to meditate on truth and loathe 
wickedness; and since our authority on morals, Aristotle, urges us to destroy 
what touches us closely for the sake of maintaining truth).119 
 
With reference to Aristotle’s first philosophy, particularly the Physics and Metaphysics, 
Dante forwards philosophical principles to articulate how revelation and reason are 
perverted by decretalists and court philosophers—hence also the reference to Aristotle’s 
Sophistical refutations: 
 
Hominibus nanque rationis intuitu voluntatem prevolantibus hoc sepe contingit: 
ut, male affecti, lumine rationis postposito, affectu quasi ceci trahantur et 
pertinaciter suam denegent cecitatem. Unde fit persepe quod non solum falsitas 
patrocinium habeat, sed - ut plerique - de suis terminis egredientes per aliena 
castra discurrant; ubi nichil intelligentes, ipsi nichil intelliguntur: et sic 
provocant quosdam ad iram, quosdam ad dedignationem, nonnullos ad risum. 
Igitur contra veritatem que queritur tria hominum genera maxime colluctantur.  
Summus nanque Pontifex, domini nostri Iesu Cristi vicarius et Petri successor, 
cui non quicquid Cristo sed quicquid Petro debemus, zelo fortasse clavium, 
necnon alii gregum cristianorum pastores, et alii quos credo zelo solo matris 
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Ecclesie promoveri, veritati quam ostensurus sum de zelo forsan - ut dixi - non de 
superbia contradicunt. Quidam vero alii, quorum obstinata cupiditas lumen 
rationis extinxit - et dum ex patre diabolo sunt, Ecclesie se filios esse dicunt - non 
solum in hac questione litigium movent, sed sacratissimi principatus vocabolum 
aborrentes superiorum questionum et huius principia inpudenter negarent. Sunt 
etiam tertii - quos decretalistas vocant - qui, theologie ac phylosophie cuiuslibet 
inscii et expertes, suis decretalibus - quas profecto venerandas existimo - tota 
intentione innixi, de illarum prevalentia - credo - sperantes, Imperio derogant 
(For it often happens that men who guide their will by the light of reason, should 
they be swayed by misguided impulses, put the light of reason behind them and 
are dragged by passion like blind men, and yet obstinately deny their own 
blindness. And so it happens very often that not only does falsehood find 
defenders, but that many stray beyond their own borders and make incursions 
into the territory of others, where, understanding nothing, they quite fail to make 
themselves understood; and thus they provoke some people to anger, others to 
disdain, and many to mirth. Now three classes of people in particular fiercely 
oppose the truth we are investigating. For the supreme Pontiff, the vicar of our 
Lord Jesus Christ and Peter's successor, to whom we owe not what is due to 
Christ but what is due to Peter, perhaps motivated by a zealous concern for the 
keys, and with him other shepherds of the Christian flock and others who I 
believe act only out of zealous concern for Mother Church: these people oppose 
the truth I am about to demonstrate - perhaps, as I said, out of zealous concern 
and not out of pride. Certain others, however, whose stubborn greed has 
extinguished the light of reason, and who, having the devil as their father, yet 
profess themselves to be sons of the church, not only stir up quarrels in relation 
to this question, but, loathing the very expression 'most sacred sovereign 
authority', would even impudently deny the first principles which underlie this 
question and those previously discussed. There is also a third category, called 
decretalists - ignorant and lacking in any philosophical or theological training - 
who argue their case exclusively with reference to their decretals (which I 
certainly think worthy of veneration); trusting in their authoritativeness, I 
believe, they disparage the empire. Nor is this a cause for astonishment).120 
 
Aristotle is central to this argument, in so far as first philosophy and logic—all of which 
inform political science and our understanding of the good from proper first principles—
are necessary to straighten out the injustice of the situation. The key thing to repeat is 
that revelation is not the primary foundation of all truth, and moreover, Dante is 
uneqivocally uninterested in anything less than the complete destruction of 
                                                       




hierocratic/theological and corporatist/juridical claims to the appropriation of secular 
and temporal power:  
 
Isti…asserentes auctoritatem Imperii ab auctoritate Ecclesie dependere velut 
artifex inferior dependet ab architect… Propter hanc et propter alias eorum 
rationes dissolvendas prenotandum quod, sicut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De 
sophisticis elenchis, solutio argumenti est erroris manifestatio. Et quia error 
potest esse in materia et in forma argumenti, dupliciter peccare contingit: aut 
scilicet assummendo falsum, aut non sillogizando; que duo Phylosophus 
obiciebat contra Parmenidem et Melissum dicens: "Quia falsa recipiunt et non 
sillogizantes sunt"(those people who assert that the authority of the empire is 
dependent on the authority of the church in the same way as a builder is 
dependent on the architect [(Metaphysics 1, 1)]…In order to refute this and other 
arguments of theirs, it must first be borne in mind that, as Aristotle states in the 
Sophistical Refutations [(18, 176b 29)] to refute an argument is to expose an 
error. And since an error may occur in the content and in the form of an 
argument, there are two ways in which an argument can be flawed: either 
because a false premiss has been adopted, or because the logic is faulty; both of 
these charges were made against Parmenides and Melissus by Aristotle when he 
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3. Critical Reception  
 
 
 In this background, a preponderance of the criticism has looked at the relationship 
between Dante and the particular events in the church/state conflicts (as discussed 
above) and intertwined this with Dante’s putative intellectual relationship with any 
number of philosophical and theological writers.122 A defining feature of this critical 
reception has been to attempt to claim that Dante is eclectic and inconsistent, to link 
him firmly within the intellectual milieu of the medieval political and juridical theorists, 
or to ignore the uniqueness of Dante as a political thinker all together—an argument 
often linked to the claim that Dante was actually an increbile poet but only a poor 
political thinker. Another abiding feature of criticism has been to identify the potential 
dates of the composition of book 4 of Convivio and the Monarchia and attempt to graft 
such potential composition dates on determined political events as a way of establishing 
a hermeneutical framework. Such frameworks, based on theoretical dating schemes 
unattested to by hard evidence, elevate or obviate particular readings and interpretive 
strategies regarding the text that often, for the most part, ignore the cohesive nature of 
Dante’s argumentation and vision for Monarchy, especially within the entire complex 
context of his life as a politician, the social, economic, and political history of Florence, 
and other historical facts that clearly contributed to Dante’s work.123  We will briefly 
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examine the latter set of topics first and then the former in light of the criticism and the 
now accepted dating of the Monarchia to 1317, then discuss the inadequacies and 




 Let’s start with the first topic. There is one formulation universally agreed upon—
perhaps because its tautology is so easy (though this is often a claim made by those who 
have not really approached Dante with a proper methodology)—namely, that Dante is 
rather difficult for the modern reader to understand.  Mazzoni says that to the modern 
reader the Monarchia appears full of “apparenti aporie.”124  The conflicting voices 
within Dante’s political opus are part of an  
 
inesauribile problematica: inesauribile proprio per l’interiore carica dialettica che 
l’ormai sicuramente accertato «eclettismo» di Dante filosofo (che trova piena 
rispondenza, del resto—dopo la rinuncia al volgare «illustre» attuato nel 
Convivio, nelle Canzoni allegoriche e filosofiche nonché teorizzato nel De vulgari 
eloquentia—nell’ostentato plurilinguismo del Poema maggiore) porta 
forzatamente con sé, imponendo un vero e proprio tour de force ai moderni 
interpreti: i quali, anche inconsapevolmente, tendono a mettere in rilievo, «iuxta 
propria principia», in sede di esegesi globale e puntuale, una o l’altra delle varie 
sfaccettature di quel prisma, sottolineando i dati che più rispondano all’idea 
archetipa ch’essi volglion riconoscere e ritrovare mentre vengono disegnando 
storicamente il ritratto di Dante teorico della politica.125  
 
 A problem in this regard has been thus that any discussion of Dante’s politics or 
political philosophy, as Ceasare Vasoli puts it, must inevitably deal with the already long 
and drawn-out “querelle” regarding the nature, origins, and tendencies of Dante’s 
                                                       
124 Mazzoni, "Teoresi e prassi in Dante politico", ix. 
 




philosophy.126 Vasoli is right to point out that in this discussion critics have often 
attempted to claim Dante as a partisan of various ideologies and failed to subject his 
thought within its whole context in an historically rigourous manner: 
 
sono spesso intervenuti elementi estranei ad una seria e rigorosa verifica storica, 
come, ad esempio, la preoccupazione di porre l’intera vicenda poetica 
dell’Alighieri sotto il segno di ideologie ben determinate, il proposito di 
conservare, anche in un tale caso, un’immagine della cultura medievale del tutto 
artificiosa o l’intenzione di connettere e, magari, ridurre entro termini 
squisitamente contemporanei concezioni e idee che sono state invece il frutto di 
un lungo e difficile travaglio intellettuale.127 
 
 For the most part, seeking a comprehensive and complete picture of Dante’s 
political work and philosophical conceptions through a holistic and rigorous reading of 
the text and history—on Dante’s own terms— has not been the dominant focus of Dante 
criticism. Many have continued in the tradition of insisting that Dante is a follower of 
Aquinas and have applied many aspects of scholastic thought to Dante so as to insist 
that the scholastic value system—which can be argued to exist through a certain mode of 
reading in the Comedy’s depiction of the afterlife—ought to be the intellectual paradigm 
for reading Dante’s on almost everything.128 Even Dante’s Aristotle is really a St. 
Thomas version of Aristotle.129   
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 We have already discussed the penchant to insist that we see Dante in the 
Monarchia as an epigone or authority appropriator of scholastic theologians and 
philosophers and attempted to dismiss this as an unscientific claim.130 Yet this is the 
predominant theme—combined with the tendencies to see in Dante so many aporie 
articulated by Mazzoni and Vasoli above—of Albert Ascoli’s recent work on Dante’s 
Monarchia, which attempts to read the treatise (with Convivio), “in terms of elaborate 
rhetorical strategies by which Dante both defines and delimits the authority of others 
and stakes his own claim to undertake such a definitional enterprise authoritatively.”131 
For Ascoli, Dante’s Monarchia, in comparison with his other works, represents Dante’s 
“dramatic entrance…into the world of high medieval culture and politics” and is a 
“window onto Dante’s self-construction as a specifically Latin auctor.”132 The treatise in 
this view is “a Latin tractatus in the scholastic mode concerned with a central late-
medieval question of political theory” that yet lacks a “prima facie claim to historical 
importance in the emergence of a prestigious modern authorship…[and]..is not, 
stylistically, on the cutting edge.”133 For Ascoli, in this treatise Dante is mostly 
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concerned with “mirroring” high medieval “dominant philosophical-theological 
discourses of the day,” and he takes the fact that Dante’s Monarchy and Convivio are 
devoid of specific historical referents (to specific popes and emperors) to indicate that 
Dante’s positions rather “seem to be grounded in a universal truth that transcends 
individual time, place, and person.”134 Ascoli’s interpretation is that Dante’s 
predominant concern with institutional and political authority in Monarchia and 
Convivio traces his overall concern with establishing his personal philosophical-poetic 
auctoritas in relation to previous auctores. The problematic of temporal and spiritual 
authority—which features strongly in Monarchia 3— in Ascoli’s view is part of “the 
issues and problems that surround the culture of authority in the Middle Ages.” This 
leads Ascoli to see Dante’s insistence that the Monarch is most uniquely capable, with 
the philosophical authority of Aristotle to be free of greed and instill universal justice 
over disputes, as idealistic except when seen as part of his rationalistic appropriation of 
authority: 
 
Dante seems to assume that “monarchy” is an office capable in and of itself of 
transforming the “will to power” into a “will to judgment” in the secular world. In 
so doing, he presumes that the person occupying that office, alone of human 
kind, will be free of the effects of the Fall of humanity, i.e., without a will tainted 
and weakened by sin, even though he will later make it clear that the universal 
effects of the Fall make imperial justice necessary in the first place (3.4.14–15). 
Dante’s apparent ability to make such an assertion without falling immediately 
into contradiction likely depends upon the purely rational terms in which book 1 
operates, a point stressed by the twice-repeated citation of Aristotle as auctoritas 
in support of his claim, rather than any of the possible scriptural, patristic, or 
scholastic theorists of human desire. These rational terms are at once human 
(human nature has just been defined in terms of a collective “possible intellect”) 
and ahistorical (apparently valid in any time and every place), and they permit a 
temporary amnesia concerning the fundamental gap between divine perfection 
and the corrupted temporality of a post-Edenic world. But when, in book 2, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
134 Ibid., 234-238. 
 
 61 
figure of the Empire is tested against the realities of history (the usurping 
violence it apparently used to gain sway over the world [2.1]) and the failings of 
individual Emperors (e.g., Constantine’s abdication of his imperial office and 
division of the Empire [2.11.8; cf. 3.10; see n 47]), the flaws of the argument 
become potentially visible. They become even more evident in book 2, and 
especially in book 3, as the Empire is confronted with the competing claims of the 
City of God on earth, that is, the Church Militant, to hold dominion over the City 
of Man. And they are still further exposed by the re-introduction of theologically 
grounded articles of faith – including the universal fallenness of human nature, 
the inability of men to establish true internal and external justice without the 
gratuitous intervention of divine grace, and the supreme authority of God to 
which all human authorities are secondary. By book 3, then, the claims of book 1 
can only be maintained by submitting them to radical modifications.135 
 
 Ascoli’s hermenutic strategy too strongly accepts Dante’s concern with authority 
and thus reads Dante’s actual articulation of his proposed Aristotelian-based 
monarchical resolution of the very real historical problems of greed through an entirely 
different lens, namely that of theology, only to insist that in fact the worldly and other-
worldly aspirations of Dante are irreconcilable if not for the latter’s enduring interest in 
authority.  Instead of historicizing the context and reasons for which Dante would 
ignore naming specific figures like Frederick II in Monarchia as compared to other texts 
like Convivio, the absence of whom is alledgedly an inherent contradiction because of 
Frederick the emperor’s immoral policies (for this he is a bad example), Ascoli’s reading 
strategy tends towards an allegorical model where Dante’s political ideas are easier to 
resolve the more difficult and possibly contradictory they appear. Ascoli says that the 
exclusion of Frederick and Boniface etc. are linked to the text’s telos: the 
“transformation of the historical scene,”136 despite the fact that historically speaking 
Dante did exclude Frederick from the Monarchia, and Dante’s references to Frederick in 
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Convivio as the one who linked imperial authority to wealth (see chapter 5), when 
historicized outside the context of anxiety of influence and the medieval culture of 
authority, can produce other readings in which Frederick’s absence is not meaningful 
for interpreting the Monarchia. In the end, Ascoli’s reading insists that the Commedia 
presents the proper means to interpret the historical materials that the text demands we 
take seriously: “Monarchia’s inability to absorb and interpret the materials of history, 
including Frederick, might be remedied by the transhistorical, “figural” framework 
offered by the poema sacro, which also allows Dante openly to assume the prophetic 
role that he can only hint at for himself in Monarchia.”137  While Ascoli’s discursive 
reading of Dante’s relationship to authority certainly has other merits, this reading of 
Monarchia seems to reflect the tendency, that Teodolinda Barolini has pointed out so 
eloquently, to “theologize” our readings of Dante on account of the “hermeneutic 
guidelines that Dante has structured into his poem, hermeneutic guidelines that result 
in theologized readings whose outcomes have been overdetermined by the author.”138  
We might agree that a figural, transhistorical, and even a reading based on authority 
might be meritorious, but insist too that we ought to be careful of overdetermining a 
broader historical-material context outside of the frame of reference that the discourse 
of authority provides.  
 
 Thus, a key aspect of this problem of the pitfall of narrative overdetermination of 
the Comedy is that it results in displacing any historical concreteness that can moor an 
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interpretation of the text often taken within abstracted theological hermeneutic which 
is, on the contrary, rooted in a religious dualism of “worldly” and “otherworldly.” By the 
same token, Dante’s statements are viewed as the resonance of an idealized Christian 
hope, not as a worldly statement reflecting something imperative about history or the 
historical imperative immanent in making political statements of the strongly normative 
sort that Dante did, in fact, make. Auerbach reflects the former in his remarks about 
Dante’s response to the politics of his time. For Auerbach, even though Dante was 
actively involved in the politics of his day, the force of his thought lies in “static and 
transcendent elements in political and historical thinking”: 
 
For him the concepts of “history” and “development” would have had no validity 
in themselves; he asked for a sign by which to interpret events and he found only 
chaos; on every hand individuals advanced illegitimate aspirations and the result 
was confusion and disaster. For him the measure of history was not history, but a 
divine and perfect order of the world: a static, transcendent principle, to be sure, 
but this does not mean that it was abstract and dead.139 
 
 Auerbach’s move then is to neuter any reading of the Monarchia that accepts 
Dante’s own claims that worldly perfection is the purpose of a just monarchical state, 
that the arc of history is changeable through political action, and that Dante’s political 
writing is a reflection of real political and material situations and events—and concrete 
aspirations—rather than a meditation on metaphysical and theological writings of 
scholastic writers.  It is hard to see how this interpretive move leaves any space for 
something that is not a typical, dead, abstract forma mentis reading.  
 
                                                       




 Amazingly this interpretive move tends to turn up everywhere and shows why a 
historicizing reading of Dante’s work generally, and of his political works particularly, is 
difficult with the overdetermined Dante hermeneutic. The reason for its pervasiveness 
as problem, as Barolini has pointed out, is that the hermeneutic leads to real historical 
meaning being theologically allegorized, going plainly against Dante’s insistence in 
Convivio that the historical sense is the literal sense and, furthermore, is the actual 
meaning of what he means to say. 140  
 
 For Giuseppe Mazzotta, Dante’s history is completely caught up in this inversion, 
in which Dante’s acknowledgment of the operation of Christian notions of divine 
providence in history somehow equates to all of history being the object of divine 
redemption. For Mazzotta, seeing what he calls “Dante’s theological structure of history” 
also involves reading (with a method best known to patristic theologians like Augustine 
and Irenaeus)— both Dante’s actual historical situation and apparently history from 
Mazzotta’s historiographical standpoint—as an allegory and figura of history devoid of 
any capability of having a historical methodology applied to it: “Dante figures the 
necessary unity between historical process and prophecy: the end of the historical 
process can be none other than the imposition of redemption upon history….History, as 
the allegory of renewal, makes a fresh start by going back to the past, and, through a 
theology of hope, opens up to the belief that the new will arrive.”141  It is no surprise then 
that for Mazzotta, notwithstanding Dante’s entire concern with the “historical city and 
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his belief that he, as a poet, occupies a singular and creative role in the shaping of that 
order,” Dante’s voice somehow “arises in a condition of exile from the city of life.”142  
Putting aside the fact that this is an absurd and nonsensical statement—i.e. what does 
Mazzotta mean that Dante, the writer of Monarchia, was writing from a city outside of 
this life?—it is clear that Mazzotta’s entire way of reading Dante is anti-historical, and 
other-worldly. Everything Dante writes is a rhetorical deployment of scholastic and 
patristic tropes, and in short, everything potentially real about Dante’s vision of political 
order is mythological and metaphorical: 
 
when scholars have had to deal with Dante’s myth of poltical order, their 
attention conventionally has focused on Monarchia either to ascertain and 
debate the philosophical assumptions that sustain its political theory or to 
establish the possible discrepancies, or coherence, between that tract and the 
political theology, which, in the oblique forms of poetic language, figures 
prominently in the Divine Comedy. One can hardly account for the reluctance of 
critics to handle this question in more than literal and purely ideological terms 
since the study of the overt thematic strains of the poem inevitably leaves out of 
the picture the importance of the interdependence of the metaphors of order and 
exile.143 
 
 For Mazzotta the problem, in other words, is not merely letting the Comedy serve 
to further an overdetermined reading of Dante’s politics into abstraction (the earthly 
and historical and real into the heavenly and “other worldly”), but rather, that it is not 
made sufficiently abstract enough. Order and Exile must be metaphors of some ideal, as 
if Platonic form (despite Dante’s utter denunciation of Platonism in the Monarchia), but 
only somewhat historically relevant, order and exile in Dante’s real life. 144  A further 
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problem indebted to this way of reading Dante has been, as Mazzotta does here, 
basically to exclude the Convivio and Monarchia from serious consideration as major 
works of Dante if not subservient to the Comedy. Anna Maria Chiavacci-Leonardi has 
written, exemplifying this belief and their interpretive dependency on the Comedy, that 
“le opere di Dante cosiddette minori, cioè scritte prima o fuori della Commedia, non 
sono sufficienti a se stesse; non si spiegano cioè nel loro stesso ambito, non si bastano, 
se non in via del tutto provvisoria” and Dante is “uomo di una sola opera.”145  
 
 Another Dante critic, Richard Kay—sharing the biases of Chiavacci-Leonardi—
makes it clear that we value the Monarchia in terms of Dante the poet, the author of the 
Commedia, not as the author of Monarchia. For Kay, “the natural temptation is to 
assume that the Monarchia is as great a work of its kind as the Commedia, but that 
would be to overrate it.”146 Not only does Kay make value judgements about how we 
should determine our reading of the Monarchia, but claims, with the authority of Gilson 
(that Dante was “neither a philosopher nor a theologian”), and that in relation to 
intellectuals of the time, such as “Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, Ockham, and even 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
problemi metafisici intorno ai quali la niente del poeta-filosofo s'era smarrita, e la cui 
soluzione richiedeva chiarezza e precisione di concetti, il velo dell'allegoria era ormai 
divenuto ingombrante. Dante filosofo conosceva troppo bene Aristotele, per ignorare il 
luogo degli Analitici Posteriori, ove si vieta di far uso delle metafore là dove s'hanno da 
definire concetti o s'ha da procedere a dimostrazioni rigorose. E senza dubbio egli 
sapeva altresì del rimprovero che Aristotele fa a Platone, nella Metafisica, che 
l'affermare che l'idee sono gli esemplari delle cose, le quali di essi partecipano, è 
vaniloquio, introducendosi nel linguaggio filosofico metafore.” 
 
145 Chiavacci-Leonardi, "La «Monarchia» di Dante alla luce della «Commedia»", 147-
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Marsiglio of Padua…Dante was a figure of less awesome dimensions,”147 despite the fact 
that Masiglio of Padua’s political work was only published after Dante’s death and value 
comparisons with other figures like Scotus and Ockham are unnecessary. This sort of 
puzzling standpoint is also reflected in Kay’s quick decision that, although Dante did 
know Aristotle very well, his “heavy-handed use” of Aristotelian logic was mostly done 
for “rhetorical effect.”148  
 
In much of the discussion on Dante’s thought, whether simplistically characterized 
either as an ultimate expression of a philosopher or theologian, or read through the 
hermeneutical lens of the Comedy, too much emphasis has been placed on phases of 
thought too.149  Solari had already in 1923 argued against an interpretive move that was 
overly dependent on tying the reading of certain works to certain phases or events, 
notion arguing for more synthetic approach: “la distinzione in fasi chiuse, successive, è 
gia per se stessa distinzione arbitraria, inadeguata a una personalità divinamente 
creatrice come quella di Dante. Il cui pensiero politico più che per fasi cronologicamente 
distinte si svolge … da una sintesi iniziale, i cui elementi hanno sviluppo e accentuazione 
diversa nelle singole opere, finché nella Monarchia si rivelano completamente spiegati e 
tradotti in forma logica e scientifica.”150 Carletti, a modern critic, rightly comments in 
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this regard, against the grain of most of the critical tradition, that “riferimenti e concetti 
politici sono presenti nel Convivio come nella Commedia, nelle Epistole come nella 
Monarchia. Talvolta prendono le mosse da fatti e personaggi reali, talaltra presentano 
un contenuto più teorico, ma la riflessione non è mai fine a se stessa, mai avulsa dal 
contesto storico, ma sempre in funzione di un utile presente per il genere umano, di una 
efettiva, concreta, applicabilità dei suoi principi in vista di una migliore convivenza 
civile.”151  
 
Ultimately, in this study I accept Nardi’s well known assertion that Dante was a 
coherent thinker whose ethical and political committments evolve but are present and 
mostly consistent in his texts from his lyric productions through the Convivio, 
Commedia, and Monarchia. For Nardi, these works are 
 
indissolubilmente legato tra loro, in quanto il fervore di quel pensiero alimenta 
l’ardente sentimento che si placa in quella poesia. Nello sviluppo di questo 
pensiero e di questa arte m’è parso che importanza fondamentale avesse la 
Monarchia, come l’opera cui Dante affidò la commozione del suo animo, quando 
si fu persuaso qual fosse per lui, il solo modo di far cessare lo scandaloso conflitto 
fra l’Impero e la Chiesa, e di ricondurre nel mondo la pace. Da quella scoperta 
prorompe, a mio parere, la luminosa altissima poesia della Commedia.152 
 
And, in disabusing ourselves of the scholasitcizing hermeneutics still so entrenched 
in Dante studies, it is helpful to remember Nardi’s, still relevant, admonishment: 
 
Ma dovunque Dante abbia fatto i suoi studi filosofici, è certo che la sua cultura 
filosofica, pur essendo aristotelica nella sostanza. è eclettica nell'interpretazione 
d'Aristotele. Un tempo si parlava del tomismo di Dante. Ma a guardar bene, la 
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leggenda del tomismo di Dante s'è formata quando troppo poco si conosceva la 
filosofia del suo tempo, sì che dire tomismo voleva dire filosofia scolastica. A 
questo si deve aggiungere il proposito apologetico o diciamo pure 
propagandistico, da parte dei neotomisti, ai quali, più che l'esatta intelligenza del 
pensiero dantesco da un punto di vista critico, premeva di richiamare i filosofi 
moderni, attraverso lo studio di Dante, allo studio di S. Tommaso.153 
 
 In terms of allegorizing and theologizing all things Dante, Nardi’s remark is astute, 
recalling, as we have seen above, that Dante is deeply concerned with justice on planet 
earth. If Dante artistically depicts the beatific vision and the Paradiso remains as much 
a deep artistic representation of metaphysical and theological mysteries154 as it does a 
narrative space inhabited by real historical persons and describing real events, at the 
end of the day Nardi helps us on the road to a historically situated Dante by reminding 
us to forget the 0ver-scholastification of Dante in so far as that it is impossible to read 
Dante at face value and believe that his commitments are scholastic. If the fundamental 
idea of the Contra Gentiles is that philosophy cannot satisfy the natural desire for 
knowlege, as Aristotle would have it—but only the beatific vision, Dante believes that 
human desire is limited to the science that is attainable, and that “la filosofia può 
soddisfarlo appieno e darci la beatitudine.”155 For Nardi, none of the philosophy or 
learning that Dante exalts in his works is done for its own sake, or for mere rhetorical 
effect, but in fact is genuinely intended “per illuminare situazioni della vita morale e 
sociale, non solo di Firenze, ma di tutta l’Italia. I concetti filosofici sono pensati da 
Dante in rapporto a queste situazioni, con l’intento dichiarato di dissipare la falsa 
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opinione sulla nobiltà, poiché questa falsa opinione a suo parere, come abbiamo visto, 
era cagione di ‘pessima confusione del mondo.’”156  
 
 However, even if we take Nardi as an incitement to historicism, even in 
historicizing studies of Dante there has still been a tendency to blunt the force of Dante’s 
political claims and displace them to the otherworldly. This is evident in the work of 
Joan Ferrante, who is correct to see that “the dominant political-social realities of 
Dante’s world, northern Italy in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, are the 
independent city-state, the claims of empire, the church, and commerce.”157  The 
Political Vision of the Comedy attempts to historicize Dante’s political “vision” but does 
so only partially. Though Ferrante argues that these historical factors are essential for 
understanding the political vision of the Comedy, she still conceives of the ultimate aims 
of his political vision in his entire oeuvre as essentially interwoven with the narrative 
presentation, fictions, and structure of the Comedy, and not the other way around: 
 
Dante’s position on the relation of individual states, cities, kingdoms to the 
empire and on the distinct separation of functions of the spiritual and temporal 
powers is fundamental to an understanding of his political vision in the Comedy, 
as they are the basic issues of the Monarchy. Once they have been established, I 
can show how Dante sees the individual’s relation to and responsibility for society 
though the three models presented in the three cantiche: the corrupt society 
based on greed and selfishness without order or justice (Hell), the transitional 
society of men working together to rid themselves of disruptive elements and to 
achieve a common goal (Purgatory), and the ideal society, based on love, wisdom, 
and justice, in which all share in the joy and harmony, presided over by the 
supreme Emperor, God (Paradise).158   
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 In other words, though a historicizing framework, the narrative of the Comedy as 
an otherworldly journey still functions as the predominant hermeneutical frame. This is 
shown in the way that Ferrante, while recognizing that “Dante’s views on commerce and 
language underlie his whole political presentation in the Comedy” and that the 
realization that “greed and selfishness are destructive to the public good and to the 
individual soul whereas love, concern for the needs of others, and a sense of social 
responsibility bring personal rewards and strengthen society,” nonetheless insists that 
for Dante it is only “in that ideal society, which in the Comedy is portrayed in Paradise, 
that the proper atmosphere for such realization is achieved.”159  As seen above, Ferrante 
at the end of accounts, seems to equivocate the idea of Dante’s emperor with an 
allegorizing notion of the “supreme Emperor” in Paradise, displacing the potential fruits 
of a historicized approach in regards to Dante’s political thought back to the 
otherworldly, and in effect, accepting the typical procedure of theologizing and 
allegorizing readings. In other words, Ferrante is helpful for putting so much of an 
emphasis on the intersections of city state, imperial, church politics and the role of 
commerce in Dante’s time, however, her grafting of the narrative structure of the 
Comedy onto the supposed aims of Dante’s political thought overdetermines her 
examination of how Dante actually responds to and addresses the very worldly aims of 
identifying unjust polities, fixing them, defining justice, and conceiving of a monarchy 
that can ensure the end of greed. Ferrante’s erudite work is limited by this 
hermeneutical frame that invites us, furthermore, to dive directly into the issues from 
outside the confines of the Divine Comedy and within the Augustinian framework of the 
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two cities. The Augustinian model itself will always lead to an overdetermined 
hermeneutics of any political theory especially if its premises are accepted. Ferrante 
accepts them, despite the fact that in Dante’s most developed political thought in 
Convivio and Monarchia this is completely unwarranted.160 She writes that “the 
heavenly rather than the earthly city…is the positive model against which the other must 
finally be seen.”161 
 
Charles Till Davis is another scholar for whom a more historicizing approach has 
been only partially successful. For Davis, Italy during Dante’s life “denoted a peninsula 
united by language and history but not by any central government. Italy remained, in 
fact, after the failure of Frederick II’s attempt to conquer her, in her habitual state of 
political chaos.”162 But he also acknowledges that economy played a central role: 
“despite this political disorder, Italy continued to be the economic powerhouse of 
Europe, the great source of her capital and the most important center of her 
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manufacturing and trade. Dante’s own city, Florence, was in the forefront of Italian 
economic activity, and her position was viewed by many contemporaries with wonder 
and admiration.”163 Davis sees greed as linked to the church reform movement and 
acknowledges that Dante seeks an emperor to squash all cupidity of rulers and popes, 
but his analysis stops there.164 Davis, in discussing Dante’s “vision of history”—the word 
“vision” is really revealing—fails to historicize or make any meaningful connection 
between Dante’s careful and intricate political theory and the actual conditions of greed 
in the Italy of his day, and defaults to the typical discourse of otherworldliness. It is 
precisely that, a “vision,” not a reality, and Davis leaves behind almost everything 
interesting one could say about the topic as theology washes away the need to be 
concerned with history, which itself becomes a merely symbol and figure of Dante’s 
subjectivity:  
Rome would again be the guardian of earthly peace and justice and the symbol of 
salvation, the temporal point at which man's earthly and heavenly beatitudes 
could intersect. Dante's vision of history was largely a vision of Rome. As Reade 
says, it was not a philosophy of history, and despite Dante's devotion to Aristotle, 
the poet showed, at least in this field, very little concern with secondary causes. 
His historical theology depended much more on myths of the past and dreams of 
the future than on a close reading of contemporary trends. He could personify 
avaricious Florence and aggressive France and their accomplices on the papal 
throne as precursors and embodiments of Antichrist. The savior or Veltro for 
whom he waited was an eschatological figure. This figure was the heir of the 
heroes of pagan Rome who made "the good world" but he was also charged with 
leading men forward toward the Rome of Paradise, the Rome of which Dante, 
Beatrice, and Christ would all be citizens together.165 
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Indeed, later, Davis writes that Dante’s “vision of the reformation of this…[world]…is 
conveyed by prophecies. These are genuine predictions, unlike the rhetorical ones 
written after the fact the one finds so often in the Commedia, and they are naturally 
often enigmatic and hard to interpret. Dante’s prophetic mirror is darker than his poetic 
one. Yet these prophecies form an important element of the poem, and up to a point 
they are clear enough. They are all directed against cupidinous lust for wealth and 
power. They assert that poverty prevents and cures cupidity, and that a total rejection of 
temporal jurisdiction by clerics is a prerequisite for ecclesiastical reform. But such 
reform is possible, according to the poet, only if it is accompanied by political, and 
apparently imperial, peace and renewal. In the Commedia Dante therefore links Francis 
and Augustus…”166  Dante’s solution, for Davis, surely seems true, but lacks analytical 
specificity:  
 
a revitalized empire and a re-pauperized church. Dante’s eschatology rests on 
twin premises: total authority for the empire and total poverty for the church. At 
first glance their juxtaposition seems incongruous, but they are really 
complementary, for only in this way can competition between church and empire 
be ended and each resorted to its proper function. As we shall see, Francis the 
mendicant and Henry VII the Roman emperor…serve as the models for Dante’s 
Conception.167  
 
While Davis’ analysis is technically correct, it is too content in seeing Dante’s 
pronouncements against greed and normative statements about politics as still mostly 
abstracted and schematically coherent within the typical Dante hermeneutic. 
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Specifically, it lacks compelling reasons, outside of a typical forma mentis discourse, 
why this is actually the paradigm that really defines Dante’s vision of empire. 
  
 It is important to mention that controversies regarding the dating of the 
Monarchia and Convivio have also played a significant role in the critical reception of 
Dante’s work. Much conjectural interpretation in the field ultimately hinges upon the 
dating of one text to another.168 Indeed as Kay points out 
 
Dante scholars have…expended a great deal of effort to determine the precise 
date of each of his works. Far from being mere pedantry, this attention to 
chronology is essential for an understanding of how the works are interrelated, 
which in turn enables us to trace the development of Dante’s thought from work 
to work. Moreover, precise dating places each work in a context of historical 
events, which often illuminate the author’s motivation and intention. Finally, 
firm dates permit us to trace the relationship between similar contemporary 
works. For instance, because of Marsilio of Padua’s Defensor pacis is explicitly 
dated 24 June 1324 by its colophon, it cannot have influenced Dante, who died in 
1321. To be sure, each work can be read in a historical vacuum, as some 
philosophers and literary critics are inclined to do, and while it is certainly a 
prudent practice to attempt to understand a work in isolation, still the result is 
also part of a larger picture. Accordingly, in order to appreciate the Monarchia 
fully, one must first determine its date.169 
 
 It is not the intention of this study to insist on the validity of these controversies 
other than in a qualified manner. Regarding the dating of the treatise, here is the rough 
outline.170 We have no mention of the treatise attested to during Dante’s lifetime. 
Besides mentions in epitaphs written by Bernardo Scannabecchi and Giovanni del 
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Virgilio—which suggest that the work was already known after Dante’s death—one of the 
first mentions of the text is by Guido Vernani who, in his De reprobatione Monarchie 
composite a Dante from circa 1329, denigrated Dante entirely, and was the portavoce 
for the attack on Dante mounted by papal operatives.171 This squares with what we learn 
from Boccaccio, who in the Vita di Dante claims that Monarchia was coopted by 
supporters of Louis IV of Bavaria and then condemned by the Dominican. Vernani, in 
addition to declaring it heretical, also wanted to burn all copies of the book and even 
mused about having Dante’s remains exhumed to be burned along with copies of the 
book.172  
 
 As Kay notes, because of such “imprecision, dates ranging throughout the second 
half of Dante’s lifetime have been proposed.”173 Some had hypothesized that the work 
might have been composed as early as 1298 or 1301-1302, before the promulgation of 
Boniface VIII’s bull Unam Sanctam. But following Nardi’s convincing demonstration 
that the Monarchia must have followed the writing of Convivio, which is agreed to have 
been composed between 1304-1307 and which logically follows the progression of ideas 
developed in the latter work, any assertion of a date before this time is thus an 
untenable position.174 Nardi’s position, besides depending on evidence regarding the 
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composition of Convivio, relies heavily on the evidence suggested by the authority of 
Boccaccio, that the treatise was composed “nella venuta d’Arrigo VII imperadore.”175 In 
sum, Nardi conjectures that the Monarchia may have overlapped with the composition 
of the last book of Convivio, but that in any case, the third book surely was a response to 
Henry VII’s decent into Italy, a position in which he is in agreement with Maccarrone.176  
 
 However, Kay notes that this position is itself highly problematic as it involves a 
further spread of dates: Henry VII was elected in November 1308, was involved in 
negotiations with the pope through 1309, arrived in Italy in 1310 and remained there 
until his death in 1313.177 Many commentators, both within Dante studies and in the 
history of medieval political thought, undoubtedly linking the Monarchia to the content 
of the political letters (Epist. 5; Epist. 6; Epist. 7) and the actual physical imperial force 
of Henry that challenged the Guelf regimes of northern Italy, have tended to place the 
treatise within the 1310-1313 range.178 While Solari, Ercole, and a number of German 
scholars of the early 20th century have upheld yet another year range, placing the 
treatise between 1314-1321, during the reign of Louis IV of Bavaria, the controversy was 
definitively settled after the philological results of the Ricci edition of the Monarchia of 
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1965.179 Ricci’s discovery that Dante’s reference to Paradiso 5 in Monarchia 1.12.6 was 
attested to in all of his 18 manuscripts gives more philological certainty to the dating of 
the Monarchia in the years concurrent with or indeed even after the composition of 
Paradiso.When coupled with the historical data we have that Dante resided with Can 
Grande della Scala at Verona in the period of 1316-1319, and that the latter needed to 
“prove that the papacy had no jurisdiction over the Empire when the imperial throne 
was vacant” the date of approximately 1317 for Ricci has stuck. While this caused some 
dissension amongst scholars who were deeply committed to other datings, and this has 
been amply discussed elsewhere, nonetheless we must agree with Francesco Mazzoni 
who viewed this as definitive.180 
 
 If this is true, I want to emphasize in this study that both Henry’s expedition is and 
the events happening concurrently with his stay with Can Grande are fresh in Dante’s 
mind, but that we must really reject the notion that Dante is only reacting to things at 
the time he supposedly wrote them. All of the following things preceded or are 
concurrent with the 1317 date:181 the death of Henry VII (1313), the 1314 election to the 
throne of Louis IV of Bavaria and Frederick of Austria, without the ratification of either 
by the Avignon pope Clement V.  Then the election of John XXII in 1316, the second 
Avignon pope, who wholly aimed to consolidate the hierocratic vision and policies of his 
predecessors going back to Boniface VIII, who then declared the imperial throne vacant, 
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and appointed Robert of Anjou the imperial vicar for Italy and deposed the imperial 
vicars nominated by Henry VII. Under his aegis power will pass decisively to Matteo 
Visconti who submits to papal prerogatives, but will be rejected by both by Passerino 
Bonacolsi of Mantua and Can Grande della Scala—who both adhere to one of the 
Monarchia’s (3) main arguments, namely that their power derives directly from god and 
has no need of papal confirmation. My contention, sharing with Nardi in the first essay 
from dal Convivio alla Commedia, is that Dante is extremely coherent and his whole 
political thought is reacting to the sum of his life thought and political/moral beliefs. In 
this thesis I show this to be a reaction to political economy.  Dante is reacting to a whole 
society over time in development in multilayered complexity from before the time he 
was born, and which will have relevance well after his death, though the fortune of 
Dante’s political work after his death falls outside the purview of this investigation.182 In 
other words, a truly historicizing approach sees everything occurring throughout 
Dante’s life—all the history—as something that potentially contributes to Dante’s 
political thought from imperial/church spats, to the problematic early capitalism that 
gave rise to and fueled these contests for power.  
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 I thus agree with Vittorio Russo, who proposed a different sort of reading some 
years ago, one that Nardi’s reading of the synthetic sensitivity and understanding of 
Dante’s doctrine of the imperio enables for us, but has yet to be truly attempted. Russo 
points out that the attempts to link Dante to any specific political event, to Guelfism or 
Ghibellinism, or by and by, within some sort of partisan reaction are misplaced. All the 
historical events and political occurrences make up the 
 
temperie rovente di avvenimenti storici e di scontro ideologico che si colloca a 
pieno diritto la Monarchia, come intervento politico e “risposta” intellettuale. E il 
suo destino travagliato, certo così diverso da ogni altro coevo esemplare della 
trattatistica politica, ne rivela da una parte lo spessore teorico che l’attraversa e 
che giustifica, al di là del topos retorico, il vanto inziale di voler mostrare verità 
intemptatas ab aliis, di voler affrontare il problema della monarchia universale 
in forma ab omnibus intemptata; d’altra parte ne riscatta la volontà progetturale 
e operativa, che Dante ascriveva alla sua opera (materia presens non ad 
speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur), giacché il politico fa 
parte di quelle inquisitiones, che essendo in nostro potere attuare, non solum 
speculari, sed etiam operari possumus…183 
 
For Russo, and I agree entirely, we must take Dante’s interest in praxis seriously, within 
the whole picture of social history of his time. As Russo continues, with a perspective 
that is valid for all of Dante’s political work: 
 
Solo a questo patto una rilettura della Monarchia di Dante riuscirà a dare 
risultati più articolati e più fruttosi; al patto cioè di riconoscervi un tentativo 
complesso di risposta teorico-politica a domande storiche ben precise, tentativo e 
domande esattamente collocabili e riconoscibili nella più vasta dinamica sociale 
del tempo, e non l’esito sterile della reazione isolata e dell’esaltazione solipsistica 
dell’esule fiorentino. Il riferimento all’esperienza biografica di Dante resta 
viceversa fondamentale per evidenziarne il carattere «tipico» in quanto 
esperienza storica di un intellettuale formatosi all’interno di una società già 
economicamente avanzata, come fu, per quei tempi, la società fiorentina, in cui la 
situazione strutturale con la comparsa di fenomeni come l’accumulazione del 
                                                       




denaro, il lavoro salariato e la divisione tra i gruppi umani della comunità per 
interessi contrari e competitivi, assunse forme a modi, che la moderna 




 What Russo highlights is the need for a historicist or historical materialist 
approach that cuts through the interpretive problems that have riddled and ruined 
many previous attempts to define Dante’s political thought outside of the real capitalist-
protocapitalist social, economic, and political structures of medieval Italy in which 
Dante lived and wrote. If the superstructure of Dante’s time has been widely observed to 
be a robust formation, as shown above, of capitalist interests developing hand-in-glove 
with political, church, and municipal institutions and interests as a political economy, 
we must also see that one reason for scholars’ inability to see it as such has a lot to do 
with the overtly philosophical, theological, and religious valence of its ideological 
composition and self-presentation. During this time in the medieval communes there 
were also many religious movements and the influence of Christian scholasticism, 
mendicant piety, as well as well newly articulated theories of statehood, which from 
Roman Law and the recovery of Aristotle, inherited new conceptions of private property 
and authority from past writers that meshed well the needs of the new historical realities 
and issued in an array of updated conceptions. The economic element was not 
completely manifest at the level of ideology, and for the historian it still remains a 
mostly separate part of the accepted political historiography of medieval Italy, but there 
is no question that one does not have to look very hard to see its total imbrication in 
political, religious, and philosophical self-presentation of this society. In sum, it is 
necessary to recognize that Dante was an intellectual responding to the latter—as his 
lived his experience in that world entirely—and, as his work from his lyric production 
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thorough the Commedia, Convivio, and Monarchia shows, with his strong focus on 
greed, he was also responding explicitly to the strong junction of economics with 
politics.184 We must dispense entirely with the quasi-Hegelian move of seeing history as 
the working of absolute spirit—as Mazzotta and many critics seem to see things—and 
Dante’s consciousness as otherwordly. We might remember Marx’s remark in Holy 
Family, where he begins arguing for a historical materialist approach to history, that 
“Real humanism has no more dangerous enemy… than spiritualism or speculative 
idealism, which substitutes "self-consciousness" or the ''spirit" for the real individual 
man and with the evangelist teaches: ‘It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth 
nothing.’ Needless to say, this incorporeal spirit is spiritual only in its imagination.”185  
 
 Steinberg has done some work in addressing the lack of historical specificity in 
studying Dante, when describing the circulation of Dante’s lyric production in 
Accounting for Dante: 
early vernacular texts were experienced in specific social ‘places.’ The manuscript 
was produced by merchant elite writers for merchant elite readers, and later 
possessors of the manuscript were also drawn from the mercantile and bourgeois 
classes. Many of the poets collected in the anthology were representative of the 
political elite….[underlying] the importance of Italian poetry for maintaining 
political and social cohesiveness….current scholarship about the duecento lyric, 
ignoring its anthropological uses, rarely explores the implications of class. Most 
studies view Dante and his contemporaries as divided by psychological, doctrinal, 
and aesthetic concerns, not by economic ones. As a result, Dante remains the last 
flame of High Scholasticism, untainted by the emergence of the marchands 
ecrivains. While erudite commentaries on the Commedia increasingly help us 
understand the medieval world behind its creation—a world split between church 
and empire, Guelph and Ghibbeline, Guittonians and stilnovists—the social 
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divisions that underlie such categories and that informed the politics and culture 
of Dante’s time are often overlooked.186 
 
 The main thrust of this study, taking Barolini’s exhortation “always historicize” 
seriously, is to re-engage in a historicist examination of the political economy of Dante’s 
Italy that exits tradition of “many commentaries…[repeating] previous 
commentaries…because the implicit hermeneutic guidelines structured by Dante into 
his text determine, indeed overdetermine, interpretation.”187 This study seeks to 
continue the work of Barolini and Nardi in Dante studies, but also move in the direction 
of laying the foundation for making a contribution outside of Dante studies in the vein 
of Curtius by contextualizing Dante’s ‘minor’ political works in terms of the political and 
economic history of his time. Curtius importantly notes in European Literature and the 
Latin Middle Ages "that dissociation from the basic foundation of history which is 
observable in all the medieval philologies is the tendency to replace unknown concretes 
by non-existent abstractions. Dissociation from history in the widest sense: national, 
political, social, economic, legal history; history of philosophy and science; ecclesiastical 
history…”188 Where Curtius was speaking of research into the problematic area of the 
“knightly and courtly ethos,” his methodological insight is equally true with regards to 
making proper sense of medieval economy and politics generally and, in particular, 
Dante’s ‘political’ works as part of a coherent oeuvre and as texts that are not mere 
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reflections of scholastic caricatures or evidence ex post facto that reinforces spurious 
stock-historiographies of the medieval period and onwards, often with vague 
genuflections to authority, humanism, or cultural antiquities (one thinks for example of 
the repetition of notions similar and derived from the influential assumptions of 
Burkhardt’s Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien [1860]): "only cooperation between 
the various medieval specialties can solve the problem…medieval philology must ask of 
medieval historiography what it has to tell concerning medieval class-ideals, and the 
concrete political, military, and economic factors which conditioned them.”189 
 
Therefore, in this study I intend to do the following: 
 
1) to take Dante seriously in terms of historical knowledge. He talks about a new politics, 
greed, and political regimes. He is disputing both sides of the church - state binary. As 
scholars are not careful in specifying what Guelfs and Ghibellines are, we ought to do so. 
It is necessary to re-parse the political and institutional history of Italy.  
 
2) to graft the real political history of Italy and Florence, church and empire, on to the 
history of the real economic development of Italy and particularly Florence. These 
histories are already imbricated, and they need to be shown specifically in relation to 
Dante to make sense of his political commitments. When we are talking about politics 
we are also talking about economy and the emergence of (proto)capitalism. I here 
propose, by running through a detailed investigation of the popolo and guild regimes of 
Florence, to show that there did emerge a class-based, wealth-based oligarchy in 
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Florence that then later consolidated its power further in big banking consortia during 
Dante’s life. Scholars almost never talk about this fact as motivating Dante’s political 
thought, although it is clearly the most plausible explanation for Dante’s unique focus 
on greed and monarchical justice as a remedy for greed’s debilitating effects.  
 
3) to carefully examine Aristotle in terms of Dante. Particularly how his philosophy of 
justice and wealth-getting moors all of the main claims Dante makes. By understanding 
Dante’s use of Aristotle as an Aristotelian inspired critique of political economy, we will 
hence see that Dante is responding to the real emergent capitalism of his time and we 
will give significant texture and nuance to his response to the church/empire conflicts, 
also seeing the political and economic structures of Florence and international entities 
as particularly operative in making such a critique necessary.  
 
Thus while this chapter 1 serves as an intital overview of this study, Chapter 2 examines 
the international and political situation of Florence and Italy during Dante’s time, 
Chapter 3 proposes a new historiography of this history and examines it as the 
development of Political Economy, while chapter 4 explores the existence of capitalism 
in Florence and Italy in the 13th and 14th centuries, how we might define capitalism, 
while chapter 5 examines Aristotle’s critique of political economy in the Ethics and 
Politics and Dante’s deployment of such political economic vocabulary to denounce the 












Chapter 2. Papato, Impero, Commune, Banchiere: The History of 
International, Italian, and Florentine Political Development in the 13th - 






In order to illustrate my thesis about Dante, as explained in the previous chapter, it 
is imperative here to furnish an appropriately detailed historical overview of the Italian 
and International political situation as well as the political conditions of Florence, not 
only during the time of Dante’s life, but also over the course of the 13th century.190 As 
Franz Hettinger has framed it, to understand the politics and society of Dante’s time 
historically one must see that it is under the spell of the two opposed forces of “Papato 
ed Impero.”191  In fact, this is often taken to be the historiographical paradigm of the 
entire high Middle Ages.192 However, this is not entirely accurate. For the purpose of 
historical precision, we must see that the political situation Dante is responding to in 
Convivio and Monarchia is in fact framed by the interplay, as Joan Ferrante and Philip 
Jones have pointed out, of the papal/imperial contest but within the complex and 
advanced context of the emerging Italian city-states, their factions, and political 
commitments—also heavily determined by commerce, trade, and markets—evolving 
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from the time of their increasing independence from imperial and papal claims in the 
early 13th and into the 14th century's beginning of "civic humanism.”193 This historical 
sketch is thus intended to give a factual overview of the political history of the 
imperial/papal (temporal/spiritual) antagonism in which we must, on a very basic level, 
contextualize Dante’s political thought, not least because it has traditionally always been 
understood this way and because it is still pertinent for a historicized re-examination of 
the facts. In so doing, this chapter also intends to set up the content of this second 
chapter for a more historicized and detailed political economic analysis in the third 
chapter. 
 
The further historicizing of this political context will show the deficiency of the 
heuristic dualisms of spiritual/temporal papacy/empire and show the necessity of 
further examination into the overdetermination—in a intellectual framework of 
theological vs. secular antagonism—of the historiography and interpretive framework of 
political thought of this time. Such overdetermination occurs at the expense of the 
extensive social, economic, and cultural histories which were so decisive in the actual 
formation and development of political activities, governmental policies, papal and 
imperial actions, and political institutions in the city states during this time.   
 
Thus this chapter will examine:  
                                                       
193 Ferrante, The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy; On civic humanism see James 
Hankins, Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).. Late medieval city states and civic consciousness in 
the 14th century are often taken to presage the “renaissance.” Surely it is the other way 
around, see “Renaissances and Revolutions” in Jones, The Italian City-state: From 
Commune to Signoria 1-54. 
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1) the International and Italian political situation, the emergence of the Guelfi 
and Ghibellini, and the basic historical antagonisms between the papacy and 
the empire over time.  
 
 2) the Florentine political situation as an interconnected and simultaneous 
historical phenomenon closely influencing and being influenced by the former.  
 
3) the later stages of Florentine political development as tracing Dante’s life 
and career, giving an explanation of the events that surrounded his exile and 




1. International and Italian Political Situation 
 
When Henry VI (1165-1197), of the house of Hohenstaufen, son of Frederick 
Barbarossa, and Holy Roman Emperor (1191-1194) died, his intention of clamping down 
on papal power suffered a setback.194 Innocent III (Lotario dei Conti di Segni; 1160-
1216), taking advantage of a paralyzing double election between competing houses of the 
German monarchy—of Philip of Swabia (1177-1208), brother of the deceased Henry VI, 
and Otto IV of Brunswick (1175-1218), of the house of “Welf” in 1198195—began his 
attempt to move imperial power into the solid orbit of the papacy, then slipping away, 
according to the tradition of papal prerogatives of the Gregorian reform movement that 
effectively had settled the investiture conflict.196 Innocent was thus also famous for his 
juridical consolidation of church powers, including the two firmaments doctrine, which 
is key to understanding the third book of the Monarchia.197 Much has been written 
about this that we will have to content ourselves to pass in outline, as this is merely 
background information for contextualizing the political scene during Dante’s 
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lifetime.198 In any case, this conflict is also the real origin of the terms “Ghibelline” and 
“Guelf” in Italian politics. The terms emerge in the context of the battle of succession 
between the Swabians and the Guelfs (Welfs) in the remnants of the Holy Roman 
Empire, while “Ghibellino" comes from Waiblingen, one of the Hohenstaufen Castles 
and comes to stand for the imperial side, and thus the terminology merges into the 
battle between the Papacy and Empire.199 The conflict between Otto and Philip and 
Innocent III, according to Kelsen, “ha portato, di conseguenza, a quella iniqua 
confusione di interessi e rapporti politici, che caraterizza il tredicesimo secolo,” and it 
was at this time that the terms “Guelf” and “Ghibelline” began to be used for names of 
political parties in Italy, to set apart supporters of the Empire from those of the Papacy, 
without completely or necessarily corresponding to such support in particular cases.200  
 
In any case, Innocent, after initially supporting Otto IV, switched his support to 
Frederick, Henry VI’s son—future Frederick II—and pitted him against Otto following 
the latter’s murder of Philip.201 Nonetheless, as king of Sicily, and with this papal 
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support, Frederick II—who Berman has called “the most brilliant and the most powerful 
monarch in the history of Europe after Charlemagne and prior to Napoleon”—managed 
to get the upper hand on his adversaries and assert the supremacy of his dynasty, 
becoming one of the most fierce adversaries of the pope, his former protector.202 Upon 
the election of Cardinal Sinibaldo Fieschi, a partisan of the imperial side, as Innocent IV, 
Frederick is purported to have declared “nessun Papa può essere ghibellino.”203 
Likewise, now no emperor could be considered “Guelf”—even if of Guelf lineage. 
Frederick—born of an Italian mother and German (Swabian) lineage—was indeed a 
decisive figure in the history of Italian politics of the Middle Ages, in that he inherited 
not only the crown, but dreams of world domination for his dynasty and the 
establishment of a secular administrative state, the details of which have been covered 
extensively by Kantorowicz and Abulafia, which was decisive in the institutional 
transition of forms of state between feudal demesnes, papal protectorates, and modern 
administrative secular governments.204  In the early 13th century, Frederick’s court was 
not only a cultural center, but a juridical and scientific center which produced the 
Constitutions of Melfi  (Liber Augustalis), and was responsible for particularly 
important juridical concepts that would contribute to secular corporate statism. These 
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concepts slowly filtered down into the legal culture of all of Italy and remained of key 
importance for the formation of later Italian city-states as they structured their political 
systems in response to mercantile culture and the broader political conflicts.205 
Frederick was also responsible for insisting on imperial investiture over temporal affairs 
directly from God, and employed his jurists—including Cino da Pistoia—to fashion such 
arguments by reinterpreting Roman law and re-appropriating classical political 
philosophy for the cause.206 On the church side clerics employed by the “Parte guelfa” —
or the papacy— were making essentially the same arguments but inverted, namely that 
the pope had supreme authority over all temporal matters through his spiritual office.207 
So in addition to being pivotal in the explosion of the contest of powers, with Frederick 
II, as Kelsen puts it, “la lotta tra imperatore e papa si ingigantì in una lotta tra fede e 
miscredenza.”208  
 
Innocent is followed by popes Honorius III (1217-1227) and Gregory IX (1227-1241), 
the latter a particularly fierce opponent of Frederick’s political dominance — who 
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excommunicated Frederick for promising a crusade, then failing to commit to it.209 
Later Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) renewed this excommunication against the 
emperor, declared him deposed, and invited the German princes to participate in new 
imperial elections.210 These developments mark a shift in the fortunes of imperial 
ambitions: Frederick’s mercenaries were soon defeated and Frederick died in 1250. The 
papal victory over the Hohenstaufen (discussed more in chapter 3) was very significant 
for the political economic history of Italy, and it was effectively complete with the defeat 
of Manfred Hohenstaufen and the Ghibellines at the hands of Charles of Anjou in 
1266,211 leaving Guelf power allied with the papacy symbolically dominant over Italy for 
the last third of the 13th century.212 
 
The papacy had won, but Kelsen notes that it was hardly much of a “win”: 
 
Tuttavia era una vittoria di Pirro. Nella lotta mortale che aveva abbattuto 
l’impero,  anche il papato si era dissanguato. Da ambedue le parti, a dire il vero,  
si fece ancora una volta il tentativo di rianimare le morte idee della supremazia  
mondiale, ma invano. Da parte papale fu Bonifacio VIII (1294-1303), che arrivò  
all’idea avventurosa di richiamare di nuovo in vita il tempo di Gregorio VII. Solo 
la dura resistenza di Filippo il Bello di Francia dovette fargli capire come questo  
pensiero fosse sterile.213 
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 In the long term, papal power went into a long-term decline after Boniface VIII, 
particularly with the so-called “Babylonian Captivity” in Avignon.214 Kelsen notes that in 
this period, following Boniface, one further attempt was made to reconstitute the old 
empire on the Ghibelline side. Namely, with a Ghibelline claimant to the Holy Roman 
Empire, Henry VII  (1308-1313), to whom Dante himself wrote and for whom Dante had 
such high hopes of restoring order to Italy, appeared temporarily capable of asserting 
German imperial authority over the popes.215 But this attempt ended up being in vain, 
not just due to Henry’s death, but because it was a new “epoca della maturata coscienza 
nazionale dei popoli, alla quale ripugnava una signoria mondiale unitaria, che tutto 
livellasse.”216 
 
 Thus, while this contest of church and empire greatly influenced the political 
situation in 13th century Italy, Kelsen rather succinctly characterizes its true complexity 
terms of the following three historical trends: 1) the “potenza nascente delle città 
italiane,” 2) the “straordinaria atomizzazione statale” 3) the “emancipazione dell’Italia 
dall’imperatore e dall’impero.”217 The important part to understand is the extent to 
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which the first trend, the growing power of Italian cities and the institutional-political 
developments they introduced, is significantly related to economic and mercantile 
development and increasingly came to overshadow the second two factors. The power of 
the Italian city-states really came to “conferire ai secoli seguenti della storia italiana la 
sua peculiare fisionomia.”218   
 This power of the cities was directly related to their economic situation: 
 
Protette dai torbidi e dalle lotte dell’undicesimo e dodicesimo secolo, esse 
usurparono a poco a  poco le regalie dei vescovi, lottarono vittoriosamente contro 
la nobiltà feudale, fondarono una vita comunale organizzata e acquistarono, 




 This factor was very decisive, in addition to the fact that the Hohenstaufen 
(Swabian) dynasty, especially Frederick II, made the mistake of underestimating the 
cities, and the more autonomous democratic impulse that had developed in them. 
Frederick’s failed imperial attempts were a consequence of his fundamental 
misunderstanding of an epochal change in political and social realities. The Peace of 
Constance (1183), whose signatories were Hohenstaufen Frederick Barbarossa and the 
Lombard League, had allowed the cities to retain regalia of local jurisdiction, elect their 
own councils and pass legislation, while consuls and judges still had to receive 
investiture from the emperor and take an oath to the Holy Roman Emperor.220 In any 
case, after the death of Frederick Barbarossa’s son Henry VI in 1197, the cities began to 
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neglect their imperial obligations, and the Peace of Constance became the focal point of 
the battle between the second Lombard League and Frederick II from 1226-1250. This 
explains why intellectual historians like Gierke, Kantorowicz, and Berman have 
recognized that the new political and juridical thought of this period was premised on 
rearticulating traditional paradigms within a situation of cities, fragmentary power, and, 
above all, the new consequences of the rule of the bourgeoisie:“il nuovo pensiero 
giuridico-statuale, che corrispondeca a questo principio, trovò la sua espressione nel 
fatto che la borghesia fu riconosciuta come detentrice del potere statuale accanto alla 
nobiltà e al clero…”221 Despite his desire to the establish a new German imperial 
hegemony, this macro-level development of the power of the cities over the late 12th and 
early 13th centuries was unstoppable, and Frederick II was powerless against the trend of 
urbanization and the rise of autonomous city-state power which was to define the 
political and social future of  Italy for some time to come, even in the traditionally less 
urban south.222  
 After Sicily was taken by the Angevines, the last ties that kept Italy bound to the 
German empire were essentially severed: the “Holy Roman Empire” became a 
practically empty name. In Italian politics “Guelf” came to stand generally for anti-
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imperialism, as Kelsen says “principio che venne considerato nazionale,” though not 
anti-monarchism, as the term came to have no meaning in regards to French or 
Aragonese intervention and alliance with Guelf powers in Italy.223 Italy—albeit 
fragmented—was left to itself, and this emancipation from imperial control had several 
negative consequences. First and foremost, many cities fell, almost without exception, 
under the signoria of tyrants—almost univocally belonging to noble families that stirred 
up factional conflicts to secure or come into more power, through demagoguery or 
violence.224 Thus, after Frederick II’s death, most of northern Italy was under the 
influence of warring dynasties, while the rest of the peninsula was divided between the 
two southern kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the papal states, various independent 
signorie, some republics of an oligarchical nature, such as Venice, or “democratic” 
oligarchies such as Florence. Stimulating extreme political faction in this decentralized 
rise of the Italian cities was the standard procedure of politics, and any precise 
historiography will see that by mid-century the contest between empire and papacy was 
but a nominal shell containing many more complex contests: 
 
Il vecchio principio della political italiana di stimolare il conflitto tra due signori 
per non servire nessuno trovava anche adesso la sua piena validità. In realtà il 
grande contrasto tra Impero e Papato, che aveva sconvolto per così lungo tempo 
il paese, era quasi del tutto estinto. Ma i partiti dei guelfi e dei ghibellini, che esso 
aveva generato, rimasero esistenti come prima, soltanto che essi entrarono in un 
                                                       
223 Kelsen, La teoria dello stato in Dante, 6. 
 
224 On the transformation from commune to signoria, see Jones, The Italian City-state: 
From Commune to Signoria; Jones, "Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-
Medieval Italy"; On violence and faction in the Italian communes see Randolph Starn, 
Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) and Carol Lansing, The Florentine 
Magnates: Lineage and Faction in a Medieval Commune (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 




nuovo stadio di sviluppo. La lotta per la Chiesa e per l’Impero cessò adesso del 
tutto di costituirne il programma… Gli antichi nomi di partiti dei guelfi e dei 
ghibellini costituirono per i più svariati contrasti di interessi, di natura politica o 
privata un vasto pretesto. Qui Guelfo, là Ghibellino divenne il grido di battaglia 
persino per le miserabili discordie tra famiglie. Dato che le più piccole 
controversie, private e politiche, si inserivano, per lo più nominalmente, nei due 
grandi principi in lotta, appariva come se l’Italia fosse divisa solo in due grandi 
riserve di eserciti. In verità vi erano però centinaia dei più diversi contrasti che 
agitavano il paese.225 
  
                                                       
225 Kelsen, La teoria dello stato in Dante, 6-7. 
 
 100 
2. The Political Conditions of Florence  
 
 Burckhardt said about Florence in der Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien: “The 
most elevated political thought and the most varied forms of human development are 
found united in the history of Florence, which in this sense deserves the name of the 
first modern State in the world.”226 Indeed, it goes without saying that understanding 
the political conditions of Florence is important for understanding Dante, but it is also 
important for understanding the entire Italian and international political situation to 
which Dante was responding. 
  
 Florence, the de facto Tuscan capital, entered the thirteenth century not being one 
of the major power players in northern Italy, though it was noted “per prosperità, per 
una ricca attività industriale e per una popolazione dedita al commercio.”227   In 
Florence, as in other similar towns public life—and this is increasingly true from the 
middle of the 13th century and the emergence of the “primo popolo” to the end of the 13th 
century and the ordinamenti di giustizia228—becomes dominated by the opposition of 
two antagonistic elements: the conservative nobility eager to defend its old power, and 
the “borghesia” which had gradually risen up with its new wealth and was looking to 
make changes and attain greater political influence. Within the “borghesia” one must 
draw a distinction—which becomes increasingly relevant as the century wears on— 
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between the “aristocracy” of “denaro,” that is of the class of now rich commercial 
merchants, the so-called “popolo grasso” and the low, common people, this group 
divided into those belonging to the lesser guilds (arti minori) and those of the 
“proletariato” the so-called “plebe minuta” or “popolo minuto.”229 Within this 
bourgeoisie, the social structure was also subdivided into the milites and pedites, 
cavalieri and fanti, to the first of which belonged the blood and monied nobility (as the 
traditional nobility of the contado also became more urbanized and indistinct from the 
bourgeoisie), and the latter, the “grande massa dei meno abbienti.”230    
 
 The organizational structure and evolution of the Florentine state was driven by 
conflicts between classes, as well as within the wealthy class, between the nobility and 
the new rich for political power. At the beginning of the 13th century, at the head of the 
State were 12-15 consuls or a podestà, who from 1207 onwards, was to be a foreigner, for 
reasons of political precaution—given the delicate situation of political factions.231 Over 
against these executive organs are the legislative bodies of the council and popular 
assembly. The “consilium” generale, was composed of about 150 members while the 
larger popular assembly would meet four times a year. While the structure of the early 
Florentine state has been explored elsewhere, these republican structures would evolve 
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within the context of the importation of Guelf and Ghibelline splits within Florentine 
politics and become the institutional structure for political economic oligarchy.232 
 
 As we learn from Najemy, the mythical roots of the Florentine split into Guelf and 
Ghibelline are attested by chroniclers Dino Compagni and Villani, also mentioned in 
Inferno 28 and in Paradiso by Dante, who claim that they started in the hatred 
generated between the houses of Uberti and the Boundelmonti over a murder of a 
prominent member of the Buondelmonti family.233 However, this division increasingly 
had little to do with the larger forces to which they referred.  
 
As Kelsen explains: 
si trattava semplicemente di due partiti di nobili, che lottavano tra di loro per la 
signoria della città, l’uno dei quali cercava appoggio presso il papa, l’altro presso 
l’imperatore. Con l’altra opposizione tra nobiltà e borghesia questa divisione di 
fazione non aveva inizialmente nulla a che fare…solo allorché essa acquista una 
notevole posizione nella costituzione—nella seconda metà del tredicesimo 
secolo—anche essa ne è soggetta. Il miscuglio delle due opposizioni, tra guelfi e 
ghibellini da una parte, tra nobiltà e borghesia dall’altra, ha dato alla costituzione 
fiorentina la sua propria complessa impronta.234 
 
 Until the times of Frederick II, the Guelph families in alliance with the papacy and 
league of north-central Italian cities, controlled Florentine government.235 Frederick 
however, wanted to obtain control of Florence, which was quite powerful as a 
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commercial and political center in Northern Italy, and supported the Ghibelline faction 
with 800 German knights. The latter managed to smash the Guelfs, and in 1248 a large 
number of them were banished236, setting up a Ghibelline restoration. However, this 
was a short-lived victory: the majority of the populace, especially the predominantly 
powerful class of large commercial interests (merchants and bankers), was of Guelph 
leanings.237 Moreover, the Ghibelline nobility then in power failed to win popular 
support for several reasons. First, they gave rise to significant vendettas in a largely 
Guelf populace by confiscating the private property of Guelf families, and destroying 
their prominent towers and palazzi.238 Also, they became increasingly aristocratic and 
reactionary. They further alienated the city’s bourgeoisie, because they had obligated the 
city and its people, more than ever before--when imperial servitude to the “empire” was 
already largely nominal--to pay heavy taxation to the court and to the military forces of 
the emperor.239  
 
 What is sometimes called the first “democratic revolution” is better known as the 
primo popolo. In October of 1250, a new government was formed called the “the 
popolo” and it presented itself as formally neutral between the parties240 and asserted 
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itself as capable of limiting factional influence.241 It lasted for approximately ten years 
before becoming ensnarled in the very struggles it tried to avoid. But from the point of 
view of establishing its political relationship to the actual social classes of the time, its 
popular “revolutionary” connotation—as shall be clear later—is not quite popular or 
revolutionary, and ought to be qualified.242.According to Najemy ”the primo popolo was 
no social revolution; it emerged from a split within the elite, between those committed 
to the factions and those who saw such alliances as damaging to the economic interest of 
their class and city.”243  
 
Najemy further notes: 
the primo popolo clearly attempted to remove the families associated with the 
elite parties and to replace the old governing class with new men. On the other 
hand, most of the Anziani came from families associated with the major guilds 
and were involved in banking, trade, and the legal profession. Among those 
whose professions have been identified were many Calimala merchants, some 
bankers or moneylenders, a dozen from Por Santa Maria, twenty jurists or 
notaries, and five from the Wool guild. No representatives of the minor, or 
artisan guilds have been identified among these officeholders.244 
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 The success of the primo popolo was based on “the support of the guilds and the 
military companies in exchange for some representation in government. The primo 
popolo thus foreshadows the analogous policies of later popular governments that 
reached even farther from the elite for support to mount more radical challenges.”245 
This reveals clearly that though “popular” in one sense, the popolo was yet majorly 
organized around wealthy interests and though anti-elite, it demonstrates a collusion 
and institutional intersection of mercantile interests and political power.  The social 
structure of this primo popolo was, as Raveggi characterizes it: “il ricco ceto affaristico 
dedito alla mercatura ed alle forme più redditizie dell’artigianato.”246  
 
 The primo popolo was an undisputed victory, however, for bourgeois and 
mercantile values. The inscription from 1254 on the palazzo del podestà, the one 
constructed from parts of the shortened elite towers, “exalted the city’s wealth, victories, 
fortune, and power, claiming for Florence the right to rule the sea, the land, and the 
entire world, and predicting eternal triumph, in the manner of Rome, over subjects to be 
ruled with justice and law.”247 The primo popolo was also responsible for a major event 
in economic history: the coining of the gold florin, which had the lily on one side and 
John the Baptist, the city’s patron saint, on the other. The primo popolo’s florin has thus 
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been noted for its role in fostering Florence’s great economic prosperity.248 As Najemy 
remarks, a new currency had not been minted since Carolingian times until Frederick II 
imitated roman imperial coinage, and Genoa and Florence were the first cities to do this, 
unprecedentedly in 1252.249 It was a declaration of sovereignty, imitation of Rome, and 
symbol of Florence’s expanding wealth and influence.250 As Holmes points out, this 
economic power and political situation was interlocked with the imperial and papal 
conflict: “Though Florence was by this time a city of growing industrial and commercial 
power in which the government of the primo popolo minted the florin…its politics were 
dominated by disputes between ancient city families linked with papal-imperial 
rivalry.”251 
 
 The position of the Ghibellines was damaged by the revolution, and basically lost 
its stability entirely with the downfall, after a short-lived period of power, of the 
Hohenstaufen. The exiled Guelfs returned within the primo popolo regime and shared 
governance with the Ghibellines, but the Ghibelline nobility was unable to resist the 
twofold opposition of the popolo and the Guelfs. By 1258 tensions between the parties 
were increasing, as Frederick II’s son, Manfred, was seeking to re-establish 
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Hohenstaufen hegemony in Italy— and the Ghibellines saw an opportunity for revenge 
against the Guelfs and an opportunity to destroy the primo popolo.252 The Ghibellines 
were expelled from the city in 1258, after a series of conflicts, and the discovery of a plot 
to overthrow the popolo.253 The Ghibelline faction did not give up however, and 
supported by Manfred, the Florentine army was defeated at the famous battle of 
Montaperti (Inferno 10) in 1260.254 The Ghibellines took the city without resistance 
after narrowly deciding against the Ghibelline League’s idea to completely destroy the 
city. Dante’s historiography famously attributes its salvation to Farniata degli Uberti, 
who “solo” and “a viso aperto,” prevented its destruction, annulled the constitution, and 
instated what Kelsen calls, “una oppressiva signoria nobiliare.”255 According to Raveggi, 
Manfred had solid “ragioni politiche ed economiche” for the idea of razing the city, not 
least of which was that the city, with its immense wealth, had been able to be intensely 
rebellious, also on account of its geographical location, and had repeatedly proven 
capable of thwarting his Ghibelline ambitions.256 Manfred also detested its coining of 
Florins without imperial approval, which gave them special economically based political 
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power for the first time, by linking capital and exchange to regional and super-regional 
politics because of Florentine state denominated currency which depended on the trust 
of the Florentine government.257 The Council of the “anziani” and the popular assembly 
were abolished, and instead a council of 300, mainly backed by aristocratic elements, 
gained power.258 This was also supported by a consular college of 90 members, with a 
board—the “credenza”— of 24.259  
 
 In any case, the return of the Ghibellines and their newfound power was also short 
lived.260 The feudal-aristocratic Ghibellines attracted lots of resentment by destroying 
the property of the exiled Guelph enemies.261 The majority of the exiled Guelph families 
from the primo popolo regime in 1260 also enjoyed  "una situazione politico-economica 
di rilievo, che in diversi casi si segnala addiritura come preminente nell’ambito della vita 
cittadina,”262 which made this Ghibelline power doomed to failure. The death of 
Manfred, and the defeat at Benevento in 1266, badly undermined the power of the 
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Ghibelline faction, and the downfall of Conradin put the nail in its coffin. 263  Two years 
after Dante’s birth, in 1267, the Guelfs took possession of the city again.264 Pope Clement 
IV, with the imperial throne vacant, first gave its signoria to Charles of Naples, pope 
Clement IV’s peacemaker in Tuscany.265 The Ghibellines left the city forever, and the 
Guelfs came to control the state and organs of power in Florence.266 
 
Holmes states the importance of this event:  
The disputes between the two parties never ceased but the Guelf victory of 1266, 
leading eventually to half a century of general Guelf hegemony, had a profound 
significance for the Tuscan cities. It meant that, with the exception of the 
persistently Ghibelline Pisa and Arrezzo, they were controlled by Guelf 
oligarchies. It involved most of the cities in adherence to a Guelf league which 
included the pope, France, and the Angevin king of Naples. It facilitated the 
involvement of Tuscan Guelf merchants in the business of the wealthiest part of 
Europe (that is, Northern France and Flanders) and in the lucrative trade with 
the underdeveloped kingdom of Naples. It made Tuscan Guelfs the natural 
bankers of the popes. It encouraged Tuscan interest in the writings and arts of 
France. The Guelf hegemony is thus an indispensable part of the environment 
which at the end of the thirteenth century became the world of Dante and 
Giotto.267 
 
 In any case, this equilibrium was short lived too, and with the separation between 
the Curia and Charles, the main allies of the Guelfs, some conflicts also arose within this 
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party as well.268 King Charles renounced his curacy in Tuscany; and pope Nicholas III—
Giovani Gaetano Orsini— sent cardinal Latino Frangipani as his legate to the city to 
repress the conflicts and disorder that had erupted. Latino, who appears to have been a 
dependable associate of the Mozzi banking family, whose member Andrea Mozzi 
(bishop of Florence from 1287-1295) was his chief delegate, arrived in Florence on 8 
October 1279.269 Latino was tasked both with settling the new dissension amongst the 
Guelfs, and ending their feud with restive Ghibelline elements. To this effect in 1279 a 
peace was drawn up which included the return of the Ghibellines and the restitution of 
their confiscated properties.270 
 
 Brucker notes that this phase saw the true consolidation of power amongst Guelf 
elites, and that the latter, moreover, was truly an economic elite that by the time of 
Dante's teenage years had solidified its power and interests over the city of Florence: 
the systematic degradation and impoverishment of the Ghibelline families 
transformed the character of the city’s elite, which had lost an important segment 
of its ancient feudal element. By the end of the 13th century, this elite contained a 
larger proportion of families of more recent origins, whose fortunes were largely, 
though not exclusively, mercantile. The old coalition of aristocratic casate had 
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broken down after more than a century of internal strife. Another challenge to the 
power and influence of the old noble families emerged gradually during the 13th 
century: in the rise of the popolo which first came to power in the 1250s (the 
regime of the primo popolo), and then after a temporary eclipse, created a new 
political order in the 1280s, the government of the guilds. The guilds were 
organizations of merchants, industrialists, bankers, lawyers, and other 
professional and craft groups. They had grown steadily in size, wealth and 
political influence, particularly after 1250, paralleling the expansion of the city’s 
population and economy. The leaders of the popolo were recruited from families 
(the Medici, Strozzi, Rucelai, Peruzzi, etc.) that were very active in trade, banking 
and industry. The rank and file included petty merchants, shopkeepers and 
artisans who belonged to the middle echelons of the city’s social and economic 
order.271 
 
 Here we also see the beginning of rather constant ecclesiastical influence in 
coalition with economic Guelf interests in the particular governance of the Florentine 
constitution. A reform of the constitution was made in favor of the “popolo” with the 
“capitano del popolo” and a new “collegio” of 14 men made responsible for keeping the 
peace.272 To make sure that the city remained under the power of the papacy, the 
“podestà” and the captain of the people had to be nominated by the pope every two 
years. However, the cardinal’s mission did not have the effects that had been hoped for, 
as the city did not bow to papal power nor were the internal conflicts resolved.273 Both 
the Guelf and Ghibelline conflicts could not be resolved, and new feuds arose within the 
two factions of the nobility. Meanwhile, the “popolo” did not trust either faction, and 
was ready to rid itself of the onerous guardianship of the nobility, which in June 1282 
led to a bloodless “second” democratic revolution, which limited the power of the 
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nobility to a minimum274 and was known as the secondo popolo or "priorate of the 
guilds": the rule of the guild corporations, united around economic and trade interests, 
over the political affairs of the commune.275 
 
 The most important progress made by the “secondo popolo” in the second popular 
constitution, which put all political powers into the hands of the “popolo,” was the 
creation of the office of the “priors, which took the place of the collegio of 14 which had 
been founded by Fragipani, and who were elected by the “corporations.”276  These are 
the guild corporations, also known as the “arti,”277 and this development also shows how 
already at this time the commercial and mercantile nature of Florence had already 
begun to heavily determine its politics. There were 21 guild “corporazioni”—7 major 
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“maggiori,” 5 minor “minori,” and 9 “minute”. Among the major guilds were the 
“giuristi,” “lanaiuoli,” “cambiavalute,” “fabbricanti di lanerie,” "medici e speziali," 
"commercianti di seta," and "commercianti di pellicce." The minor guilds were 
composed of the "mercanti di ritaglio," "macellai,” "calzolai e calzaiuoli," "maestri 
falegnami e maestri di pietre," "fabbri e negozianti di ferramenta." The “minute” were 
composed of “piccoli maestri.” 
 
 Only members of the 7 major guilds had political rights (later with the minor guilds 
the 12), and for this reason, many nobles enlisted in one of the major guilds so as not to 
be excluded.278 Jones details how in fact, this exclusion of other guilds from the regime 
was indicative of the strong consolidation of capitalist elements in Florence.279 The 
influence of the guilds was most evident in the election of the priors, of which there were 
6, one for each “sesto” or ward of the city, and each had two-month terms.280 Their 
office was to “vigilare sul tesoro (amminstrazione del patrimonio communale), 
esercitare la funzione giurisdizionale su tutti e prendere le difese dei deboli e dei piccoli 
contro i forti e i grandi.”281 The elections of the priors took place through a board 
committee, in which the heads of the guilds played a decisive role along with exiting 
incumbent priors. There were also, besides the priors—whose main activity was involved 
in legislation—two “supremi uffici” of the podestà and the capitano del popolo. 
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According to Kelsen, “inoltre in aparenza niente di essenziale fu cambiato nei maggiori e 
minori collegi consiliari, che affiancavano i due rappresentanti supremi della citta.’”282 
 
 There was no long lasting tranquility or order following the implementation of this 
constitution, but the consolidation of the popolo as an economically stratified elite was 
continuing along with great success: in 1289 the “consiglio dei 100” was created, which 
was a financial commission upon whose agreement every request for funds depended, 
“prima che essa venisse presentata ai collegi consiliari di rito.”283 The members of this 
new college were nominated by the priors from a pool of citizens who payed more than 
100 florins of tax. The principle undergirding this institution, namely that those who 
have the most tax burden are entitled to control the purse of the state, according to 
Kelsen (and Hartwig) is an evident departure from the earlier medieval corporative 
doctrine of the state.284  
 
 In 1290, the term of the podestà was reduced from one year to a half year. It was 
also established that between two priorates that there had to be a gap of three years 
between candidacies as an effective sort of term limit. The number of officers for “arti 
maggiori” was capped at 12. The nobility, however, could not bear its lack of political 
power before the growing affirmation of guild-republican, and popular power: it did not 
want to tolerate a signoria of the guilds that deprived it of all its traditional political 
rights. Thus it was able to make use of the distinction which became ever more obvious 
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between the “borghesia dominante” the so called popolo grasso which had slowly taken 
on the “modi di fare” of the nobility, and the poorest people, completely deprived of 
political rights.285 Thus when the remnants of the traditional noble families and even the 
new nobles, encouraged by the warrior glory of renewed factional strife (driven by a 
certain fetishism of violence and pseudo-knighthood and a clash of powerful clans), and 
attempting to profit from this internal division within the popolo, then publicly and 
forcefully opposed itself to the existing order, another revolution took place that 
solidified and guaranteed the continuity of the new constitution around the interests of 
the wealthy bourgeois guildsmen's interests.286 These nobles who had opposed the 
existing order were labeled the Florentine "magnates" and a movement arose to punish 
them and limit their attempt to exert political power over and above the priorate of the 
guilds.287 This movement was led by a noble who had defected to become a popular 
rabble-rouser (of wealthy bourgeois rabble!) named Giano della Bella. In 1293 he helped 
pass the famous “ordinamenti di giustizia.”288 
 
 The ordinamenti had several effects.  One of the consequences of the ordinamenti 
was the decision to admit to the office of the prior only those who were not only—as was 
the case with numerous nobles—members of a guild, but those who actually practiced a 
profession. With this rule many magnates were practically excluded from the most 
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influential office of the city. Furthermore, the minor guilds received political rights, 
albeit not to the same extent as the major guilds: the mass proletariat of workers 
remained almost completely excluded.289 In addition to exclusion from the government, 
the magnates were subjected to various and fairly oppressive sanctions. For example, 
the purchase of capital assets or land was made more difficult for “grandi," the smallest 
offense against a citizen by a noble magnate was punished with the greatest severity, the 
responsibility of the magnate families for crimes committed by every member of their 
family was significantly increased, and the ability to sue or prosecute an accused noble 
was extraordinarily simplified. According to Brucker, “Each male member of a magnate 
family had to swear an oath of obedience to the commune, and to provide a surety of 
2000 lire that he would keep the peace.”290 Magnates/nobles were also barred from 
being present anywhere that a “corporazione del consiglio del popolo” was meeting, so 
as to prevent corruption.291 A new office was created called the “gonfalonieri di giustizia” 
for enforcing these ordinamenti, and this official had power over a special thousand-
man-strong police force at his disposal for so doing. 
 
 In regards to the interpretation of the ordinances, which seems salient, Brucker 
argues that they “have been interpreted, by Salvemini and others, as a consequence of a 
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class conflict between a noble landed aristocracy (magnati) and a capitalist bourgeoisie 
(popolani)."292 However, in his estimation, which seems correct and settled by historical 
consensus, as Nicola Ottokar has shown,   
there were no significant economic or social differences between families 
designated as magnati and popolani. It would perhaps be more accurate to 
interpret the Ordinances as a product of a conflict within Florence’s ruling elite, 
in which one potent coalition of families (popolani) sought to weaken a rival 
group (magnati), by keeping them out of office, and by subjecting them to severe 
and discriminatory judicial penalties.  The ordinances were nothing less than a 
complete humiliation of the nobility, which had initially tolerated them without 
opposition.293   
 
The point is, as Davidsohn corroborates, that the period that sees the rejection of 
magnates is in fact the period that indicates the victory of capitalist interests over the 
entire political system of Florence.294 
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3. Dante's Entry into Politics and the Period up to and following his Exile 
  
 Dante's entry into politics takes place in the tumultuous times of the 1290s, the 
period that Davidsohn has characterized as seeing the triumph of capitalism in Florence, 
and the events surrounding the downfall of Giano della Bella.295 Eventually, through 
various plots, those labeled magnati managed to exile the hated demagogue Giano della 
Bella (1295) and to ease the restrictions stipulating that one must actually practice a 
profession in a guild to be eligible for the priorate, moving back to the requirement that 
one merely be a guild member.296 Giano della Bella’s designs to confiscate the funds of 
the Parte Guelfa in the name of the commune hastened his downfall.297  As after the 
second democratic revolution, many members of noble families enrolled in the major 
guilds to be able to participate in the political process, among whom was also Dante, 
who was, from a "noble" Guelf family.298 Dante, as attested by many sources, enrolled in 
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the guild of “Medici e speziali,” and between 1295 and 1297, he repeatedly appears as a 
member of the “consiglio dei cento.”299 
 
 Thus his career in politics began in the aftermath of the magnates/popolo conflict 
and the ordinances of 1293. By the time Dante begins his active engagement in politics 
in 1295, the Guelf oligarchy had regained control.  However, this was to give way to yet 
more faction: after the 1295 restoration of stability, the Guelf party itself was on the 
verge of splitting into two opposed factions, the Black and White Guelfs. These factions, 
as we shall see in the next chapter (chapter 3), were a "who's who" of elite capitalist 
interests.300 Generally speaking, the black faction—led by Corso Donati (from the old 
noble Donati family)—was affiliated with feuding factions in Pistoia and, skewed to the 
papal and magnate side. The whites represented other elite and wealthy groups of 
magnates and popolo/popolani and were led by a rich banker, Vieri de’ Cerchi, from the 
Cerchi family, a wealthy nouveaux riche, banking family.301  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Dante was from a merely bourgeois class, moderately wealthy family involved in 
banking, but with little known relationship to ancient noble families—the truth about 
which little was known even in the Florence of his day where agnatic lineages would 
fabricate ancient noble ancestry to embellish the knightly reputation of their families. 
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pubblica," Reti Medievali Rivista <http://rivista.retimedieavali.it> 15, no. 2 (2014): 
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 It goes without saying that Dante was well connected with many politicians of his 
time on both sides of the eventual factions: his "amico," poet Guido Cavalcanti, not only 
had a public and personal vendetta with Corso Donati, but was remembered for a 
"contemptuously aristocratic demeanor in politics, as in poetry."302  Dante also 
exchanged tenzoni (from the 1293-1295 period) with Forese Donati to whom he was 
related by marriage and, by extension, to family members of the eventual black 
faction.303 These tenzoni not only illustrate Dante’s "position in a world in which poetry 
and politics were both fairly widespread activities of a social elite,”304 but show how 
much the political economic configuration in which Dante found himself influenced his 
own poetic production. 
 
 In a study on Dante’s tenzone with Forese Donati, Susan Noakes investigates 
Dante’s place “in the competition among contending socioeconomic groups.”305  Indeed, 
she argues that the Dante we are often most familiar with remains “in surprising and 
important ways an ahistorical, decontextualized figure, read as if walled off from much 
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of the material in contemporary historical records.”306 Noakes thus goes “against the 
grain of American literary criticism," which  “banished” biography from its shores, in 
arguing (against Cursetti) that the structure of the tenzone “is best understood by 
reference to the biographical context, when more fully explored than previously, in 
terms of all its social, economic, and political dimensions.”307 Noakes sees the need to 
historicize given that “the symmetry between Dante’s first sonnet and Forese’s last” 
involves the deployment of the “terminology of money and commerce” and that the 
poems “bring together discourses of corporality and economics.”308 Her thesis is thus 
that “this series of poems is integrally connected to the late thirteenth-century 
Florentine context, especially by its interweaving of three discursive themes: virility, 
nobility, and banking, or to use less modern terms, moneylending or usury.”309 She 
insists, rightly, that “there is no need to seek the tenzone’s context elsewhere," because 
“as with Dante’s other works, the tenzone with Forese is best read as an intervention in 
the major social, economic, literary, artistic, and political developments of his time, and 
that Dantists need to understand better all those contributing contexts in order to 
interpret this tenzone in all its cultural implications.”310 
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 Indeed, politics and economics--though not exclusively and often interwoven with 
other philosophical, theological, and literary concerns- as we have already indicated in 
chapter 1, reverberate through almost all of Dante's literary production. The 1295 period 
is also thought to be the time in which Dante wrote Le Dolci rime,  Dante’s great 
canzone condemning the conflation of wealth and nobility.311 While we shall return to 
this important canzone, its denunciation of greed and monetary accumulation is acute 
and it bears, as Holmes puts it: “the flavour of commentary on the contemporary 
political scene. The definition of nobility which Dante attacked in that poem, ‘long-
standing possession of wealth together with pleasing manners,' is just such a definition 
as would have suited the magnate supporters of Corso Donati.”312 
 
 Indeed, according to Mazzoni, Dante's writing of this period is part of his ongoing 
anti-magnate sentiment, but is more meaningfully seen as also signaling a shift to 
political and moral criticism of his own society beyond mere anti-magnate criticism: 
 
Non avremmo sottolineato questi particolari se l’atteggiamento in ultima analisi 
antimagnatizio dell’Alighieri (quale appare dal suo patrocinare la quinta 
proposizione) non trovasse sicura conferma in scritti certamente anteriori a quel 
periodo: si rammentino le canzoni composte a celebrazione di due virtù morali, 
Nobiltà e Leggiadria (Le dolci rime e Poscia ch’Amor), ove l’analisi dell’umano 
comportamento, e il reciso giudizio che Nobiltà non consiste nel sangue ma 
nell’operare virtuoso, e il non meno acerbo giudicare sull’ormai assoluta 
mancanza di «leggiadria » e d’ogni altra virtù nei cavalieri, oltre che dirci la 
misura dell’impegno morale di Dante, ora tutto teso a divenire il cantor 
rectitudinis, rappresentano indubbiamente anche l’espressione di un preciso 
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sentire « politico », nell’accostarsi aperto alla parte democratica. Ma andrà pur 
anche ricordato il riaffiorare, e ben acuminato, della polemica antimagnatizia, 
parecchi anni dopo, in un episodio indimenticabile del poema: nel pathos che 
anima lo scontro violentissimo con Filippo Argenti nel canto VIII dell’Inferno, 
con quel Filippo Argenti riconosciuto e promosso a paradigma del magnate 
superbo e iracondo anche dalla tradizione novellistica e aneddotica, che non 
necessariamente farà capo, per le notizie, al Dante della Commedia.313 
 
 Thus during this period, Dante was elected to the Trentasei del Capitano 
(November 1295 to April 1296), and is recorded as speaking on 14 December 1295 in a 
council comprising members of the twelve major guilds. Here he took issue with the 
method for electing priors, and voted against a measure that would allow Priors to select 
their successors. In May 1296, Dante became part of an important body: the Council of 
One Hundred. On June 5, 1296 he spoke against granting political asylum to Pistoese 
exiles in addition to supporting a measure granting special powers for the Priors to 
punish anyone, but especially magnates, either guilty of or suspected of using violence 
or intimidating popolani in public offices. Though Dante is known to have been present 
in the councils of the next two years, records are lacking regarding his activities.314 
 
 Going back to the splits between the whites and blacks, the origins of the split are 
murky but reside in the ongoing factional contrasts within the city contrasts.315 The 
genesis of the names, according to Kelsen, arose from “Private controversie di due 
famiglie della vicina città di Pistoia, delle quali l’una, non si sa perché, si chiamava i 
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‘bianchi’, l’altra i ‘neri’, offrirono l’occasione.”316  This quarrel was brought to Florence, 
and in any case, new names of partisanship merely concealed old divisions.317 Kelsen 
remarks that initially, this new subdivision of white and black guelf had nothing to do 
with the old division between Guelfs and Ghibellines.318 However, since in the city there 
were only meager remains of Ghibelline sympathizers, it must be understood that both 
the Whites and Blacks considered themselves as Guelfs. However, the disagreement, 
increasingly bitter, between the Whites and the papal curia brought the partisan division 
on the white side increasingly far from the base commitments of the Guelf party and 
closer to a position that would have been traditionally considered Ghibelline, if not for 
the fact that in a one-party state being an open Ghibelline was effectively political 
suicide by this time.319 As far as the White and Black affiliations of the popolo and 
popolani are concerned, the situation was the following: the dominant popular party, 
constituted by bourgeois with political rights and opposed to submitting to the pope and 
magnates, was affiliated with the Cerchi White faction. According to Kelsen, “alla nobilta 
di denaro si unì la nobilta’ intellettuale delle persone colte.”320  While little record 
remains of the position of commoners and the proletariate, they are thought to have 
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sided with the dominant wealthy bourgeois that had sided with the blacks. The latter 
sought support in the church and alliances with foreign powers.321  
 
 At this time, Boniface VIII (Benedetto Caetani), in whom the already almost 
forgotten dreams of Church supremacy had been re-awakened, became a prime actor in 
the unfolding political drama of Florence.322 As has been pointed out, Florence was 
tightly linked financially to the papacy and armies of Florentine merchants and bankers 
had close relations with Rome and the curia.323 Boniface wanted Florence as part of the 
papal temporal domain, as it was the most powerful city in northern Italy and was the 
most important center of papal Guelfism. The pope believed he could subject Florence 
to church supremacy by supporting the Blacks against the democratic “popular” 
constitution324 maintained by the Whites: 
 
When Dante reappears in the political records in the summer of 1300, a new 
political crisis is developing. The conflict between the Cerchi and Donati factions, 
later to become known as the White and Black Guelfs respectively, had become 
more intense. Corso Donati had been banished. In exile he had established 
influence at Rome with Pope Boniface VIII, an aggressive promoter of the 
interests of the papacy. Corso persuaded Boniface that the present rulers of 
Florence were unreliable. In this way he opened a rift between the pope and the 
ruling Whites, which he hoped to use to secure his own restoration. In the spring 
of 1300…the Florentine leaders decided to prosecute a group of Florentine 
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businessmen at the papal court, allies of Corso, for working against the interests 
of the commune. Thus, by a process of mounting distrust between the two 
governments at Florence and Rome, the political divisions were linked with the 
interests of outside powers. It was in this way that a Florentine citizen, who had 
taken up a position in the native politics of his city, could as a result find himself 
caught up in the politics of Europe.325 
 
 
Thus, Boniface VIII, intending to directly intervene in the internecine disputes of the 
city, sent a legate under the pretenses of negotiating a "peace" between the feuding 
sides, but it was viewed as a disguised supporting of the Blacks, and the offer was 
refused. The rest of this is well known history, summarized by Holmes: 
 
Dante was associated with the Whites. He was very likely a party to the decision 
to prosecute the Florentines at the Papal court. For two months in 1300 he was a 
Prior, that is one of the six men who held supreme office in the commune. As 
such he had to confirm the city’s stand against the pope’s intervention. He was 
thus deeply involved in city politics, marked out by identification with the ruling 
faction and already the object of a papal condemnation, directed against the 
rulers of the city. His political baptism of fire had been swift….For more than a 
year after his priorate Dante remained prominent in the city. On 1 November 
1301, the brother of the King of France, Charles of Valois, acting as an agent of 
Boniface, entered Florence with a substantial army. Once inside he allowed the 
Blacks to carry out a coup d’état which completely reversed the political situation 
and led to the exile or prosecution of the White leaders. When Charles of Valois 
came Dante was probably away on a mission to Rome, a last-minute attempt to 
halt the action of the French invaders, and it is likely that he never saw the inside 
of Florence again after 1301. On 27 January 1302 he was sentenced, in his 
absence, to a fine and exile for financial corruption in office and for conspiring 
against the Pope, Charles of Valois, and the city. On 10 March he was condemned 
to death.326 
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According to Brucker,  “the leading families of the triumphant Black faction, led by the 
Donati, used their influence with the podestà, messer Cante de’ Gabrielli of Gubbio 
(1302), who passed sentence of confiscation, exile and death on 600 members of the 
White party, including Dante Alighieri and Petrarch’s father.”327 Obviously there is no 
evidence Dante was guilty of corruption nor reasons to suppose that Dante was hostile 
to the papacy as such on the grounds of a general hostility to the exercise of temporal 
power by spiritual authority.328 
 
 
Per  quel  che  riguarda  la  posizione  di Dante  si  è  generalmente  giunti  a  
considerarlo,  fino  al  suo  esilio,  come membro  di  quel partito  fiorentino,  che  
si  chiamava  convenzionalmente guelfo.  Successivamente  si  avvicinò  al 
ghibellinismo,  senza  tuttavia  iscriversi  ad  alcun  concreto  partito politico.  In  
realtà  egli  rimase  al di sopra  di  qualsiasi movimento di partito;  egli,  secondo 
la sua propria bella espressione,  si  è  fatto  «se  stesso  partito».  Il  suo  ideale  
imperiale  trae  origine non da una determinata  appartenenza partitica;  esso  è  
espressione  di  una  convinzione  scientifica, che  scorgeva  in  uno  stato  
mondiale  monarchico  la  salvezza dell’umanità. In questo ambiente Dante ha 
ideato  la  sua  grande  concezione  sullo Stato e l’umanità: tutto il mondo 
occidentale diviso nei due campi nemici  del  papato e  dell’impero —  l’Italia  
frantumata  in  innumerevoli  stati  e  partiti  che lottano  tra  di loro, che si 
adoperano ad annullarsi  l’un  l’altro — la patria grondante del sangue di una 
nefasta guerra civile —  ed  egli  stesso  un  esiliato  senza  patria,  un  uomo senza 
pace,  che  nulla  brama  più  della  pace!  Pace  per  sè, per  la  sua  città  e  per  l 
’Italia,  per  tutta  l ’umanità!”329  
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As Kelsen says, “peace” was the biggest aspiration of his life, “il concetto centrale del suo 
sistema politico” pointing to the end of book 1 of Monarchia.330 
 
 The canzone Doglia mi reca, from this period, was also an anti-courtly rumination 
on the disastrous effects of greed and monetary accumulation as connected with the 
notions of nobility, beauty, and elite courtly values. But this period after exile is when 
Dante also began to ruminate in a way beyond the moral lyrics on the problem of 
Justice. As Holmes points out, his political misfortune is placed in a philosophical 
framework in the canzone Tre Donne, from the 1302-1304 period. One of the ladies is 
Justice and her daughter and granddaughter. Although human virtues have so fallen on 
evil days, Love declares “let the eyes that weep and the mouths that wail be those of 
mankind whom it concerns, having fallen under the rays of such a heaven; not ours, who 
are of the eternal citadel” (piangano gli occhi e dolgasi la bocca/ de li uomini a cui tocca, 
che sono a’ raggi di cotal ciel giunti; / non noi, che semo de l’etterna rocca). As Holmes 
writes, “Love acknowledges the proper role of Justice. In the later part of the poem 
Dante refers more directly to his own plight. He takes pride in being an exile, like the 
exiled personification of Justice, but he ends by sending his poem off in search of 
reconciliation. 
 
Canzone, ucella con le bianche penne; 
canzone, caccia con li neri veltri, 
                                                       
330 Ibid., 20; Mon. 1: “O  genus humanum, quantis procellis atque iacturis quantisque 
naufragiis agitari te necesse est dum, bellua multorum capitum factum, in diversa 
conaris! Intellectu egrotas utroque, similiter et aflectu: rationibus  irrefragabilibus 
intellectum  superiorem non curas, nec experientie vultu inferiorem sed nec affectum 
dulcedine divine suasionis, cum per tubam Spiritus Sancti  tibi  affetur: ‘Eccequam 
bonum et quam iocundum habitare fratres in unum.’” 
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che fuggir mi convenne, 
ma far mi poterian di pace dono.  
Però nol fan che non san quel che sono 
 
(Song, go hawking with the white wings [White Guelfs]; song, go hunting with the black 
hounds [Black Guelfs]—which I have had to flee, though they could still make me the 
gift of peace. It is because they don’t know what I am that they don’t do so).”331  
 
 
 In the next chapter we shall see that Dante’s interest in justice and monarchy is 
specifically conditioned by the complete enmeshment of political and economic 
interests—already partially discussed in this chapter—which will set the stage for re-
examining his political thought as properly a critique of political economy.  
 
  
                                                       
331 Holmes, Dante, 25. 
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Se niuna lezione è utile a’ cittadini che governono le repubbliche, è quella che dimostra 
le cagione degli odi e delle divisioni della città, acciò che possino, con il pericolo d’altri 
diventati savi, mantenersi uniti…e se di niuna republica furono mai le divisioni notabili, 
di quella di Firenze sono notabilissime: perché la maggior parte delle altre republiche, 
delle quali si ha qualche notizia, sono state contente di una divisione con la quale, 
secondo gli accidenti, hanno ora accresciuta ora rovinata la città loro; ma Firenze, non 
contenta di una, ne ha fatte molte. In Roma, come ciascuno sa, poi che i re ne fuorono 
cacciati nacque la disunione intra i nobili e la plebe, e con quella infino alla rovina sua si 
mantenne…Ma di Firenze in prima si divisono intra loro i nobili, di poi i nobili e il 
popolo, e in ultimo il popolo e la plebe; e molte volte occorse che una di queste parti, 
rimasa superiore, si divise in due. Dalle quali divisioni ne nacquero tante morti, tanti 
esili, tante destruzioni di famiglie, quante mai ne nascessero in alcuna città della quale si 
abbia memoria.332 
 
Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine 
 
 
*    *       *  
 
Like Machiavelli, his predecessor in Florentine History, John Najemy too begins his 
History of Florence 1200-1575 highlighting the dynamic of class conflicts, especially 
between rich and middle classes, but also between the latter and the poor class, as a 
major and decisive factor in the evolution of Florentine political and social history. Such 
analysis is a strong component of Aristotelian analysis (in the Politics, Aristotle 
extensively discusses class conflicts, especially linked to haves and have-nots as a motor 
of regime change and the transmutation of political fortunes) and Marxian analysis 
later. Of course, the history of actual class conflict between lower classes and wealthy 
classes is outside the scope of the present study, but the point is that the entire history of 
the city that gave birth to the explosive factionalism that saw the condemnation and 
exile of Dante for "monetary corruption" was characterized itself by the evolution of 
oligarchical formations within the Florentine republic and conflict, as we have already 
                                                       




seen in outline, not just amongst the wealthy and poor generally, but predominantly 
amongst the extremely moneyed elite popolo, popolani, and popolo grasso/magnati.333 
This complex and multilayered political conflict, as Najemy puts it, was further 
undergirded by the aspirations of "the ‘popolo’ that created the guild republic and 
challenged the elite to justify its power within a normative framework of law and 
political ethics; and the artisan and laboring classes, whose exertions and skills 
produced the material culture from prized textiles to the stones of rich men’s homes, 
and who in turn challenged the popolo to allow the guild republic to embrace its full 
implications.”334 Indeed, as Najemy points out, Florence’s history and culture changed 
through these conflicts and class antagonisms, which Machiavelli termed the “divisioni."  
 
 In the previous chapter we examined the major political history of the international 
papal/imperial conflicts, Italy, and Florence starting in the early 13th century through the 
time of Dante's exile in the early 14th century. We also examined Dante's political career 
in the context of this history. In this chapter, I will be examining the political history of 
the upper classes—popolo, popolani, and magnati—and their affairs and evolution in 
the political institutions of Florence.  This chapter is intended therefore to build off the 
previous chapter with the following aims:  
 
                                                       
333 For extensive discussion of these the terms, see the essays in Raveggi et al., 
Ghibellini, guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere politico a Firenze nella seconda 
metà del dugento, edited by Sergio Raveggi (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1978).  
 
334 John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575 (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), 2. 
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1) to show that, in fact, the traditionally told history of politics in the age of Dante is but 
one layer of a narrative that must be historicized in terms of economic interests 
 
2) to provide evidence of political economy as a historical object; ie. that the intersection 
of political and economic interest is demonstrable as a, if not the, major driving force of 
the history often told as a conflict between ideological values between city, empire, and 
church and the factions and conflicts within Florence itself in the 13th and 14th  centuries.  
 
 My contention, in short, is that Dante's political thought—in favor of a single 
monarch whose prime directive is to stop the endless and regressive power of greed—is 
a response to the devastating injustice that he perceived was being precipitated by the 
intersection of politics and economics in chrematistic capitalist polities such as his own 
(explored in chapter 5). Thus in order to show what the object termed 'political 
economy' is as an historical object,335 this chapter shows—through a thoroughly 
historicist re-reading of the history of chapter 2—that in fact, at almost every stage of the 
political and social history of post-popolo (1250) Florence, the entire evolution of its 
institutional history is driven by this intersection of politics and economics: through 
economic interests determining and/or influencing the conflicts between church and 
empire and in the evolution of the institutions of the Florentine state according to the 
dominant prerequisites and hegemonic directives of the commercial and banking class. 
Given the outsized international power of the Florentine banks, this history of 
Florentine political economy thus also demonstrates that it is impossible to read the 
                                                       
335 This is very different from thinking of political economy according to its own 
ideological construction, as has been the topic of a vast literature in modern Marxism.  
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international history of the papal-imperial conflicts that ravished Italy during this 
period without grafting it upon the intersection of capital and politics taking place 
within Florence.  
 
The chapter thus proceeds with the following sections, which provide the historical 
evidence for my thesis.  
 
3.1) Political economy in the period of the primo popolo and the period of 1260-1266 
that saw the Ghibelline restoration under Manfred Hohenstaufen and the pope, in 
collaboration with Florentine bankers and capitalist class, exiled Guelfs, and Charles of 
Anjou, defeat Manfred and enact the Guelf restoration in 1267.  
 
3.2) The consolidation of political economic institutions and oligarchy in the secondo 
popolo and priorate of the guilds (1282) through Giano della Bella and the Ordinamenti 
di giustizia (1293-1295). 
 
3.3) Papal intertwinement with Florentine (and Tuscan) capitalism, and the political 
economy of White and Black Guelfism (1281-1304). 
 
3.4) The consolidation of political economic interests in the post-1308 Mercanzia as 
rule of corporations over the city of Florence. 
 
As my aim in the chapter is to provide ample historical evidence of political economy 
in Italy during the period of Dante’s life, the majority of my argument draws from the 
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secondary work of historians who have written extensively on these topics based on 
primary source documents from Italian archives. My aim is to integrate the work of 





1. The Primo Popolo, Ghibelline Restoration, and Victory of the Guelfs 




The popolo of Florence was not really “popular,” if popular implies socio- 
economically diverse or populist. In fact, to the contrary, the popolo government was 
actually the first example in Florentine history of the triumph of an explicitly 
mercantile-banking oligarchy. According to Najemy,  
the primo popolo clearly attempted to remove the families associated with the 
elite parties and to replace the old governing class with new men. On the other 
hand, most of the Anziani came from families associated with the major guilds 
and were involved in banking, trade, and the legal profession. Among those 
whose professions have been identified were many Calimala merchants, some 
bankers or moneylenders, a dozen from Por Santa Maria, twenty jurists or 
notaries, and five from the Wool guild. No representatives of the minor, or 
artisan, guilds have been identified among these officeholders.336 
 
The prominence of financial interests in the primo popolo is remarkable, and the 
extent of its being “popular” lies in the fact that the government of 1250-1260 
extensively excluded most of the previous ruling class and attempted to crack down on 
Guelf and Ghibelline factionalism.337 The primo popolo, as is true for the rest of 
Florentine political and social history through the life of Dante, starts the pattern of 
consolidating influence and power with the moneyed elite, to the exclusion of the poor 
and less wealthy bourgeoisie. In this sense, the primo popolo was not a “social 
revolution”: “it emerged from a split within the elite, between those committed to the 
factions and those who saw such alliances as damaging to the economic interests of their 
                                                       
336 Ibid., 67. 
 
337 Ibid., 68. 
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class and city.”338 The primo popolo’s success was enabled by the strengthened 
institutions of the guilds and military confraternities, which were also institutions that 
would become increasingly important in safeguarding the interests of the city-state’s 
new economic elite.  
 
We see a concrete example of political economy, not just in the social and economic 
formation of the primo popolo state, but also as an intersection of economic and 
political interests actually driving international political contests, in what otherwise 
looks like a basic conflict over secular/church ideology and power, when the Ghibellines 
return to Florentine rule for six years with Guido Novello of the Counts Guidi (a cousin 
of Guelf Guido Guerra) governing in the name of Manfred Hohenstaufen after the Guelf 
loss at Montaperti in 1260. We see the heavy, and hardly “invisible,” hand of capital at 
work. While old Ghibelline elites return to politics, the social make-up of those 
participating in state organs was like that of the primo popolo: it was almost entirely 
composed of wealthy merchants and bankers; participation of non-elite guildsmen was 
negligible, though certain Guelf elements of the same class were essentially kept out of 
power and politically restricted. However, as Najemy points out, the “fatal weakness” of 
the Ghibelline restoration was its failure to actually control the power of the exiled and 
restricted Guelfs who had suffered such a humiliating loss at Montaperti. Namely, the 
problem lay in the state’s  “inability to control the influence of Florentine merchant 
capital in and outside the city. The commercial and banking companies whose leading 
parties were exiled in 1260, such as the Bardi, Mozzi, Rossi and Scali temporarily lost 
                                                       




their Florentine property but not their far-flung investments and assets, which were 
beyond the reach of the Ghibellines. Even companies that continued to direct operations 
from Florence were difficult to control.”339  
 
This analysis highlights an aspect about the nature of state capitalism at this time, 
before the 16th century, that is articulated by Heilbroner, namely that 
 
 …capital, which arises within the state and which exists only at the pleasure of 
the state, becomes increasingly capable of defying, or of existing ‘above,’ the 
state. A network of commodity flows cuts through the boundaries of national 
sovereignty to form a ‘system’ that operates according to the dictates of its own 
logic, with less regard for those of politics. Such a world system came into 
existence originally with the rise of integrated market flows of broad dimensions 
in the sixteenth-century—what Wallerstein has called a ‘world-economy’—but in 
recent years its presence has become dramatically apparent in the emergence of 
supranational corporations and pools of money seemingly capable of eluding all 
constraints of political boundaries. 340   
 
Heilbroner’s analysis in turn demonstrates the world-system nature of the evolution 
of a capitalist society already at this time in which political and economic interests are 
totally intertwined, not just on the level of the internal class relations of Florence itself, 
with its wealthy popolo and super wealthy bankers, but at the level of relations with 
other Italian cities and political plays between monarchic, church, and seigniorial 
elements.341 During this time we see the beginning of a pattern of politics being 
                                                       
339 Ibid., 72. 
 
340 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism (New York: Norton, 
1985), 94.  
 
341 On the fact that Wallerstein’s world-economic analysis of capitalism must be 
recognized in medieval Italy and western Europe (and further), see the important and 
definitive contribution of Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World 
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determined by overlapping interests that cluster around bankers with sufficient capital 
abilities to fund military operations or hold sway at a more local or regional level. We 
will see this scenario repeated by Boniface VIII in extra-state level collusion with 
banking and industrial interests in the suppression of the White Guelfs later (see 3.3 
below). However, in terms of the Angevin Alliance at this time, “no one realized the 
potential significance of [the restive nature of Guelf capital] more than the pope elected 
in August 1261, the Frenchman Urban IV, who turned his pontificate into a crusade to 
destroy the Hohenstaufen and put an end to their repeated attempts to control the 
peninsula and encircle and dominate the papacy.”342  
 
In sum, Urban needed someone to challenge Manfred, which led him to Charles of 
Anjou (brother of King Louis XI). The connection here is that Charles needed a 
significant amount of money to fulfill this ambition, thus Urban pressured Florentine 
bankers to rally against the Hohenstaufen through threats to release their debtors from 
obligations, interrupt imports of Flemish textiles, or even imprison or confiscate their 
goods. According to Najemy, as the result of secret negotiations with papal officials 
many merchants entered a pact and pledged financial support for the Angevin campaign 
to avoid these punitive measures. Davidsohn reports that the Pope manipulated the Arte 
della lana, the textile guild, with the textile issue as leverage, and generally “cercò di 
piegare ai suoi disegni i membri delle corporazioni, minnacciando i loro interessi 
economici” and later intensified this with “minacce all’ Arte di Calimala, la corporazione 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For a discussion of the 
historiography of the history capitalism in medieval Italy, see below chapter 4. 
 




dei banchieri.”343 As Najemy puts it, what is remarkable is not just the fact that such 
negotiations were going on despite the Ghibelline state (that had no knowledge of it for 
up to two years), but that the state had no effective power to combat the movement of 
capital and capital linked interests. In the end 181 Florentine bankers and merchants 
from twenty-one major companies (including big names such as the Scali, Mozzi, Spini, 
Pulci-Rimbertini, Bardi, Cerchi, Frescobaldi and Rossi firms) pledged loyalty to the 
papacy and the Guelf cause, and committed to the destruction of Ghibelline rule and 
Hohenstaufen power.344  As Najemy writes,  
these pacts were the foundation of a momentous rearrangement of power in Italy, as 
the already great and still growing wealth of Florentine merchant-bankers turned 
decisively against the Ghibellines and Manfred, allied with the papacy and Charles of 
Anjou, and made Florence the financial core of a Guelf entente that linked the city to 
France and to what was about to become the Angevin south of Italy. The German-
Hohenstaufen imperial orbit in which the commune had emerged and developed was 
now replaced by a papal-French-Avignon orbit that offered new and greater 
opportunities for Florentine commercial expansion.345 
 
Najemy details these “opportunities” for Florentine bankers, in an analysis that 
exposes why the scholarly discussion about the conflict between spiritual or temporal 
realms and competing claims between them are often blurred and why even a binary like 
church/empire can be misleading as a heuristic category (as I have discussed at length 
above), and perhaps only really be helpful if we remain in the abstraction of publicist or 
scholastic treatises on political notions of spiritual and secular authority, which are 
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Sansoni, 1972), 763-764.; See also ibid., 764. ff., regarding the “Conquista dei banchieri 
fiorentini.” 
 
344 Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575, 73. 
 




deracinated from the actual historical reality except to the extent that they are 
commissioned to support one or the other side of the debate at various historical 
intersections of conflict between particular popes and particular national monarchs. On 
the papal side of the deal in financing Charles’ (imperial) army, the banks provided 
interest-bearing loans backed by repayment in ecclesiastical (papal) taxes they collected 
as agents of the papacy throughout Europe, especially in France. Also since the pope 
declared Manfred a Muslim and Heretic, the war became a crusade and hence eligible 
for crusade taxes. On the other side of the ecclesiastical taxation privilege, since many 
church entities and prelates could not pay their assessments, the same bankers loaned 
them money to pay the taxes they themselves were collecting with additional loans at 
interest and fees. Florentine firms, thus, secured an astonishing double or triple dip 
profit from loans to Charles and those ecclesiastical entities taxed on the authority of the 
pope to repay them. Dealings such as these make the legacy of medieval investiture 
conflict seem quite remote and clearly irrelevant in practice, and if anything only 
adumbrate the sort of massive objections out of Germany that would re-emerge two 
centuries later in the protestant reformation. On the imperial side, the most lucrative 
gain of all was that Charles gained promises of influence over Tuscany and southern 
Italian territories and thus was in a position to grant expansive “commercial, trading, 
and banking privileges to his creditors in the southern Italian territories that he was 
about to conquer.”346 
 
In 1267, Charles of Anjou was made the podestà and the Ghibellines were effectively 
smashed. Ultimately (and surprisingly) this group of merchant-bankers close to Charles 
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(and allied with the papacy) did not take complete power: of the companies that made 
loans to Charles only the Bardi were regularly present in the 1267-1280 Guelf councils. 
According to Najemy “despite their decisive role in the Guelf victory, it may have been 
the very fact of excessively close ties to Charles that kept these families from power.” 
Nonetheless the historical consensus here is that this period of the Guelf restoration 
marks the beginning of a shift, right during Dante’s birth and infancy in which  
 
economic realities worked inexorably to define the ruling class…and the 
merchant and trading giants became the core of a newly configured elite. This 
was by no means the ‘triumph’ of a ‘bourgeoisie’ over an ‘aristocracy.’ It was 
rather a process of evolution within the elite itself, a replacement at the center of 
power of elite families that did not adapt to the age’s booming capitalism by 
equally elite, if somewhat more recent, families that did. However, 
simultaneously and as a consequence of economic expansion at the local level, in 
particular the boom in textile trades, the non-elite popolo of the guilds also 
gained strength and prepared to challenge the entire elite, both its old and new 
components. These two developments are sometimes confused and even 
conflated. Although they overlapped, they were distinct: on the one hand, a 
transformation of the elite from a predominantly (but never exclusively) warrior 
class characterized by its knighthoods, city enclaves, and countryside strongholds 
into a class increasingly  (although still not entirely) defined by far-flung 
mercantile activities across Europe and the Mediterranean; and, on the other 
hand, the rise to unprecedented political strength through their guilds of a 
coalition of local merchants, manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, and notaries. 
Both processes came to full view around 1280.347 
 
  
                                                       
347 Ibid., 75-76. 
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The “Priorate of the Guilds” exemplifies another stage of the development of political 
economy during Dante’s adolescence and young adulthood. The Priorate of the Guilds 
arose following a general attempt to reconcile and re-enfranchise government divided 
between exiled Ghibelline interests and Guelfs with the peacemaker Cardinal Latino. 
While I will not go into extensive detail here, what is important to recognize is that for 
the first time “the power of legally recognized and self-constituted guilds to generate 
binding collective obligations on behalf of their members was used to buttress a 
Florentine government,” essentially since in this context of capitalist dominance over 
politics the form of state began to change as the arti, or guild corporations, began to 
appear more concretely as legal entities known as “universitates.”348   
 
As Angevin rule collapsed with the Sicilian Vespers (1282), the transfer of power to 
the guilds had popular support. Dino Compagni recalls (1.4) that he was one of six 
popolani who succeeded in winning support for the “priors of the guilds, to aid the 
merchants and guildsmen whenever necessary.” Within a year, the priorate of the guilds 
was the de facto governing entity in Florence.349  Effectively then, from the narratives of 
Villani and Compagni, we learn that the 1280s sees the creation of a guild regime whose 
                                                       
348 Ibid., 77-78.; For more complete definition of this issue of the universitas—or 
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Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1959), 10, et passim, and Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies; A Study in 
Mediaeval Political Theology, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).  
 




controlling interests are the most powerful guilds (incidentally those with the greatest 
world capital deposits, industrial, and financial influence): Calimala (international 
merchants, bankers, and large-scale commodity traders), Cambio (international 
merchant companies and many non-elite companies), and Lana (woolen cloth and 
textile importers, large production industrialist and smaller producers).350 At this time 
then, a large political question was that of how many guilds would be given priors to sit 
on the priorate. While this was resolved by eventually expanding membership to twelve 
of the twenty-one guilds, “over the next decade, the elite managed to control the 
elections and produce priorates cumulatively dominated by members of five major 
guilds. From 1282 to 1292, Calimala and Cambio jointly had 46% of the posts, Giudici e 
Notai 19%, Lana and Por Santa Maria each 10%” while 14/156 families (consorterie) 
appearing in the priorate during the same period held 26% or 98 of the posts.”351 In the 
years that led up to Dante’s writing Le docli rime and Doglia mi reca, Florence 
increasingly looks like an oligarchy of capitalist interests, a true rule of the rich. 
 
 These dominant families with their grip on the priorate of the guilds “were not the 
ruling Guelf elite of 1267-80. With some exceptions, the politically successful families 
were now from the banking and commercial class…the institution of the priorate thus 
promoted the rise to leadership within the elite of merchant-banking families and the 
gradual slide into obscurity of older families.”352 This transition had moral and political 
consequences within Florence that led to the secondo popolo and the ordinamenti di 
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giustizia. According to Compagni (1.5) the hope had been that the priorate would be a 
“non-partisan government protective of ‘the small and the weak’”, but this was not the 
case. Not only did it fail to reduce elite power but appeared as a controlled sort of crony 
capitalist oligarchy. Though the priorate was supposed to safeguard the wealth of the 
commune and protect the small against the powerful, the laws were corrupted. They let 
the smaller (popolo/popolani) be attacked and taken advantage of by the grandi 
(magnates) and by the rich popolani grassi.353 In other words, the priorate of the guilds 
and its super oligarchical constitution caused political and factional conflict, and even 
violence, to erupt between the merely wealthy and the super wealthy, but this 
distinction is rather weak as some of the mega-rich were not considered as a pariah class 
but as good “popolani”: 
 
Compagni laments the control of the new institutions by ‘grandi’ who were just as 
objectionable in his eyes as the old elite: a lordly and haughty ruling group that he 
saw as a combination of magnates and wealthy non-magnates linked to them by 
marriage. In his eyes the class that had to be reined in was not limited to the 
magnates; it was the entire elite, magnate and non-magnate, against which his ‘good 
popolani’ of the non-elite guild community needed to marshal their forces.354  
 
Another factor playing a role in these events was the ruling elite’s war with 
Ghibelline Pisa and Arezzo in the late 1280s. They scored a victory at Campaldino 
(Dante fought in it) in 1289, but the war went on for several years. This military activity 
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conduced to further strengthening of minor guilds, and saw the concurrent emergence 
of Vieri de’ Cerchi and Corso Donati as future leaders of the White and Black factions.355 
 
In 1292, under pressure to represent the interests of the non-elite, that is non-super 
wealthy guildsmen, the council of the consuls of the twelve major guilds discussed 
proposals for giving an “equal say in the nomination and/or final approval of candidates 
to the independently elected consuls of the twelve guilds.” This question would 
determine whether new men would be recruited evenly from the twelve guilds into the 
priorate or whether to bypass the guilds and entrust the election to a body chosen by 
outgoing priors which would effectively limit access to the priorate to the same elite 
which had already been dominant for the last decade (for example, in the way that 
nearly every US Treasury and Federal Reserve administration is run by former Goldman 
Sachs bankers who in turn pick Goldman Sachs bankers to replace themselves).  What 
was at stake was that middle and minor guildsmen might share equally in the priorate 
and its elections. Though the elite (represented by the five major guilds with a 
preponderance of bankers) was against this measure, “the debate was a breakthrough 
for the popolo and the guild community in establishing the autonomy and equality of 
each guild in nominating candidates and the equality of all twelve guilds in the final 
voting. For the next century, the autonomy and the equality of the guilds…became the 
hallmarks of guild republicanism."356  
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Thus the anti-magnate legislation of 1292 was intended to punish those labeled 
magnates and to keep egalitarian participation in the government of the priorate of the 
21 guilds an institutional reality. In what Najemy calls the “most important political 
document in Florentine history” which was written with six priors elected in 1292, along 
with three jurists, and first promulgated on Jan 18, 1293, the Ordinances did “two 
overwhelmingly important things: they 1) created a formal federation among the guilds 
and placed the executive branch of Florentine government in its hands, and 2) codified 
and expanded existing antimagnate legislation...”357  
 
…appropriating the concept of justice to legitimate both its constitutional reforms 
and its policy toward the magnates, the Ordinances borrowed the Roman law 
definition of justice as the ‘constant and perpetual desire to ensure each his right 
[ius]’ and declared it the foundation on which the Ordinances themselves ‘are 
deservedly called ‘of justice’”  and promulgated “for the welfare of the res 
publica.” The first rubric created the formal federation of twenty-one guilds, 
claiming “that is judged most perfect which consists of all its parts and is 
approved by the judgment of them all.” The second part of this sentence is a loud 
paraphrase of a famous maxim of Roman law, quod omnes tangit debet ab 
omnibus approbari (that which touches all must be approved by all), which, 
although not applied to government in its original context, was frequently used 
by medieval jurists to assert that legitimate rule depended on consent. In this 
version, the “parts” are the guilds, and the whole that they constitute is in one 
sense their federation and in a larger sense the “res publica” whose welfare the 
Ordinances promote. The ordinances thus affirmed that the legitimacy of 
Florentine government depended on the consent of the guilds. Each of the 
twenty-one guilds was required to appoint a legal representative empowered to 
swear an oath on behalf of his guild to “construct and preserve the good, pure, 
and loyal society and company of these same guilds,” to honor and defend the 
communal magistrates, priors, guilds and the whole Florentine populus 
and…preserve and defend the justice and right [iustitia and ius] of the 
guildsmen.358 
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 The ordinances, as seen in chapter 2, also restricted the political participation of 
the “magnates” by requiring members of the guilds to actually practice the profession 
represented in it, and not merely enroll in the guild on the basis of membership in a 
powerful banking or mercantile consorteria, which had been the normal avenue to 
oligarchical power in the unreformed guild regime. Effectively it was like restricting 
membership to actually practicing executives, and excluding mere members of the 
corporate boardrooms and interconnected economic elite. The composition of the 
magnates included much of the economic elite of bankers and commercial traders, but 
“the presence among the magnates of so much of the economic elite makes it impossible 
to argue, as many have, that the ordinances mark the rise to power of the capitalists that 
had been pushing older ‘feudal’ families from the centers of power. Behind the popular 
government of 1293-5 were the non-elite guildsmen who viewed with suspicion the 
entire elite (old and new, Guelf and Ghibelline, bankers and landowners).” Relegating 
the entire economic elite to magnate status would have caused an upper class revolt, so 
the ordinances were mostly designed to curb their absolute power and to serve as a 
warning to those who did not cooperate in a more inclusive guild regime with non-elite 
guildsmen.359 As an example of this Najemy offers the Peruzzi bankers, not as rich and 
established as the Bardi, but included in the non-magnates because Pacino Peruzzi had 
argued in favor (Feb 14, 1293) of giving the consuls of the twelve guilds greater 
influence, and so it is no coincidence that his kinsman Giotto Peruzzi (acting head of the 
company) was also elected that same day and sat on the same priorate with Giano della 
                                                       




Bella who expanded the list of magnate families.360 In any case, the history of this period 
has many fascinating aspects that cannot be examined here in detail, but serves to 
exemplify another level of political economy fully operative in the history of the 
development of the Florentine government.  
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 4. Papal Intertwinement with Florentine (and Tuscan) Capitalism, and the 
Political Economy of White and Black Guelfism (1281-1304) 
 
 The works of scholars of the late 19th and 20th century, Robert Davidsohn,361 Gino 
Arias,362 Gino Masi363 and  the work of the later generations of scholars following their 
fundamental work, George Holmes,364 John Najemy,365 and Raveggi et al.,366 are 
particularly important for understanding that the history of the relationships between 
the Holy See and the Italian bankers is one of the most interesting aspects of Italian 
economic and legal history.367 Gino Arias shows us that rather than being a “semplice 
                                                       
361 Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze.  
 
362 Gino Arias, "I banchieri italiani e la S. Sede nel XIII secolo: linee della storia esterna," 
in Studi e documenti di storia del diritto (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902) and "Il 
fondamento economico delle fazioni fiorentine de’ guelfi bianchi e de’ guelfi neri e le 
origini dell'ufficio della Mercanzia in Firenze," In Studi e documenti di storia del diritto 
(Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902). 
 
363 Gino Masi, "I banchieri fiorentini nella vita politica della città," Archivio Giuridico 
"Filippo Serafini" 9 (1931): 57-89; Gino Masi, Il nome delle fazioni fiorentine de' 
bianchi e de' neri (Aquila: Officine grafiche Vecchioni, 1927); Gino Masi, La struttura 
dociale delle fazioni politiche fiorentine ai tempi di Dante,” Giornale Dantesco 31 
(1930): 3-28.  
 
364 George Holmes, “The Papal Revolution, 1294-1305,” in Florence, Rome, and the 
Origins of the Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 163-186.  
 
365  Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575. 
 
366 Sergio Raveggi, Massimo Tarassi, Daniela Medici, and Patrizia Parenti, Ghibellini, 
guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere politico a Firenze nella seconda metà del 
dugento, edited by Sergio Raveggi (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1978).  
 
367  In what follows I base my self primarily off the account of Arias (1902), whose 
contact with primary documents on this question (along with that of Davidsohn and 
Gino Masi) remains so authoritative, despite being over 100 years old, that it is 
repeatedly cited by Najemy, Raveggi et al., and George Holmes in their historigraphies. 
While the historiographical narrative of the political economy of papal banking in 13th 
and 14th centuries then is not “new” to the field of Italian, and particularly Florentine, 
economic and political history, it must be stated that it is “new” in relations to other 
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enumerazione dei contratti fra codesti mercanti e la Chiesa,” such a history shows a 
well-defined and long-term political economic relationship, and must be seen in its 
entirety, taking account of “lo svilluppo commerciale, con la politica pontifica, con la 
costituzione de’ paesi, ai quali i banchieri appartengono e nei quali, per solito, 
primeggiano.”368 In other words for Arias, the papal relationship with all the Italian city 
states and foreign powers is of absolutely critical importance, and must be seen as a 
crucial layer in the complex political economy of their institutions and social 
configurations.  
 
We have already discussed the relationship (3.1) between Urban IV and the Guelfs in 
Florence that led the intervention of Charles of Anjou on behalf of the pope in 
Florence.369 In the era of French Pope Martin IV (1281-1285), the papacy continued its 
extensive relationships with the Tuscan bankers for the collection of church taxes 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
parallel historiographies in intellectual history as well as in Dante studies, which have 
tended to view church state conflicts according to their purely top-level ideological 
arguments in publicist literature and in temrs of political clashes between church and 
imperial parties, without conntecting the latter to either the municipal political history 
of Florence or the economic and social history of Florentine politics. The total 
imbrication of the political and economic with the church, then, needs to be retold over 
100 years later in relation to Dante when it is totally absent from contemporary 
treatments. My inclusion of this historiography here then, predominantly based on 
Arias, is rooted in my conviction of its fundamental importance and that the 
historiographies of more recent historians on the topic (though less exhaustive on this 
particular question), as is obvious from their work, are reliant on Arias’ and Davdisohn’s 
yet unrivaled archival work on banking and papal politics in the late 13th and 14th 
centuries. New work remains to be done building off these historians, but would only be 
possible through exhaustive new research in Florentine and Roman archives. 
 
368 Gino Arias, "I banchieri italiani e la S. Sede nel XIII secolo: linee della storia 
esterna," in Studi e documenti di storia del diritto (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902), 77. 
 
369 See also, Raveggi et al., Ghibellini, guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere 
politico a Firenze nella seconda metà del dugento, 56-58 
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(decime) from all over Europe, and even as far as Iceland and Greenland. In the early 
1280s, the Bonsignori of Siena, the Spiliati-Spini, Pulci and Rimbertini of Florence, and 
the Ricciardi of Lucca were the preeminent players in the collection of decime, amongst 
dozens of firms, including the Cerchi, Frescobaldi, della Scala and del Pazzo, the latter of 
which Giano della Bella—hardly a populist revolutionary (!)—was an investment 
partner.370  The taxes collected by over a dozen other banking firms were eventually 
processed and deposited in these four.371 According to Arias, these relationships were 
primarily ordered around reciprocal political and economic aims: 
 
è, prima di tutto, da notarsi il grande numero delle compagnie, con le quali la 
Chiesa durante questo periodo, ha rapporti d’affari, a differenza di quanto 
accadeva ne’ tempi anteriori. Ciò rivela l’attuazione di un’abile politica per la 
quale i pontefici cercano di sottrarsi alle prepotenze di una o di poche case 
bancarie e di provocare insieme la gelosia e la concorrenza fra i ‘mercatores 
Romanae Ecclesiae’.372 
 
As this was before the age of central banks, not every bank offered (nor could offer) 
the same guarantees of low-risk solvency and so it was, from time to time, necessary for 
the papacy to switch to firms that offered stronger protections on deposits.373  Arias 
notes that it is also not surprising during this period of particularly unstable political 
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371 For a succinct overview of papal relationships with Florentine banking and 
commercial firms, which follows and corroborates Arias’ narrative, see Holmes, 
Florence, Rome, and the Origins of the Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 
35-43 
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conflict in Tuscany that the papacy—following a decentralized approach—selected banks 
in different regions and under different political authorities: besides reinforcing the 
political advantages of the papacy in regards to its financial and political power afforded 
by large deposits spread between many municipalities, firms, and locations, increasing a 
spread of banking relationships functioned to ensure that the church’s financial (and 
political) health would survive any commercial or political crisis that might arise in any 
particular city.374 It was essentially a way of guaranteeing a politically stable pipeline of 
ecclesiastical rent-taking and of preserving capital in investment banking corporations 
whose accounts tended to the least amount of risk when combined with their other 
financial activities, including loans and speculations based on their large deposits, of 
which ecclesiastical money represented a large capital base.   
 
But the competition and political contests between Tuscan firms, though there was 
an increasing shift in power to the Florentine banks in this period, brought risks and 
uncertainties. As Arias comments,  
avvenimenti improvvisi potevano ridonar nuovo vigore ai banchieri Senesi e 
toglier credito ai Fiorentini o anche far sì che il centro della vita bancaria si 
trasportasse altrove, per esempio, a Pistoia o Lucca. Nè basta: poiche non tutte le 
compagnie avevano credito uguale nei diversi paesi, era bene rivolgersi per le 
singole operazioni, a quelle che in un determinato luogo godessero maggior 
fiducia.375  
 
One of the downsides of a decentralized system was that loans in sufficiently large 
quantities were less easy to secure because of the political chess involved in having 
allegiances so decentralized and making promises regarding collection of decime to 
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more firms. The church needed lots of loans to assist the Angevins in Sicily at this time—
again with Charles of Anjou (who had vanquished Manfred Hohenstaufen and the 
Florentine Ghibellines), recently returned from Middle Eastern crusading-- to fight 
Ghibelline elements there aligned with the Aragonese crown. As Arias puts it, 
underscoring the real political economy involved here (the close interlocking between 
political power and financial interest), “era necessario reprimere la rivolta, la quale 
aveva prodotto un risveglio del partito Ghibellino e minacciava di compromettere 
seriamente gli interessi Pontifici. Le ditte bancarie, per conto loro, non acconsentivano a 
far prestiti a Carlo d’ Angiò, senza la garanzia dei Pontefici, non garanzia morale, 
s’intende, ma delle decime ricevute in deposito.”376   
 
 Thus to ensure access to the massive loans necessary for this campaign the 
church gave more of a monopoly over the collection of tithing deposits to a few firms 
over others—as a form of incentivizing future revenues and guaranteeing the large 
outflows of capital involved—while still maintaining a large spread of deposits 
everywhere, as Arias puts it, to maintain political power and a fragile balance between 
Ghibelline and Guelf commitments: “Le vicende della guerra Siciliana e in genere il 
risveglio Ghibellino aiutano anche a spiegare la cura addimostrata da Martino IV di non 
prediligere questa o quella città, a favore delle altre. Così si sfuggiva il pericolo che i 
banchieri della città trascurata, con uno di quei loro subitanei mutamenti, si 
determinassero ad aiutare l’incipiente risorgimento del partito cosidetto imperiale.”377 
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According to Arias, this explains why the Bonsignori bank, of traditionally Ghibelline 
background, was granted more favors by the church at this time: to preempt with money 
any lack of dedication to Guelf papal causes that might erupt into Ghibellinism should 
insufficient capital not be persuasive enough.378 
 
There was significant backlash amongst bishops given the (correct) perception that 
these decime collected for “crusading in the holy land,” especially in strongly Ghibelline 
Germany—fresh off the decline of Hohenstafuen power—were actually being used for 
other overtly nefarious political (anti-Ghibelline) purposes, as all the money was going 
directly to a handful of powerful Italian banks and was not deposited, as had often been 
traditional before this time, in monasteries and diocesan controlled institutions. This 
opposition, most marked in Germany, signaled an attempt to take money away from the 
Angevin-Papal alliance and deny Charles of Anjou the money necessary for his Sicilian 
campaign. For this reason, Martin IV ensured that the papacy ceased entrusting 
deposits of church tithes with monasteries and bishoprics entirely, and instead had it all 
go directly into the hands of his personally selected Italian bankers.379 Of course, this 
also had risks, as corruption was not unknown and some bankers embezzled church 
funds over and above the fees and commissions collected in service to the pope.  
 
The economic-political power of the church was so strong (the equivalent of several 
large world governments in the modern context), however, that market forces (so to 
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speak), which would otherwise have threatened the spread of deposits—that is, the risk 
that a preferred bank was outcompeted by anther or lost money on a risky deal, or if the 
church withdrew too many deposits threatening the capital security of the accounts—did 
not even threaten its capital. Sometimes banks would ignore papal orders to transfer 
money to other firms, either because doing so would undermine another investment 
(especially in the case of smaller firms) or because of competitive rivalry. In some 
instances, when the church would demand to withdraw large funds from smaller banks, 
because of commercial relationships between the latter and larger banks, competing 
banks would even pay the church the demanded deposit in the name of the other bank 
in order to prevent some (perhaps even modest) interest of their own being ruined by 
the failure of the smaller bank which would occur had all the funds suddenly been 
withdrawn.380 The church withdrawing deposits of decime for some smaller banks was 
equivalent to a modern bank run, and could cause a complete failure of the institution, 
given the high amount of leveraged securities in relation to hard cash, that then, as 
today, were on the books of these companies.  
 
Honorius IV (r. 1285-1287), Martin’s successor, more or less maintained this policy 
of selecting banking partners based on political expediency, in this case wielding it to 
further Guelf interests: 
Sotto Onorio IV, si affidano spesso incarichi alle compagnie Fiorentine degli 
Alfani e degli gli Spiliati-Spini. Ai primi si assegna la decima d'Ungheria e 
Polonia, agli Spiliati-Spini, secondo l'ordine di Martino IV, è consegnata la 
decima di Colonia, Brema e Magdeburgo; alle due compagnie riunite quella di 
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Sardegna e Corsica, così per la Terra Santa, come per la Sicilia e l'altra di 
Norvegia. Accanto a codeste due società, si trovano due altre, pure Fiorentine, 
degli Abbati e dei Frescobaldi, le quali operano talora unite, talora per conto 
proprio. Compariscono anche in vari casi i Bonsignori, i Ricciardi, e gli 
Ammannati.381 
 
The the policy of Martin IV and Honorius IV continues in the next pontificate as 
well, that of Nicholas IV (r. 1288-1292), where “Non si trova… un così grande numero di 
compagnie, ma si vede applicato lo stesso sistema di equilibrio fra le città Toscane, e 
l'altro d'accaparramento delle ditte non sicuramente Guelfe. Niun altro scopo in fatti 
dovette avere, sotto Martino prima, e poi sotto Onorio, il favore per gli Abbati, se non 
quello di sottrarre i prestiti al partito Ghibellino, a cui gli Abbati stessi appartenevano 
per tradizione e di legare costoro e i loro adepti alla Chiesa.”382 
 
 During this period the hegemony of control over papal capital lay in these banks: the 
Florentine Spiliati-Spini, the Pulci, the Bonsignori (who were given all the collections 
from England and asked for many loans), the Ricciardi of Lucca and the Pistoian 
Chiarenti. Also, around 1291, the Frescobaldi entered the picture, “i quali nel settembre 
del 1291 avevano in deposito dodicimila fiorini di danari di Terra Santa e cinquantadue 
mila libre di tornesi, della ‘decima di Cestelle’.”383 From 1291-1292 the same pattern is 
seen: the popes gave a special privilege to the Chiarenti of Pistoia as his “speciali 
mercatanti” to service two hundred thousand pounds owed by the king of France—partly 
because of Nicolas’ links to the Colonna family, the latter also being close associates of 
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the Chiarenti. But the pope also knew that giving the Chiarenti the contract would 
change their political commitments to the Guelf side:  “avevano fino allora dimostrato 
tendenze piuttosto Ghibelline, le quali naturalmente scomparvero, non appena furono 
entrati al servizio dei pontefici.”384  
 
Arias astutely notes that 
Questo è uno dei sistemi dei papi: tenere al servizio costantemente banche 
sicuramente guelfe ed insieme, con favori di breve durata, se pure in apparenza 
superiori a quelli concessi agli altri, tenere a bada quelle banche, che fan credere 
di proseguire o intraprendere la speculazione Ghibellina. Cosi i Chiarenti, che 
sembrano giunti a tanto grande potenza, saranno poco di poi posti alla pari con 
altre compagnie ed anche, per qualche tempo, allontanati, non perchè ai 
successori di Niccola non piacessero le idee di questo papa, ma per le mutate 
necessità.385 
 
The political power acquired through money and promises of profit reminds one of 
Dante’s remark in Inferno 21 that “there, everyone’s a grafter but Bonturo/ and there-
for cash-they’ll change a no to yes” (“ogn'uom v'è barattier, fuor che Bonturo/ del no, 
per li denar vi si fa ita”).386 There is essentially no record of papal finances at the time of 
Celestine V (r. 1294) due to his extremely short pontificate, but there is copious data for 
Boniface VIII (r. 1294-1303). Arias points out that preceding the start of this pontificate, 
because of the economic crisis that followed the war between Philip le Bel (Philip IV of 
France) and Edward I of England, “avvenne la definitiva rovina di molte case mercantili 
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di Siena, di Lucca e di Firenze.”387 At this time the Bonsignori fell out of favor for failing 
to make sufficient payments on agreed upon loans for “defensione de Regno”, and Arias 
reports that their agents in the Roman Curia were arrested.388  
 
Around 1300, in the context of this financial crisis made more severe by war, the 
Bonsignori and the Ricciardi disappear mostly from papal financial dealings, the former 
because of mismanaging and misrepresenting the books and the latter because some of 
the firms’ partners seem to have attempted to pilfer funds from creditors. When 
discovered by the pope, he ordered the capital and property of the firms seized.389 For 
Arias the disappearance of the Bonsignori of Siena and the Ricciardi of Lucca—which 
represented the only non-Florentine banking relationships with the papacy--was also 
due to the prevalence and monopoly of Florentine financial power, but in any case the 
Boniface VIII era sees a decisive pivot to almost exclusively Florentine banking and 
political relationships.390  But the banks that emerge from this period of financial 
difficulties intact (more marginalized in dealings with the church, though not in open 
war with the church) came to resent the Church and felt the need for a coalition against 
the privileged firms—in this case the Florentine Mozzi and Spini and the Pistoian 
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Chiarenti—and their associates who benefited from the papal relationships and 
weathered the crisis better.391  
 
 Arias sums up the linkage between politics and economics here during the time of 
Boniface’s pontificate and, although writing nearly a century ago, allows us to deepen 
what are otherwise conventional narratives in the field of Dante studies or church state 
history, which give only vague reasons for the debacle and violence between Whites and 
Blacks at Florence and the intervention of the pope that resulted in Dante’s exile along 
with other Whites: 
non si erri nel dichiarare la genesi dei fenomeni, nè si dica che la preferenza di 
Bonifacio per gli Spini deriva dalla loro avversione contro Giano della Bella e dal 
loro favore pel papa, in altri termini dalla politica che costoro seguivano in 
Firenze. Il rapporto causale è proprio il contrario: il privilegio è determinato dalla 
potenza economica della ditta, la quale per uniformarsi ai suoi interessi, deve 
seguire una politica decisamente pontifica. In altri termini è il fatto economico 
che genera il politico, non questo che determina quello. Pei Chiarenti, il favore 
del papa nasce da queste cagioni: necessità di contrapporre ai Fiorentini una 
forte ditta straniera, in quanto era compatibile coll’utile della Chiesa…prevalenza 
finanziaria di costoro sulle compagine Pistoiesi. La volontà del papa di acquistare 
influenza su Pistioia anziché essere la causa del fatto ne era semplicemente una 
conseguenza:  i Chiarenti, allo scopo di assodare il bilancio, facevano propaganda 
pontificia ed acquistavano facilmente adepti, perchè molti concittadini erano a 
loro uniti dagli interessi commerciali.392  
 
 
In other words, the politics in which the banks were involved in Pistoia and Florence 
prior to the eruption of White/Black Guelf factionalism, respectively, had nothing to do 
with an “ideal” politics or theological-poltical ideological commitments of which their 
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relationship or preference for or against the papacy and for or against Philip le Bel was 
an indirect effect. It was rather the other way around! 
 
  Between 1294 and 1297 the relationship of the Spini-Mozzi-Chiarenti with the 
papacy remains strong, and they have a near monopoly over the collection of decime, 
with the addition of the Florentine Franzesi (who are also given a plethora of 
ecclesiastical decime in northern Italy and also happen to be the personal bankers of 
Philip IV of France).393 In 1298, it appears that the monopoly is placed more exclusively 
in the hands of the Spini, with the Chiarenti and Spillati falling out of favor.394 The Spini 
were now granted a near monopoly over the decime, until around August of 1300, in 
Italy and several European territories that year, in so far as the pope needed to grant 
such rights to the decime collection to secure from the same Spini loans necessary for 
the king of Sicily.395 During this period the pope engaged in banking relationships that 
involved a complex web of Florentine bankers, the king of France (Philip IV), his 
brother Charles of Valois, and Philip of Aragon.  
 
 The tumultuous years of 1301-1303 see the pope shifting his allegiances, seeking 
the greatest leverage over Florentine political outcomes in order to maintain a strong 
control over the city that now had the supreme control of his entire capital power. The 
monopoly of the Spini firm thus required intense intervention to protect the former 
from hostile political foes, namely their now angry competitors. Thus we see a strong 
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relationship with the Bardi come into play as a counterbalance to the previous 
exclusivity with the Spini; after the fall of the White Guelfs in Florence, his relationship 
with the Cerchi firm (a white Guelf powerhouse) nearly disappears, given that the Black 
hegemony made it no longer necessary to maintain relationships with them.  
 
 In any case, to bring focus back on the political economy from the time of Dante 
around 1295 after Giano della Bella’s removal, Najemy notes that the popular party did 
not disappear but that the factions soon split between the white and black Guelfs and as 
such constituted an elite resurgence: “As the elite succeeded in rebuilding vertical ties of 
patronage with clients from the popolo, the emboldened factions were soon at each 
other’s throats.” Najemy’s opinion is that it is difficult to know why some families joined 
one or another of the factions.396 As we know Guelfs and former Ghibellines are found 
amongst both the whites and blacks, and “both factions included merchants and 
bankers.” According to Najemy, “competition between rival banking families” was the 
major factor in this factionalism: the whites were led by major banking Cerchi family 
while among the blacks the Spini were Boniface VIII’s most important creditors.397 
 
 Again Arias, writing based on primary documents and the chronicles of Dino 
Compagni and Giovanni Villani, presents a clear picture of how the politics of this 
period of factionalism between White Guelfs and Black Guelfs was determined by 
economic interests in an international political economy of which Florence was a 
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capitalist epicenter, as we have seen, not only for the papacy but also for foreign 
monarchies and their interests involving political client states. In the summer of the 
year 1300 the factional split emerges between the Blacks and the Whites. On the White 
Guelf side we find many of the banks and consorterie seen above in relationships with 
the pope: the Cerchi (the leaders of the faction), the Abbati, Rossi, some of the 
Frescobaldi, Mozzi, Scali, Alfani, some of the Frescobaldi, some of the Bardi, the 
Falconieri, and some of the Pulci.398 The Spini stand out (the near monopolistic papal 
bankers of the time) as the major heft behind the Black side. According to Compagni, 
the Spini, in fact, were not only the greatest adversaries of the Whites but the greatest 
cause of division, as Piero Spini was supposedly responsible for the nose-slicing incident 
committed against Ricoverino dei Cerchi on Calendimaggio, 1300.399 
 
The main question is what did cause the furious and violent political factionalism that 
arose between these two groups of bankers? According to Arias, 
una volta dimostrato che fra gli uni e gli altri esisteva una profonda 
inconciliabilità d’interessi, qua bisognerà vedere il motivo reale dell’animosità 
reciproca. Ormai sappiamo come i banchieri non si lasciassero facilmente 
trasportare da uno spirito di parte d’indole astratta, ma fossero indotti a seguire 
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 This tendency is especially evident in the history of the powerful Cerchi, whose 
entire history as an investment banking consorteria engaged in political faction is that 
of a constant change of alignment according to the needs of their economic interests.401 
There should be no surprise how a political ideology such as Machiavelli’s was nurtured 
through many centuries of his study of Florentine Realpolitik. During the Ghibelline 
restoration the Cerchi were aligned with the ruling Ghibellines, but seeing the 
impending downfall of Manfred and the Ghibellines, they then switched their support to 
the Guelfs (after 1267), backing Charles of Anjou and pope Urban—in exchange, as has 
been mentioned above in section 3.1, for extensive commercial privileges—while still 
keeping, as Arias puts it, “per maggior cautela, un piede nel partitio ghibellino.”402 In 
1294, as magnates, they supported the conspiracy against Giano della Bella,403 only to 
later join forces with Giano’s oldest banking friends and to become the leaders and most 
dedicated followers of the White Guelf faction.404  
 
 The economic logic behind the rise of the White faction is thus fairly simple,405 
when seen through the political economic lens, and has little to do with abstract rivalry 
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with other families (or for example mere outrage at the incident on the Calendimaggio, 
when Ricoverino dei Cerchi’s nose was severed by a member of the Spini family), but 
with concrete economic interests. One must ask why an elaborate faction of wealthy 
bankers would coalesce against personal insults, if not for some serious threat to their 
ability to maintain capital, power, and profits. As shown above in Chapter 2 and in 
Chapter 2.1-2, the center of power in Florence had already shifted to a de facto and a de 
jure plutocracy and oligarchy—a hegemony of capitalist interests in the internal and 
external politics of the city. The economic crisis at the end of the 13th century, which had 
concluded with the collapse of important banking centers and firms in Siena and Lucca, 
increased the competitive tensions between the Florentine banks. At the time one of the 
surest ways to exit the crisis was to seek business with the papacy, and by extension, the 
foreign powers involved in client relationships with the papacy (which had a vast market 
privilege, as, by proxy, did further foreign states and municipalities). More important, 
the memory of the former decentralization of papal finances was strong, and the Spini-
Mozzi-Chiarenti’s near banking monopoly with the papacy and foreign states was 
viewed with envy and suspicion. To secure themselves from the downturn, as Arias puts 
it:  
il mezzo più utile doveva sembrare la partecipazione al commerico coi Pontefici, 
sia perchè assicurava una fonte perpetua di guadagno, sia perchè aggiungeva 
credito alla ditta bancaria e la poneva in relationi continue d’affari coi re di Sicilia 
e coi re stranieri, sia infine perchè, in quei momenti disastrosi, garantiva la 
protezione dei papi, tanto utile per ottenere i pagamenti puntuali ed in genere i 
più grandi privilegi mercantili.406  
 
                                                       




Thus, given the power of the monopoly, the banks that were left out, as indicated above, 
saw the Spini and their allies an existential threat to their banking livelihoods, which 
explains why the Cerchi, a very old and revered banking house, saw the papal/Spini 
monopoly as such an economic threat that it broke its tradition of supporting the most 
powerful political interests, at this time papal Guelfism, in favor of forming a formidable 
but risky political coalition around protecting their economic interests. Thus we see that 
the White Guelfs (only nominally but not significantly anti-magnate) were truly formed 
not as a political faction but first as a banking coalition. In other words, the major 
reason behind the White Guelfs was to form a counter weight against the total control of 
the said monopoly and the pope, in addition to foreign powers led by the king of France, 
not only over Florence and the decime everywhere, but also over their ability to profit 
and maintain stable capital flows of which business with the church was almost a sine 
qua non requirement at the time.407  
 
 The proof of this thesis is that when the Mozzi’s share in the monopolistic banking 
relationship with the pope and his international cronies also shrinks, due to increasing 
control by the massive Spini bank, we see Mozzi too join the white faction against the 
blacks, Spini, Pope and Corso Donati, their ally. Thus, by the time of the infamous event 
at the Calendimaggio between the Spini and the Cerchi families that has been the 
legendary cause of the Black and the White split we already have a solid, historically 
validated rationale for the increasing political tensions. In fact, following the blood-
shedding factional event in Florence of that year the pope attempted to temper the 
                                                       




monopoly and also create additional factions within the opposing White factions by 
reemploying and giving significant contracts again to the Mozzi, Bardi, and Cerchi 
banking consorterie—not only three of the richest Florentine banks, but amongst the 
richest Florentine banks then allied with the White Guelf faction. This favoritism to the 
consorterie previously left out, who had already shifted political allegiance, is also the 
cause of the subsequent splits between White Bardis and Black Bardis, White Cerchi and 
Black Cerchi, in so far as the commercial and banking operations of the family 
companies were so extensive that once reincorporated into economic relations with the 
pope, some refused to adhere to the original (new) White political faction, their 
economic interests having been assuaged, and became anti-partisans against other 
members of their family companies.408  
 
  In this way Boniface VIII managed to divide the political forces of his adversaries 
and secure the safety of deposits held in the Spini banks (and the other major partners 
re-admitted to papal service) by weaving a complicated political web of manipulated 
economic interests against the White Guelf regime. According to Dino Compagni’s 
chronicle, Charles of Valois (brother of Philip Le Bel) acting in concert with Boniface 
VIII and the Black party, upon his arrival in Florence thus extorted massive amounts of 
money from the White Guelf bankers and worked to ruin them as punishment. As a 
consequence of this, Dante became a victim of the calumnious exile, along with many 
other prominent members of the White faction.  
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 The banking conflict was not the only cause of the White and Guelf factionalism 
that erupted at this time, leading to the exile of Dante and the defeat of the Whites at the 
hands of Boniface and Charles of Valois, yet one must assert the strong link between 
economic interest and political action: 
non può mettersi in dubbio il rapporto di causa ad effetto fra i fatti economici e 
politici ricordati…attorno alle due coalizioni di banchieri si aggruppano, a 
seconda che credono utile e per ragioni che andranno particularmente studiate, i 
magnati, la borghesia industriale e commericante, il popolo minuto. Queste tre 
classi, si scindono, al pari della classe bancaria, alimentando i due partiti. Dino 
Compagni rivela esattamente tale fenomeno: “divisesi la città di nuovo, ne’ 
grandi, mezzani, piccolini”…E ben si comprende come proprio i banchieri 
fossero, per dir così, alla direzione dei due partiti: essi ne avevano non solo la 
cagione più forte, ma anche il mezzo pratico più adatto, come quelli che potevano 
legare strettamente a sè, specialmente per mezzo dei prestiti, il maggior numero 
d’individui. Scrive infatti il Villani che i Cerchi: “per lo seguito grande ch’aveano, 
il reggimento della città era quasi tutto in loro podere.” E Dino Compagni dice 
che i Cerchi eran molto ben veduti “perchè molto serventi”; che “agevolmente 
avrebbero avuto [la Signoria] per la loro bontà, ma non lo vollono consentire” e 
che Berto Frescobaldi seguì la parte de’ Cerchi “perchè avea ricevuto da loro molti 
danari in prestanza”.409 
 
 For Davidsohn, who also examines these events more extensively, but less shortly 
and synthetically than Arias, the key factor in the political history of Dante’s time in this 
regard and surrounding these events is the rise of capitalism. It is self-evident: 
Nel secolo decimoterzo in tutte le grandi città dell’ Alta e Media Italia la società 
assunse un nuovo assetto economico, come a Firenze, dove però le conseguenze 
politiche del mutato regime economico furono più manifeste che altrove. Lo 
sviluppo del capitalismo, di cui nei tempi moderni la scienza si è affaticata a 
scoprire le origini, fu quello che dette la sua impronta a quell’epoca.”410  
 
As Holmes remarks: 
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In the age of Dante, Florence’s tradition of vendetta (a tradition shared with other 
Italians) acquired an enlarged political importance, because a number of the 
Florentine families which had local reasons for bitter hatred now also had world-
wide connections as merchants and financiers which allowed them to call foreign 
powers into play on their behalf. This feature of the vendetta is of course already 
visible in the Guelf-Ghibelline disputes of the mid-thirteenth century, when 
enemies in Florence were able to link their disputes with the quarrels of the pope 
and the king of Naples. But the expansion of Florentine commerce in the later 
part of the century led to an extraordinary—and temporary—state of affairs in 
which some Florentine business firms had so great a world-wide standing that 
quarrels which originated in Tuscany could be transferred to distant parts of 
Europe, and occasionally they were so indispensable to the pope or king of 
France that they could call substantial papal or French help to their aid in 
Florence. The custom of vendetta can be found in many societies, but the linking 
of the family vendetta with the rivalry of firms having a dominant importance in 
international commerce is a peculiarity of this time and place. It is difficult to 
think of other cases where vendetta, local political disorder, and international 
commerce were bound up in this way, and it must be regarded as the product of 
exceptional circumstances which gave a particular colour to the Florentine scene 
for a few decades.411 
 
 
 While I cannot here, in the space of this study, expand more on these historical 
details regarding the financial connections and political economic ties between the white 
and black Guelfs, my goal has been to establish the fact of an international political 
economy operative over the events in the politics of Dante’s time and leading up to his 
exile.412 In fact, one cannot read Dante’s political thought without realizing it is a direct 
response to such a political economy. In the next section, we shall see how the events 
from the 1280s-1303/4 contributed to the consolidation of oligarchical interests in the 
Florentine state “Mercanzia.”  
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5. The Consolidation of Political Economic Interests in the post-1308 
Mercanzia as an Effective Rule of Corporations over the city of Florence 
 
 
 The fact that political instability was firmly linked to competitive economic 
interests in the crisis that gripped Florence in the turn of the 14th century is reflected by 
the formation of the “universitas mercatorum.” The period after 1308 sees the rise of the 
mercanzia, the institutional consolidation of the banking and mercantile elite in the 
Florentine government taken to a whole new level. This block holds power through the 
1340s and on, and though Dante was in exile, he no doubt was aware of the happenings 
in Florence and the political-economic entwinements that it represents are certainly 
reflected in his writing, as it is essentially the institutionalization of wealth-getting 
within the state.  
 
 The mercanzia arose from the needs of international capital. Acerbic faction and 
political disorder was really bad for business, as Arias writes: 
 
Le crisi commerciali ed economiche, le guerre fra le case di commercio, che fan 
capo alla divisione economico-politica dei Bianchi e dei Neri, la caduta dell’arte di 
Calimala, quale direttrice del grande commercio d'esportazione e d'importazione e 
la rivalità di quell'arte con l'arte della Lana. S'intende in primo luogo come, per 
uscire da quello stato anormale e pericoloso e per resistere più efficacemente alle 
insidie e allo persecuzioni straniere, dovesse sembrar utile raggruppare in un 
ufficio unico le forze delle singole arti ed avere come rappresentante all'estero un 
ufficio cui spettasse questa special competenza. Ma più valore ebbe la divisione 
interna: la discordia fra le case bancarie e la scissione della borghesia grassa, 
l'alternarsi al potere delle fazioni avverse, rendevano molto difficile ed incostante 
la protezione del grande commercio Fiorentino. Le autorità politiche del comune 
naturalmente dovevano ispirarsi agli immediati interessi mercantili della fazione 
loro, anzichè a un criterio d'utile generale. Nei tempi anteriori, la borghesia grassa 
era tutta concorde contro i magnati e contro il popolo minuto; ora invece si divide 
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in due fazioni scindendo anche le altre due classi, le quali si aggruppano 
rispettivamente intorno a questa or quella parte Borghese. Per la costituzione delle 
nuove parti politiche, il grande commercio non poteva dunque più sperare in una 
protezione concorde, come nei tempi precedenti. Indi la necessità d'un ufficio 
speciale capitanato da un forestiero e sottratto, il più possibile, alle vicende 
interne. In altri termini, la Mercanzia si presenterebbe come un tentativo per 
assicurare stabilmente, levandola all'arbitrio delle fazioni, la protezione del 
commercio internazionale. Dico tentativo, perchè un organismo che vive 
in uno stato non può interamente separarsi dalle vicende di questo. 413 
 
 In 1308, the year that Corso Donati died, the mercanzia was created, which, as 
Najemy writes, was “destined for a long and significant role in the city’s economic and 
political life.” The mercanzia, or universitas mercatorum, was an organization created 
by the international import-export merchants and bankers of the five largest guilds 
(Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and Medici, Speziali, Merciai) to protect 
their collective political and economic interests.  
 
There were several factors behind this: 
 
 1) Given the fact that about eight high profile merchant companies had gone into 
bankruptcy between 1300 and 1310,414  the institution was necessary so that creditors 
could seek enforceable claims against insolvent debtors. Frequently in these cases, 
creditors—who were often foreign—would have to petition governments or guild courts 
which had already been created in the 13th century, whose judgments only extended to 
its members and often times could not render judgments against debtors beyond the 
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city of Florence or Tuscany. This was problematic because capital and assets were often 
scattered around many states and territories and easily circulated, effectively meaning 
that given the international nature of capital already in existence, and particularly the 
international reach of Florentine banking and mercantile commerce, that Florence’s 
international merchants wanted to protect themselves from collateral damage from 
foreign entities abroad: in the case that their peers were insolvent in another realm and 
punishment was exacted against other Florentine interests, and in the case that they 
needed to pursue claims against peer merchants or debtors who attempted to protect 
assets or debts from collection abroad. As Najemy says, “it thus functioned as a civil 
court, not unlike the guilds, but with the important difference that its jurisdiction 
extended to any and all Florentines, including residents of the contado and district, 
‘whether or not they are members of guilds,’ thus cutting through the complex and 
contested limitations on the jurisdictions of individual guilds. At a creditor’s request, the 
official of the Mercanzia could compel Florentine companies to submit account books 
for investigation.”415 
 
 But, as Najemy points out, the mercanzia was more than a simple tribunal. It 
emerged from a “prehistory of de facto cooperation and consultation among the consults 
of the major commercial guilds on such issues” and the push for formalization of such 
cooperation came from the merchant elite itself. This was a true consolidation of 
economic and political interests in the governance of the commune, representing world 
market “capitalism” and shows the evolution from party factionalism to a consensus on 
                                                       




corporatist politics that put economic governance over the old disputes of church and 
empire, linked with banking rivalries, that had so damaged the city and its wealthiest 
corporate interests, as seen in 3.3. As Najemy explains in more depth: 
 
the commune did little more than extend its recognition to an authority created 
by the international merchants of the five guilds. The new official was hired and 
monitored by the Mercanzia, not the commune. But the Mercanzia was more 
than a tribunal. As an universitas, or corporate association, it represented the 
interests of Florence’s merchant community to the commune and foreign 
governments and protected those interests by legislating in matters of 
commercial law. Indeed, from at least 1312 it had its own statutes. The Mercanzia 
had no formal membership: any merchant of the five guilds who engaged in trade 
or banking outside the Florentine dominion could be elected to the Five or sit on 
any of the association’s ad hoc committees that dealt with particular problems. 
The larger significance of the Mercanzia is that, for the first time, the elite was 
defining itself with reference to economic interests and responsibilities, 
representing itself as a community of merchants rather than as a warrior class or 
as partisans of church or empire. As a product of (a portion of) the guild 
community, the Mercanzia also signified the elite’s implicit acceptance of the 
guilds and customs and procedures by which merchants and guildsmen typically 
resolved disputes, settled bankruptcies, and managed relations amongst 
themselves and with the outside world. Participating in the Mercanzia were all 
the city’s great merchant and banking families, except for the politically 
significant, but numerically small, contingent of magnate merchant houses 
(Bardi, Scali, Spini, Mozzi, Frescobaldi, and a few others), but even they were 
regularly represented on the Mercanzia’s committees by non-magnate business 
partners. Former Guelfs and Ghibellines, former Blacks and Whites cooperated 
in the association’s judicial, administrative, electoral, and diplomatic functions. 
Venerable non-merchant families like the Donati, Cavalcanti, Della Tosa, and 
Adimari largely disappeared from center stage at this point, not because a new 
class of merchants suddenly arose, but because an already powerful economic 
elite finally realized that the worst possible response to their class could make to 
the popolo’s challenge was a continuation of party conflicts. They decided in 
effect that those older non-mercantile elite families had provided singularly 
ineffective leadership for their class, especially in the preceding decade, and that 
they now needed a new collective representation of themselves grounded in the 
institutionalization of the economic interests and responsibilities. The Mercanzia 
represented not a new elite but rather a new image of a changing elite.416 
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 This dominance of international capitalist elements is shown in the fact that 
eligibility for the Mercanzia’s committees was limited to members of the five guilds 
from export and import from abroad or those who ‘engage or invest in money-changing 
and lending’ in any part of the world. Basically, as Najemy puts it, the criterion cut 
through the memberships of the major guilds, while meaning that many retailers, 
producers, service providers, and lenders who were based only within the dominion of 
the Florentine government were not part of the most powerful state sanctioned 
institution. As Najemy writes,  
this was as close as the economic elite could come to an institutionalized 
distinction between themselves and the rest of the guild community. By this 
definition, the Mercanzia’s constituency included some guildsmen who bought and 
sold within Tuscany and central Italy and did not engage in truly international 
trade, but the great companies found it much easier to assert their leadership 
within this group than they did in the more heterogeneous full membership of the 
five guilds, let alone the broader community of twenty-one guilds. Merchants who 
traded beyond the borders of the Florentine dominion…had significant interests in 
common…regional traders did not lack incentives for cooperation with 
international merchant-bankers, and from such shared interests and frequent 
contacts the elite was able to forge a degree of consensus within the Mercanzia that 
was unattainable in their separate guilds. The Mercanzia thus embraced those 
merchants, who even if not from great families, depended on the success of the 
economic elite for their prosperity. Most importantly, the Mercanzia could ignore 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
This sense of belonging to an interguild elite was, in fact, institutionalized in the 
Mercanzia, the organization of international and interregional merchants and bankers 
from the five major commercial guilds (Calimala, Cambio, Lana, Por Santa Maria, and 
the Medici, Speziali e Merciai). Although the Mercanzia was itself a corporation, it was 
never integrated into the guild federation. In fact, it was later used by the oligarchs as an 
instrument for imposing electoral and political controls over the guilds themselves…. it 
is sufficient to point out that the Mercanzia gave a precise institutional configuration to 
the merchant oligarchy's sense of itself as constituting an interguild elite whose 
members had more in common with each other than they did with the hundreds of non-
oligarchic members of their own guilds. Throughout this book the term "oligarchy" will 




the popular pressures to which the individual guilds and the full guild federation 
were subject.417 
  
 Najemy details the make up of the mercanzia, the first full list of “all the 
companies that fell under its criterion of international trade or banking” coming from 
1322, the year after Dante’s death. It lists 264 companies, sometimes with investing 
partners listed and some without names or precise numbers (ASF, Mercanzia 136). Of 
these 34 came from the other 16 guilds (of the 21), but “the 500-600 investing partners 
of all 230 major guild firms were Florence’s early fourteenth-century economic 
oligarchy, and these family companies were its inner core.”418  
 
In terms of what sort of political regime this was, it has many of the major features 
of what modern theorists regard as classic features of the state in a capitalist system.419 It 
was an effectively open and complete institutionalization of the oligarchy of the rich 
without any masking of the fact. As such, the major organs of the state and conceptions 
of justice in the mercanzia were manifestly not viewed in terms of the contrapassum or 
distribution of and production of goods for the moral good of persons and ultimately for 
their collective intellectual perfection-- which is Aristotle’s idea and as we shall see 
Dante’s idea in the Monarchia (also see Marx on surplus value in Grundrisse where “the 
common” is coopted by capital and seems indistinct from it)— but rather reflected of the 
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state as being a super-corporate entity in which the real adjudication of interests is 
predominantly in representation of citizens qua members of guilds, business and 
banking corporations.  In other words, the mercanzia represents a mode of governance 
where state justice is not only protecting the rights of debtors and creditors, but where 
individual citizens are seen qua their status as market agents, and not in terms of their 
virtuous contribution to the commune: arithmetical justice. The kind of values 
represented by this mercantile republic, as articulated by people like Brunetto Latini—
writing before the rise of the institution—have nothing to do with Aristotelian virtue 
ethics and political goods.420  
 
*             *             * 
 In observing the history of the bourgeoisie in Florence, no matter all the various 
forms of constitutional “checks and balances,” which over time, as we have seen, 
involved multiple iterations of priorates, councils, guild councils and priorate 
configurations with the guilds, through the secondo popolo and finally mercanzia, in the 
end, “power in the Italian communes clung obstinately to wealth and migrated with 
movements of wealth, and through all revolutions of political and economic regime, 
oligarchy, in fact or law, was the predominant form of government.”421  
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 According to Jones “in the first century of the commune this represented, in 
contemporary language, government of those called minores or pedites, who constituted 
the populus, by the class of maiores or milites, a composite group of feudal gentry and 
merchants, who in Florence, for example, may have numbered some 100 families.”422  
In some towns this sort of regime, which is similar to the sort that Dante’s Cacciaguida 
has so much nostalgia for, survived unchallenged, but for the most part it started a long 
trend of disintegration after 1200, influenced as we have seen by the factors of  
1) faction within the governing class (Guelf/Ghibelline etc.) rival families and 
consorterie  2) the movement of the popolo into a bourgeois class who, enriched by 
trade and enlarged after their urban migration, “began to rebel against magnate 
domination, and in the course of the thirteenth century secured a share…of the 
communal government.”  
 
 In any case, we have already seen that this history is not a history of the “whole 
people” or of large-scale enfranchisement, but of a system in which the emancipation of 
the popolo was actually the beginning of the stratification of the richest corporate 
interests that developed out of the embourgeoisement of the populace in the urban 
center of Florence—that is also of their universitates (corporations and guild 
corporations)—and the juridical victory of capitalism developing properly significant 
political economic institutions at every stage of the process. In the governments 
generated by these developments, “the groups most powerfully represented were the 
richer trade guilds, especially the guilds of bankers, businessmen and industrialists—the 
                                                       




popolani grassi.”423 By the 1330’s, in Florence, 70 percent of all major offices were held 
by members of the three wealthiest guilds of Calimala, Lana, and Cambio. Even in 1343 
when there was a “popular revolution” and the full corporations of the 21 guilds insisted 
on more access to power again, at this time, according to Jones, only some 3,500 men 
were eligible for office of a population then of nearly 80,000, of whom at no point, was 
more than one tenth actually qualified. The majority of office-holders were drawn still 
from the upper guilds—that is capitalist elements.424 As Jones says, “such was the type 
of government described by contemporaries as democratia and represented by 
Florentines as an egalitarian, broadly-based polity.”425 We must keep this in mind when 
we hear high-minded talk about the civic mindedness of the Renaissance “humanist,” 
such as Alberti and Saultati, who were hardly for all of humanity but conspicuously for 
their class.426  While Florence’s republican history is unique, the point is that  
 
the popular movements of the thirteenth century merely raised, without solving, 
the problem of the governing class. Nowhere did the popolo extinguish the 
magnati or even suppress their partisan divisions. In most towns their powers 
were undiminished. Even when disenfranchised, they retained their wealth and 
influence, in both church and state and their old ambition to dominate; and in 
this they were readily joined by the popolani grassi, who adopted their habits 
and outlook.427 
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This is essentially capitalist oligarchy, but in the northern Italian space almost 
everywhere numerous conflicts persisted between patricians and plebeians and, 
according to Jones, “everywhere the patrician class, whatever its social affinity, 
continued to fight factiously for power; and everywhere the final effect of internal 
dissention was the same: the large neutral majority, the ‘homines communes’ (Bartolus) 
who, with a civic spirit far older than humanism, kept the administration going, grew 
increasingly apathetic, ceased to attend councils, and left political action to their 
betters.”  This was made easier by the “independent tendency, from the thirteenth 
century on, to concentrate authority, for the sake of speed and efficiency, in small 
executive councils, magistracies, plenitpotentiary committees of balie. In every way, 
therefore, institutionally and politically, the irresistible trend, as even republicans 
recognized, was to restrict supreme office, the unpaid honores, to a group of dominant 
families….”428 The political creed can be summed up by Guicciardini: “government [in 
the Italian communes of the 13th century] belonged properly to the wealthy and wise.”429  
 
 Dante was squarely anti-oligarchical, anti-capitalist, and anti-wealth-getting. In 
the next chapter we will briefly examine the question of capitalism in 13th and 14th 
century Italy, and we shall conclude this study by exploring how Dante can be said to 
have been a critic of political economy according to the Aristotelian paradigm, in the 
final chapter.   
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Chapter 4. Capitalism or 'c'apitalism? A Brief History of the Historiography 






A major question to ask is whether or not what I have shown to be the fact of 
something historically verifiable as political economy in Dante’s Florence and Italy—if 
what constitutes this object as certified by induction—is really “Capitalism.” 
Undoubtedly, defining capitalism is a task riddled with major difficulties that exceeds 
the scope of the present study, though a deductive-analytical conception of capitalism 
outside the historicity of actual institutions and social-material conditions is plainly 
absurd. Nonetheless, it is helpful to briefly consider in this chapter how medieval Italy, 
as explored in chapter 3, can be said to be a ‘capitalistic’ political economy. This chapter 
then serves as an auxiliary supplement to the main argument and as such is a short 
overview of the history of the historiography of capitalism. My argument is that 
capitalism—with a lower case ‘c’—did exist in medieval Florence in a qualified sense and 
this fact is irrefutable.  
 
There have been a wide range of definitions of capitalism—too many to catalogue 
here—but a brief survey of scholars’ definitions from the 19th - 21st centuries shows that 
they overlap with many of the features of the political economy we have observed in 
chapter 3. According to Bowles, a non-controversial definition of capitalism is a “system 
for organizing production which is based up on the institutions of private property and 
the market, and which relies upon the pursuit of private profit as its driving force.”430 In 
other words, 1) “private ownership of firms’ and society’s productive assets” 2) the 
market, “that is, the voluntary purchase and sale of goods, services and factors of 
                                                       




production such as land, labour and capital” 3) “the profit motive as the driving 
force.”431 This definition does, in fact, match the historically verifiable conditions of 13th 
and 14th century Florence and medieval Italy generally. Schumpeter’s definition of 
capitalism also definitely attests to the 13th and 14th century Italian space, especially in its 
highlighting the importance of banking and credit: 
A society is called capitalist if it entrusts its economic process to the guidance of 
the private businessman. This may be said to imply, first, private ownership of 
nonpersonal means of production, such as land, mines, industrial plant and 
equipment; and, second, production for private account, i.e. production by 
private initiative for private profit. But, third, the institution of bank credit is so 
essential to the functioning of the capitalist system that, though not strictly 
implied in the definition, it should be added to the other two criteria.432 
 
While Weber is also famous for his linking of protestant religious sentiment as a 
serious constitutive feature of capitalism433—and this has been the object of many 
critiques such as that of Tawney—he elsewhere does not insist on it.434 In his General 
Economic History (Chapter XXII: The meaning and Presuppositions of Modern 
Capitalism) Weber attempts to make a functional definition of capitalism, saying that 
“capitalism is present wherever the industrial provision for the needs of a human group 
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432 Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Capitalism. Reprinted From Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1946, 
Vol. IV, 801-807," in Essays: On Entrepreneurs, Innovations, Business Cycles, and the 
Evolution of Capitalism, ed. Richard V. Clemence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1989), 189. 
 
433 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons 
(London: Routledge, 1992). 
 
434 R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 




is carried out by the method of enterprise, irrespective of what need is involved.”435 A 
crowning feature of capitalism for Weber is “rational calculation.” Weber defines “a 
rational capitalistic establishment” as one “with capital accounting, that is, an 
establishment which determines its income yielding power by calculation according to 
the methods of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a balance.”436 This definition 
more or less corresponds to medieval Italy, as the evidence of the accounting and 
business practices of major Italian firms of the early 14th century, such as that of the 
Peruzzi, shows.437 Despite the fact that he says “capitalism of various forms is met with 
in all periods of history,” he erroneously discounts the possibility of any outcropping of 
true Capitalism before the 16th century, as Wallerstein and others will do after him,438 
and actually has reservations about its true existence until the middle of the 19th 
century.439  
 
                                                       
435 Max Weber, General Economic History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1981), 275. 
 
436 Ibid., 275.; Weber goes into more detail on this in The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, trans. Talcott Parsons and A. M. Henderson (New York: Free 
Press, 1964), 275-289, et passim. 
 
437 For a major case study in the accounting and business practices of the Peruzzi 
company in the late 13th and 14th centuries, see Edwin S. Hunt, The Medieval Super-
companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).  
 
438 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-system: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: 
Academic Press, 1976), 15-47. 
 




To return to the religious issue raised by Weber, as Giacomo Todeschini has pointed 
out,440 there is a problem with the Weberian thesis and similar ones, which tend to be 
                                                       
440 Giacomo Todeschini, Il prezzo della salvezza: lessici medievali del pensiero 
economico (Roma: Nuova Italia scientifica, 1994), 13-14, argues that economics are 
almost totally excluded from master narratives of the middle ages from Spann to Denis 
“perchè si ammette in generale come presupposto che «né l'antichità né il Medioevo 
elaborarono dei sistemi ben definiti di teorie economiche» (Spann, 1936, p. I)', mentre 
d'altra parte si riducono le eventuali osservazioni economiche medievali (Tommaso 
d'Aquino è di solito il termine di riferimento privilegiato) a problemi di rapporto fra 
società religiosa e società laica. Stabilito a priori che quest' ultima nel Medioevo non ha 
teorie economiche, la questione diventa naturalmente quella dei modi con i quali la 
società ecclesiastica ossia la cultura teologica ha condizionato e frenato lo sviluppo 
economico complessivo…In queste ricostruzioni generali, a ben guardare, il Medioevo è 
in realtà la premessa più o meno coerente di uno sviluppo successivo, che inizia, 
solitamente, fra XVI e XVIÌ secolo con la Seconda Scholastica e con le teorie 
mercantiliste…Esiste evidentemente, in tali ricostruzioni di lunghissimo periodo, un 
equivoco per quanto riguarda la sezione tardo antica/medievale dalla volontà di 
intendere le concettualizzazioni economiche medievali come un fatto globale, 
indipendentemente dai periodi che compongono il Medioevo (occidentale, orientale, 
nordico), ma soprattutto dalla tendenza ad applicare alle fonti utilizzate per scrivere di 
pensiero economico medievale criteri vistosamente anacronistici, che in nessun caso 
sarebbero ammessi quando, per esempio, si parlasse e scrivesse di città medievale o di 
demografia medievale. Si crea così nei quadri generali del tema un disagio palese nei 
confronti di  un Medioevo esterno alle categorie del discorso economico occidentale, ma 
ineliminabile nella storia della morale economica occidentale; la presunta perfericità di 
questo Medioevo nella storia della coscienza economica europea, e d'altronde la sua 
centralità nella storia occidentale del conflitto fra moralità ed economia non 
incoraggiano evidentemente a valutarne più da vicino le modalità di espressione: ad 
analizzarne il linguaggio economico. Parafrasando Polanyi, si potrebbe osservare che 
come nelle soietà antiche manca un termine che definisca l'economia, ciò che non 
"impedisce all' economia di esistere con caratteristiche differenti da quelle moderne, 
cosi nel Medioevo manca l’espressione-concetto pensiero economico, ma questo non 
elimina l'esistenza di un vasto e complesso sistema di definizioni e di analisi economiche 
all'interno del variegato universo delle fonti medievali…… queste fonti, come si vedrà, 
siano a tutt' oggi in parte inedite, o che la storiografìa, come pure si vedrà, tenda spesso 
a farne un uso estremamente specifico e strumentale, relativo cioè a situazioni, autori e 
momenti di cui si intendono sottolineare altri aspetti, non elimina il fatto che il pensiero 
economico medievale come oggetto storiografico esista, ma che tuttavia appaia 
attualmente come complesso discorsivo da decodificarsi: esso, cioè, dovrà essere 
recuperato a partire da elementi che la storia del pensiero economico moderno e 
contemporaneo non riconosce come pertinenti, da fonti e testimonianze talvolta 
insospettabili, ma non per questo meno espressive di modi di verbalizzare la realtà 
economica medievale…Bisogna riflettere, inoltre, sulla collocazione di questo oggetto di 
studio nella produzione scientifica degli specialisti, cioè degli storici del Medioevo; senza 
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incapable of seeing the space of western Europe, Italy and France in particular (and the 
larger geopolitical configurations of the high Middle Ages), as playing a central role in 
the development of early capitalism.441  This perhaps only applies to hypotheses formed 
without the benefit of the deep historical work done over the course of the 20th and 21st 
centuries, by Armando Sapori,442 Raymond De Roover,443 Robert Lopez,444 Henri 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
voler anticipare un' analisi storiografica che si svilupperà più oltre, si potrà tuttavia 
ricordare fin dalle prime pagine di questa esposizione quanto lo studio della riflessione 
economica medievale sia marginale in molta della ricerca medievistica attuale, coerente 
in tal senso con una consolidata tradizione. Anche da questo punto di vista si può ben 
osservare il disagio di cui già si è accennato: il pensiero economico medievale, lo si 
intenda come etica economica medievale o come lessico economico medievale, tende a 
non affiorare nell'analisi storiografica dei medievisti, e quando questo affioramento 
avvenga, esso sarà marginale alla storia di vicende econo-spirituali e teologiche viste 
come ben altrimenti significative. Anche la volontà enunciata di recente da uno storico 
come Le Goff di ricoostruire il dibattito economico medievale sull'usura al di là di 
atemporali categorie teorico-economiche non gli impedisce tuttavia di ricondurre la 
questione a come un ostacolo teologico" (il divieto d'usura ecclesiastico, in questo caso) 
freni (o stimoli) lo sviluppo economico bassomedievale. Anche in questo caso, che si 
riprenderà, al centro dell'attenzione storiografica non è il modo medievale di scrivere (e 
parlare) di economia, ma l'economia stessa medievale intesa come realtà oggettiva in 
conflitto con un sistema concettuale ad essa contrapposto in quanto tale. Ma per 
affermare l'esistenza di questo costutto, e dunque la nozione stessa di freno (o stimolo) 
ideologico esercitato, per esempio, dalla morale teologica bassomedievale nei confronti 
della società di mercato coeva, occorrerebbe prima di tutto aver chiaro come, con quale 
lingua e con quale lessico parli quella morale teologica, quale linguaggio sorregga le 
eventuali polemiche, quanto in esse "freni" lo sviluppo e quanto invece semplicemente 
ne esprima le contraddizioni o ciò che ai nostri occhi sembri in esso contraddittorio." 
 
441 For a helpful overview of the debates over the existence of capitalism in the middle 
ages and their scholarly contexts, especially regarding the overlaps between Renaissance 
historiography and the historiography of Medieval Italian economy, see William 
Caferro, "Economy: Hard Times or Prosperity?" In Contesting the Renaissance 
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 126-147.  
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Pirenne,445 Fernand Braudel,446 Janet Abu-Lughod,447 and others whose work has given 
ample material through which one can articulate a historical and historical-intellectual 
picture of capitalism, with a lower case ‘c’, especially one that accepts either a strong or 
light version of the distinction Marx articulated between medieval “merchant’s capital” 
and modern “industrial capital.”448 However, a major impediment to articulating a new 
theory of medieval capitalism has been the same overdetermining trend that I discussed 
in regards to Dante studies and criticism in chapter 1, except in this case, within what I 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
443 Raymond De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges; Italian 
Merchant Bankers, Lombards and Money-changers, (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval 
Academy of America, 1948); Raymond De Roover, "The Scholastics, Usury, and Foreign 
Exchange." Business History Review 41, no. 03 (1967): 257-271; Raymond De Roover, 
"Le marché monétaire au Moyen Age et au début des temps modernes. problèmes et 
méthodes. Revue historique (1970): 5-40; Raymond De Roover, Business, Banking, and 
Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974).  
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).  
 
445 Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (New York: 
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call the history of the historiography of capitalism: namely, the tendency to take the 
heavy slathering of self-consciously forwarded theological claims from scholasticism 
regarding everything and, additionally, every other part of the complex edifice of Roman 
catholic doctrine and religiosity circulating at the time as the dominant hermeneutical 
framework for understanding and examining all other historical phenomena, especially 
political and economic phenomena. This trend is perhaps related to the bias of the 
Weberian thesis about the “protestant” nature of capitalism, but not exclusively so, as it 
is also overdetermined by the official doctrines of the church regarding usury as 
exhaustively interpreted and developed by scholastic thinkers.  
As Cave and Coulson have put it: 
The medieval attitude toward usury was closely bound up with the doctrine of 
just price. It is a commonplace to say that usury was forbidden on the grounds 
that Aristotle had declared money to be barren, and that it was prohibited by the 
Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church. Aristotle's idea was that it was contrary 
to nature to exact usury since thereby the lender was making money for its own 
sake, thus robbing money of its proper function, i.e., that of being a medium of 
exchange. This idea was handed down to the Middle Ages through the Romans. 
With regard to the Scriptures we find that the Old Testament was interpreted as 
permitting usury between Jew and Gentile, but not among Jews themselves. In 
the New Testament there is apparently only one passage, the interpretation of 
which is doubtful, which can be considered as forbidding the practice, while the 
Fathers are vague and contradictory as to their reasons for forbidding it. At the 
time of the fall of the Empire some of the Fathers condemned the taking of usury 
as a sin against charity, but not against justice, and this was the prevailing 
attitude down to the twelfth century. Nevertheless, civil codes permitted it, and 
there were not lacking clerics who signified their approval of these codes. In A.D. 
1139 the Second Lateran Council ordered excommunication of usurers, and the 
opposition to the practice was further strengthened by another decree in A.D. 
1179. At the same time Pope Alexander III declared it to be a sin against justice, 
and from this time usury was condemned outright.449 
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One aspect of the over determined hermeneutic is to maintain that theological 
prohibitions against usury and denunciations of greed—whether from the patristic or 
scholastic tradition (often recycling the former)—actually reflect historical legal regimes, 
prohibitions, and societal mores at any given point.450 While it is true that over the 
course of the early Middle Ages, the Catholic Church developed a strong intellectual 
tradition—drawing from and renovating biblical and patristic sources—focused on the 
vice of usury and spawning canonical prohibitions to it, this ought not to be mistaken 
with its fact in practice nor ought it to over state the church’s power in particular 
political zones of authority to enforce prohibitions. Also, while it is true that in some 
places there were minority Jewish communities of usurers in the High Middle Ages, 
they were very protected by the authorities and increasingly part of a much larger 
Christian community of bankers and merchant companies. 451 An easy temptation for 
many generations of scholars has been to fall into the anti-historical and anti-Semitic 
stereotype (in my opinion much of this imagination is due to the legacy of Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice), as reflected by Arnold, that  “a merchant class, slowly rising to 
power after the Middle Ages, had no place of prestige in the social hierarchy. Therefore, 
when the need for banking and credit began to be felt, only the despised Jewish 
moneylenders could fill it. Society tolerated them but felt compelled to establish the fact 
that such techniques were unworthy by laws of the Church declaring them illegal and 
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immoral.”452  At best it is only a half-truth (with some important implications), at worst 
it furthers anti-Semitic stereotypes.  
 
So, as Henri Pirenne writes, although there are some scruples as to the complexity 
and level of advancement of credit, financial instruments, and money markets in the 
Middle Ages, where personal loans were hard to differentiate in species from 
commercial loan contracts, for example, save “in the great Italian cities, where the 
governing institutions of financial markets and the banks of the future were already 
beginning to take shape,” there is no doubt about the pervasive and widespread practice 
of usury and systematic profiteering by large financial institutions with the tacit or 
explicit support of states. 453 There is no doubt that the rights of creditors to money 
made by usury were even eventually enforced by civil courts, as we have seen in the early 
14th century Florentine legal system.454 The notion that the 13th-14th century canonical 
prohibitions against usury somehow mean that there is no early capitalism to investigate 
in the medieval period is totally bogus. As Pirenne writes,  
 
the fact that this prohibition [of usury] passed from ecclesiastical into civil 
legislation certainly made it still more of a hindrance. In actual practice, however, 
it was impossible to enforce its literal observance and it was applied in full rigour 
only in cases of "manifest usury," i.e., of consumption loans upon pledges, in 
which an excessive rate of interest was stipulated. The need for credit was too 
great and too general for men to think of discouraging lenders. From the 
                                                       
452 Thurman Wesley Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University 
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thirteenth century onwards the canonists were seeking to modify the absolute 
prohibition laid down in the text Mutuum date nihil inde sperantes by various 
expedients. It was discovered that in any advance of money involving either an 
eventual loss (damnum emergens), or a cessation of gain (lucrum cessans), or a 
risk of the capital (periculum sortis), an indemnity, or, in other words, interest 
(interesse), was justifiable. Thus interest was simply legitimate usury, and it is 
easy to understand how delicate was the distinction between this tolerated usury 
and the prohibited usury, and what scope it left for interpretation by the judges. 
In commerce the "letting out" of money was authorised by current practice. It 
was the rule at the fairs of Champagne and in general in the operations of 
commercial societies. In the fourteenth century the theologian, Alvarus Palagius, 
states that the prohibition of usury is not applicable to the latter. The fact 
remains, however, that the censure of the Church was always hanging like a 
permanent menace over all who concerned themselves with credit. Very often 
debtors were absolved by the Church from the obligation to pay interest on their 
debts. Consequently the utmost ingenuity was expended upon dissimulating the 
dangerous interest. Sometimes the lender deducted it in advance of the sum 
borrowed, sometimes it was concealed under the guise of a penalty for delay in 
repayment, sometimes the debtor acknowledged the receipt of a much greater 
sum than he had really received. Altogether the legislation against usury does not 
seem to have prevented it in practice very much more than the Volstead Act in 
America prevented the consumption of alcohol. It was a hindrance but not a 
barrier.455 
 
However, by the time of the later 13th century, it must be noted that Italian bankers 
were largely unscrupulous and unconcerned with the difference between lucrum 
cessans, periculum sortis, damnum emergens, etc. and engaged in unabashed usury. 
The 13th and 14th centuries reflect the rise of what Joel Kaye and Peter Spufford call a 
monetized society.456 If anything, the development of such categories over the long 13th 
and 14th centuries reflected updating the theology and philosophy of what counts as 
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“natural” or properly moral (natural) behavior with regards to money, buying, selling 
etc. with actual practices that had already become or were increasingly becoming 
divergent with the tradition.457  According to Joel Kaye, 
 
As the power and weight of the marketplace within society grew over the course 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, opposition between the economic order 
and traditional models of natural order led to continuing attempts (seen most 
clearly within scholastic usury theory) to force economic definitions to conform 
to traditional definitions of ‘‘natural’’ equality. The distinction between natural 
order and market order created great tension within an intellectual culture whose 
habit was to unify and synthesize. The tension grew as the power and position of 
the market in society grew, until, by the late thirteenth century, as a result of this 
continued opposition, it was the conception of the natural order that began to 
give way.458 
 
 Odd Langholm has also convincingly shown, in the Merchant and the Confessional, 
how this same need to update the theology with practice was also operative in the 
creation of procedures for guilt cleansing for the religious capitalist in an era that saw 
the dawn of canonically mandatory confession in the Catholic Church. Manuals and 
treatises were drawn up by friars and religious writers that specified how priests and 
penitents ought to do conscience “accounting” and gave rubrics for mortal and venial 
financial sins. 459 It thus became possible in the 13th century to be able to participate in 
financial and profiteering operations that had hitherto been routinely considered turpe, 
while watching for the good of one’s eternal soul: those “who have sinned in buying and 
selling as to cause, time, person or place, should be told to spend their profit on the 
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poor.”460  Edwin Hunt shows how this penitential practice evolved into a corporate 
practice of allocating a small percentage of annual profits in the super-companies to 
God—in the form of payments to charities—marked down in accounting ledgers as 
payments to “Messer Domeneddio.”461 
 
In practice, the only institution unable to engage in usury directly, by the time of the 
age of Dante, were Church institutions themselves, who had somewhat to adhere to their 
own canonical and theological prohibitions, and, as we have seen extensively in chapter 
3.3, had major recourse to the Florentine and Italian banking sector to do these 
activities by proxy with their ecclesiastical capital. Pirenne couldn’t have been more 
understated in his assessment that “the Church itself was continually obliged to borrow 
from the financiers whose actions it reproved. It was to them that the Papacy entrusted 
the collection and management of the revenues, which came to it from all parts of 
Christendom; and it is very plain that the Popes could not have been ignorant of the sort 
of business in which their bankers were engaged.”462  
 
Another aspect of the hermeneutical defect of viewing history through the lens of the 
letter of the religious or theological forma mentis becomes more complicated when it is 
combined with the notion that the medieval economy was “static” like the feudal 
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economy of the early Middle Ages. 463  Georges Bataille, the eminent French economist 
and anthropologist, makes the mistake of seeing the Middle Ages as “static,” if not 
slavishly attached to general medieval moral prohibitions on usury, which shows a 
shocking lack of historical rigor. For Bataille, Weber had emphasized the most essential 
point about capitalism in the connection between “a religious crisis and the economic 
turnover that gave rise to the modern world.”464 In his section “Economy in the Doctrine 
and Practice of the Middle Ages”—which reflects some similarities with the basic 
assumptions upon which Le Goff’s work Your Money or Your Life rests465—Bataille says 
                                                       
463 The caricature of a “static” medieval economy—which is implicit in a classical 
political economist like Adam Smith—in opposition to the “Renaissance” non-static 
economy, is best summed up by Karl H. Dannenfeldt, The Renaissance: Medieval or 
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pre-capitalist days, led their particular lives. It did not matter whether they were secular 
magnates or among those priests who, according to Alberti, desired to outdo all in 
splendour and display, in inclination to inactivity and the absence of all economy. As a 
matter of fact, such an unregulated and indolent mode of life led to the economic ruin of 
the majority of the old noble families. In contradistinction to the nobleman as well as 
the mediaeval peasant or artisan, the bourgeois entrepreneur calculates; he thinks 
rationally, not traditionally; he does not desire the static (i.e. he does not acquiesce in 
the customary and the traditional) or the disorderly but the dynamic (i.e. he is impelled 
towards something new) and the orderly”; also, see Bowles, Understanding Capitalism: 
Competition, Command, and Change, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 6. where the entire framework is based on the idea that prior to 1500, the 
economy was mostly unchanging and “…people's understanding of the physical world 
was so rudimentary that births, deaths, and harvests, whether abundant or meager, 
were frequently interpreted with recourse to magic, superstition, or reference to God's 
will.” 
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that “there were contrary types of economy corresponding to two different religious 
worlds: The ties between the precapitalist economy and Roman Catholicism were just as 
strong as those between the modern economy and Protestantism.”466  Borrowing the 
Smithian conception of “productive” and “unproductive labor,” the former resulting in 
vendible commodities which allow the reproduction of capital, according to Bataille, 
“what differentiates the medieval economy from the capitalist economy is that to a very 
large extent the former, static economy made a nonproductive consumption of the 
excess wealth, while the latter accumulates and determines a dynamic growth 
apparatus.”467 This statement, given what we know from the work showcased in this 
study about the massive productive, credit, and trading apparatuses geared towards 
profit and the recycling of that capital into massive international trading and money 
fructifying operations, is categorically false. Bataille also over generalizes in conflating 
one view of Christian economic thought—like that emphasized by Noonan on usury 
doctrine468—which ignores the fact that economic thought over the course of the 13th 
century was actually working to legitimize and make licit usurious and other business-
monetary practices, with a practice that he imagines was altogether different. “Its basic 
principle” says Bataille, “was the subordination of productive activity to the laws of 
Christian morality.” It so happens that this system looks an awful lot like stereotyped 
feudalism of the very early Middle Ages and not 13th -14th century Florence, extensively 
examined in this study (ch. 2-3): 
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The producers must satisfy the needs of the nobles and the priests; in exchange, 
from the former they would receive a share in the divine life and the moral rule to 
which their activity had to be strictly subordinated. The idea of an economic 
world independent of the service of the clerics and the nobles, having its 
autonomy of its own laws as a part of nature, is alien to the thought of the Middle 
Ages. The seller must part with the merchandise at the just price…Money that is 
lent cannot be an object of rent, and usury is expressly prohibited by canon law. 
The scholastics only made allowance cautiously and belatedly for the difference 
between loans for a business undertaking, which give the creditor the moral right 
to profit, and those used for the consumption of the borrower, for which no 
interest is justifiable. The rich man has his reserves: if the poor man becomes 
destitute, can the rich man who keeps him from dying of hunger, without himself 
being inconvenienced, demand repayment of more than he advanced? This would 
be to make time pay; and time, unlike space, was said to be God’s domain and not 
that of men. But time is given in nature: if money always makes it possible 
somewhere to finance profitable ventures, a natural law gives to the factors 
“money + time” the additional value of interest (of a share of possible profit). In 
this way moral thought is the negation of natural laws: the Church’s intervention 
opposed a free development of the productive forces. Production, according to 
Christian morality, is a service whose modalities (obligations, responsibilities, 
prerogatives) are determined by the ends served (by the clerics, in sum, who are 
the judges of those ends), not by a natural movement. This is a rational and 
moral—but static—conception of the economic order; it is what a divine, 




 While Bataille does admit “formal judgments are not the only ones. And the nature 
of the medieval economy may not be fully disclosed in the writings of the theologians 
and jurists,” he suggests that it “may not be defined in the real practice either” it seems, 
because of that society’s “understanding of wealth.”470 For Bataille, “before the 
reformation” it was not possible that society capitalistically set aside “the use of 
available resources to the expansion of enterprises and the increase of capital 
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equipment” preferring “an increase of wealth to its immediate use.”471 Jones, however, 
has abundantly made clear that the stereotypes that apply to northern European 
formations or feudalism in this period are in fact quite different in the south, and 
particularly in 13th and 14th century Italy, whose middle age was anything but a “dark 
age.”472  So much for Bataille’s argument, which can safely be discarded as it depends on 
interpreting ideological superstructures at face value as a basis for making any other 
material interpretation possible against a preponderance of evidence to the contrary: it 
is simply untenable today, as Giacomo Todeschini’s work on the categories of a proper 
historiography of the history of capitalism and economy has shown.473  
 
But the history of capitalism is yet the domain of extensive controversies, from the 
debate about the transition from feudalism to capitalism, agricultural and agrarian 
formations, the Brenner controversy, primitive accumulation and a host of other 
arguments.474 While this literature cannot be examined here, one major figure in the 
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debate about the historical roots of capitalism is Fernand Braudel. In his Civilization 
and Capitalism, Braudel astutely writes that the word capitalism is a “fighting word”: 
“ambiguous, hardly scientific, and usually indiscriminately applied, it is above all, a 
word that cannot be used of the ages before the industrial period without being accused 
of anachronism.”475  But I agree with Braudel wholly, when he says that  
there was nothing to be gained by throwing out along with the word the 
controversies it arouses, which have some pertinence to the present-day world…if 
capitalism is thrown out the door, it comes in the window. For whether one like it 
or not, there was, even in the pre-industrial era, a form of economic activity 
irresistibly evocative of this word and of no other. While such activity may not yet 
have been employing the industrial ‘mode of production’ (which I do not consider 
the be-all and end-all of capitalism) it cannot in any case be confused with classic 
market transactions.476 
 
As Braudel notes, “since the word is so controversial” it is helpful to trace the 
historical etymology and development of “the words capital, capitalist, capitalism.”477 
For Braudel, regarding the  “key words of the vocabulary of history” one should ask a 
number of questions, “where do they come from? How have they come down to us? Are 
they likely to mislead us?”478  Braudel’s survey is extensive, and I’ve distilled the most 
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important points that help us focus on the kinds of vocabulary used in Dante’s time.479 
Braudel notes that every civilization must develop a specialized vocabulary to “grapple 
with the necessities and disputes of exchange, production and consumption…the 
meanings of which were constantly deformed with the passing of time.” He warns that 
the “word capital, the oldest of the three [capital, capitalist, capitalism]…did not take on 
the meaning we now associate with it, indeed did not even begin to have this sense, until 
about 1770, with the work of Turgot, the greatest French economist of the eighteenth 
century.”480  
But, indeed, as Braudel writes the word rises out of 13th century Italy: 
 
Capitale (a Late Latin word based on caput=head) emerged in the twelfth to 
thirteenth centuries in the sense of funds, stock of merchandise, sum of money, 
or money carrying interest. It was not at first defined with any rigour, as the 
discussions of the time centered primarily on interest and usury (to which 
scholastics, moralists and jurists eventually opened the door in good conscience, 
because, they said of the risk run by the moneylender). Italy, the forerunner of 
modernity in this respect, was at the centre of such discussions. It was here that 
the word was first coined, made familiar and to some extent matured. It appears 
incontestably in 1211 and is found from 1283 in the sense of the capital assets of a 
trading firm. In the fourteenth century, it is to be found practically everywhere, in 
Giovanni Villani, in Boccaccio, in Donato Velluti. On 20 February 1399, 
Francesco di Marco Datini wrote from Prato to one of his correspondents: ‘Of 
course, if you buy velvet or wollen cloth, I want you to take out an insurance on 
the capital (il chapitale) and on the profit [to be made]; after that, do as you 
please.’ The word, and the reality it stood for appear in the sermons of St 
Bernadino of Siena (1380-1444) ‘…quamdam seminalem rationem lucrosi quam 
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Specifically in regard to the “reality” of capital, Braudel writes, that while capital and 
capitalism in its true sense are often thought as inseparably linked to the industrial 
revolution, we must question “whether…capitalism in its true sense really sprang to life 
fully armed at the same time as the industrial revolution.”482 He notes that “British 
historians are now inclined to date the origins of the industrial revolution at least as far 
back as 1750, if not a century earlier” and highlights the important observation of Marx, 
who  
placed the beginnings of the ‘industrial era’ in the sixteenth century—but 
admitted that ‘the first attempts at capitalist production’ (not merely capital 
accumulation, it should be noted) appeared precociously in the Italian city-states 
in the Middle Ages. Any emerging organism, even if it is still far from having 
developed all its final characteristics bears within it the potential for such 
development and can already be assigned a name. All things considered then, the 
new notion of capital can be regarded as an indispensable theoretical concept for 
the understanding of the centuries covered by this book.483 
 
Again, in response to Wallerstein’s “fascination” with the origins of capitalism in the 
sixteenth century, Braudel writes that  
 
For Wallerstein, the European world-economy [of the sixteenth century] was the 
matrix of capitalism. I do not dispute this point, since to say central zone or 
capitalism is to talk about the same reality. By the same token however, to argue 
that the world-economy built in the sixteenth century on its European site was 
not the first to occupy this small but extraordinary continent, amounts to saying 
that capitalism did not wait for the sixteenth century to make its first appearance. 
I am therefore in agreement with the Marx who wrote…that European 
capitalism—indeed he even says capitalist production—began in thirteenth-
century Italy.484 
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Braudel, in agreement with Marx puts the focus on the Italian city-states: 
the merchant cities of the Middle Ages all strained to make profits and were 
shaped by the strain. Paul Grousset had them in mind when he claimed that 
‘contemporary capitalism has invented nothing’. Armando Sapori is even more 
explicit: ‘Even today, it is impossible to find anything—income tax for instance—
which did not have some precedent in the genius of one of the Italian republics.’ 
And it is true that everything seems to have been there in embryo: bills of 
exchange, credit, minted coins, banks, forward selling, public finance, loans, 
capitalism, colonialism—as well as social disturbances, a sophisticated labour 
force, class struggles, social oppression, political atrocities. By at least the twelfth 
century in Genoa and Venice, as well as in the towns of the Netherlands, 
extremely large payments were being made in cash. But credit was quick to 
follow.485   
 
Mentioning that the only real alternative challenge to the predominance of the 
Italian city states was the “modern state foreshadowed by Frederick II’s achievements in 
southern Italy,” but that it “had got off to a poor or at any rate a slow start, and was in 
addition to be adversely affected by the fourteenth-century recession,”486 Braudel goes 
on to say that “the predominance of the city-states can only be explained in the context 
of the first world-economy ever to take shape in Europe, between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries. It was in this period that the extensive trading-zones were 
established of which the cities were at once the instruments, the articulations and the 
beneficiaries. The birth of Europe, that monstrous shaper of world history, took place 
not in 1400, the starting-point of this book, but at least two hundred years earlier.”487 
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There is, of course, before Braudel, much consensus that the birthplace of capitalism 
was medieval Italy. Marx discusses this, as cited by Braudel (n 54), in Capital vol. 
1.8.26, the section on primitive accumulation, where he maintained that  “capitalist 
production developed earliest” in medieval Italy.488 But Sombart in The Quintessence of 
Capitalism (1915), goes even further, calling Florence “the Bethlehem of the capitalist 
spirit.”489  The spirit of capitalism, he writes: 
first manifested itself in Italy. From the 13th century onward it extended over all 
the trading republics of Lombardy; by the 14th century it was fully developed 
there; and throughout the Middle Ages its intensive growth in Italy was 
unparalleled in Europe. As we have already observed, the evidence that is 
available for Italy during this period is abundant enough. It was just that state of 
mind which I have termed the ‘bourgeois spirit’ that was found in the Italian 
cities earlier than elsewhere, and it reached its highest development in the 
Tuscan republics.490  
 
Noting the differences between Tuscany and the great sea trading powers of Genoa and 
Venice, Sombart emphasizes  
that it was from Florence that the strongest impulse for the development of the 
‘bourgeois’ outlook came. As early as the 14th century the Florentines were filled 
with a feverish (I had almost said American) desire for gain, and a devotion to 
business that almost amounted to a passionate love. Florence was that state 
[according to Burkhardt] ‘which was requested by dying fathers in their last wills 
and testaments to fine their sons one thousand florins if they had no regular 
occupation.’491  
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 In his monumental work, Der Moderne Kapitalismus, Sombart also perhaps 
insists on these points more strongly,492 and none other than Davidsohn, in his 
Geschicte von Florenz (Storia di Firenze, vol. 2, II, 538 ff.) discusses “La genesi del 
capitalismo” (the birth of capitalism) in the context of the 1293-1295 Ordinances of 
Justice that coincide with the start of Dante’s own political career, in a level of detail 
that merits its own study on the history of the historiography of capitalism that goes 
beyond this study.   
 
 There is thus wide consensus on something called “capitalism” or “proto-
capitalism” existing in fact in medieval Italy. Going back to Braudel’s discussion of the 
roots of the word “capital,” I would like to here lay to rest any doubt and prevent any 
obfuscation of the facts about the existence of the word capital and its meaning in 
practice in 13th and 14th century northern Italy. To update Braudel’s etymological 
research, a few simple searches in the online Tesoro della Lingua Italiana delle Origini 
reveals potentially thousands of uses of derivatives of the word “capitale” in 
unpublished Italian language and Italian dialect documents from the 13th-14th centuries, 
reveals that it the word “capital” was in use and that it clearly refers to monetary 
capital.493 In vernacular Italian forms, such as capetale, capitagli, capitaie, capital, 
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capitale, capitali, cavadal, cavaldal, cavar, cavear, cavedal, cavedale, cavedhal, 
chapitagli, chapitale, chapitali, chapjtale, chavadal, chavedal, kapitale, and kapitali, 
from the period between 1200-1400, the word takes on the exact range of meanings a 
modern reader would expect in its conceptual denotations.   
Capital is 
1) as a noun, “patrimonio fruttifero in denaro accantonato da un singolo o da un gruppo 
di individui”  (profitable assets/holdings in money set aside by an individual person or 
group of individuals) 
2) as a noun, “qualsiasi bene o patrimonio, mobile o immobile”  (any property or asset, 
movable or immovable) 
3) As a verbal expression  “fare capitale: accantonare un bene per il futuro, arricchirsi 
(anche fig.)” (to make capital: to store an asset for the future, to enrich oneself (also 
figuratively)) 
4) As a noun,  “somma di denaro prestata a uno, al netto degli interessi” (a sum of 
money loaned to someone, after interest) 
5) As a noun, “Qualsiasi bene dato in prestito” (any good or property loaned to 
someone) 
6) “Prezzo di una merce” (the price of a good) 
 
*         *         * 
 
 Heilbroner, in The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, helps us to think better about 
what the significance of capitalism is in terms of Dante and his critique of medieval 
political economy. Referring to Braudel, Heilbroner says “in his immense panorama of 
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economic life that leads from the late middle ages through the industrial revolution into 
modern times, the doyen of French economic historians, Fernand Braudel, mentions 
capitalism only in passing in his first volume, traces the etymology of capital and 
capitalist but not capitalism in his second volume, and manages to avoid an explicit 
definition of the term in his third, where capitalism appears as a congress of trading and 
commercial activities but is curiously absent in any sense of a clearly defined social 
order.”494 Indeed, whatever capital-ism is, the consensus is that particular entwinement 
of political and economic realms is inherent to capitalistic systems, due to the social 
formations of such a society at a particular stage of its historical development.  
 
 Heilbroner offers us here a sort of road map to chart some of the issues, however 
briefly and inadequately (because such an exploration, again, trespasses the boundaries 
of this study), especially because while it is easy to cluster lots of descriptive analysis of 
multiple “trading” or “commercial” phenomena that are clearly capitalist or involve 
capital, ultimately “capitalism” is an institutional and social reality whose complexity is 
embodied in a form and habit of state (as we shall see in the next chapter in an 
Aristotelian sense). This state formation contrasts with tributary and feudal social and 
state formations which, respectively, embody the logic of those systems. Heilbroner 
points out that “capitalism cannot be understood in terms of its structure of production 
alone, any more than tributary states can be grasped exclusively in political, or primitive 
                                                       





societies in communal, terms.”495 Basically he says that we have to look at the totality of 
the social formation beyond only its most visible elements: 
In capitalism as in other regimes, a central organizing principle and its 
institutions influence all aspects of the social formation, whether these be 
concerned with material life, justice and social order, or custom and belief. In 
primitive societies that organizing principle is kinship with its networks of 
reciprocity; in tributary societies it is the principle of centralized rulership with 
its associated aristocratic or priestly hierarchies; and in capitalism, as we have so 
often discussed, it is capital with its self-expanding attributes.496  
 
Critiquing Daniel Bell’s “multi-axial” analysis of capitalism in The cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism, which divides society into “techno-economic structure, 
the polity, and the culture”497 —almost akin to Gramsci’s withering criticism of some 
political theorists’ tendency to make rigid distinctions between civil society and the 
state498 —Heilbroner poses the question: “if the realms coexist in an unordered, 
equivalent manner, how shall we distinguish the trials and tribulations of modern 
capitalism from those of other societies in the throes of their contradictions? Did not the 
Roman empire or late feudalism or Ming China have their techno-economic structures, 
their polities and their cultures, each with its axial principle? Were not the conflicts and 
contradictions among those realms decisive in changing, perhaps even in destroying, 
these societies?”499 Heilbroner’s answer to this line of questioning opens up his larger 
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analysis: “the answer—and I think it is an answer which Bell would agree—is that the 
contradictions of capitalism somehow arise from the nature and logic of the system—
that is, from the unfolding of a society under the peculiar stresses and strains generated 
by its historically unique search for generalized [monetary] surplus.”500 While other 
societies can have different sorts of contradictions—cultural, political, religious—and 
capitalist societies are not spared or immune from those sorts of traditional sources of 
“disruption,” Heilbroner’s point is that capitalism has a unique sort of tendency, such 
that “the failure to accord centrality to one principle and its embodying 
institutions…robs social analysis of its classificatory potential as gravely as the dogmatic 
insistence that all attributes of any given society can be explained as mere 
epiphenomena of its mode of production or of any other organizing structure.”501 
 
In this key passage, Heilbroner frames the entwinement of political and economic 
realms in regards to the state as a particularly capitalist logic (cf. the entire analysis of 
chapter 3): 
From this perspective it is a matter of course that capital, as the dominating 
principle of the society identified by its presence, must color and infiltrate the 
institutions and beliefs that lie beyond its immediate ambit of operation. The 
state that carries on the formal tasks of government, or the ideational structures 
that contain and convey its world views, could no more escape being recognizable 
as ‘capitalist’ than could the governing institutions or the ideational creations of 
earlier formations escape being identifiable as belonging to tributary or feudal 
forms of historical society. The influence of the economic realm on its intertwined 
political and social realms does not therefore involve any mechanical dependency 
or slavish passivity of the latter but only their congruence with, and 
complementarity to, the operating relationships of capital. Such a view is 
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perfectly compatible with the obvious fact that the hand of state, although 
generally exercised on behalf of the regime of capital, is also stayed by notions of 
fairness and justice, as well as political expediency. By utilizing its power to the 
hilt, for example, it might be possible for the state to depress wages dramatically, 
thereby assisting the accumulation of capital, but the full force of state power is 
normally held back by considerations of bourgeois morality itself, or simply by 
the calculations of prudence. It is therefore not only possible, but necessary, to 
accord to the political and ideological realms a degree of freedom to act on behalf 
of motives that antedate those of capital accumulation and that persist along side 
it, although generally subordinated to it. What is needed is no more—and of 
greater importance, no less—than a recognition of the existence of general 
priorities and interests without which no social formation has any historical 
center of gravity.502 
 
  One important point thus is that there clearly are, in the case of Dante’s time 
several motives in “political and ideological realms” such as the investiture conflict, 
Boniface’s pursuit of re-igniting papal power almost a century after Innocent III, 
transitional ideas of nobility, theological and ideological elements pertaining to secular 
and church powers, ideologies and political theories about monarchy in the political 
thought of the time and, as Lansing has shown in the Florentine Magnates, sociological 
motives regarding knighthood and nobility in elite violence that antedate motives of 
capital accumulation. There are also clear indications of the development, as Joel Kaye 
and Odd Langholm have shown, of a bourgeois morality that is firmly rooted in religious 
traditions, cultural phenomena, and intellectual strands that ante-date the 
predominance of a capitalist logic. But as I have shown extensively in the previous 
chapter—in the case of Florentine history of Dante's time, especially from the 1290s 
onwards—the preponderance of historical evidence shows decisively that these 
phenomena are “generally subordinated to [capital]” as the main historical dynamic 
characterizing the material and social relationships they embody.  This is another way of 
saying that in the capitalism, with a little ‘c’ of Dante’s time, the “motives that antedate 
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those of capital accumulation” and the developing ideological, religious, philosophical, 
and cultural responses to the increasing hold of capitalist logic in 13th and 14th century 
Italy, constitute a “superstructure” which is reciprocally interactive with, but largely 
subordinated to (in the force of its historical development) the economic/material 
relationships innested in the base of the state institutions, configurations of property, 
and economic power: a less ideologically manifested, but still very clear, base whose 
main characteristic is the “capitalist” logic.503    
 
 What is this base and superstructure? As Marx famously defines them in the 
Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859): 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material 
forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces 
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this 
merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations 
within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then 
begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead, 
sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure. In 
studying such transformations, it is always necessary to distinguish between the 
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be 
determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, 
religious, artistic, or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men 
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an 
individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of 
transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness 
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must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict 
existing between the social forces of production and the relations of 
production.504 
 
 Thus Dante’s political prescriptions and critiques can be better understood as a 
critique of “political economy” (though I think critique of capitalism would be good). 
Thus in book 3 of Monarchia Dante is critiquing the self-conscious ideological content 
(superstructure) of his Florentine and medieval Italian political economy—especially 
regarding the theological claims to Church power over the state—while in Book 1 he is 
offering a normative political theory rooted in the material and economic foundations in 
the base including a strong moral argument against the power of greed to divert human 
beings as a society seeking a common end from the fulfillment of that end. While this is 
only one part of the way of understanding Dante’s conceptual framework, we will in the 
next chapter examine Dante’s Aristotelian critique of “political economy” as a more 
precise mode of approaching the particular problem of “political economy.” In any case, 
the critique of political economy is heavily involved in defeating the fiction of the 
separation of the political realm and the economic realm, and calling into question the 
intertwinement of politics with a certain form of capitalistic wealth-getting that subjects 
justice and social goods to economic modes of the logic of monetary accumulation not 
present in non-capitalist systems.  
                                                       
504 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1977); Marx ends this preface on the critique of political economy by 
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and how little they conform to the interested prejudices of the ruling classes – are the 
outcome of conscientious research carried on over many years. At the entrance to 
science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be made: Qui si convien lasciare 





 For Heilbroner, key to a critique of a capitalist political economy, therefore, is a 
careful examination of the “properties of the economic and political spheres themselves, 
in particular those that comprise the productive and distributive activities of the social 
formation, and those that define the realm charged with governance.”505  In other 
words, he is looking at how the capitalist logic operates through the state—as we have 
done in chapter 3. He notes, 1) that one of the chief characteristics of pre-capitalist 
orders is that there is no truly “clear-cut division” between economic and political 
activities. In fact, in these pre-capitalist formations, “nothing like an economic ‘realm’ 
can be discovered in any of them.” Although he does not mention Aristotle, the point he 
makes is very Aristotelian (which we will examine shortly), in that the economic factor, 
that is the social provisioning for needs “for material survival” are indeed visible in all 
societies as well as the “technical and organizational problems of altering or channeling” 
them.506 Thus according to Heilbroner, the lack of “formal boundaries that exclude the 
exercise of state power over the organization or direction of production or distribution” 
is what precludes these activities from “constituting a realm”:  
The economic domain is simply of one piece with the political…the crucial 
relationship of domination in tributary systems is applied alike with regard to the 
allocation of labor or the administration of justice, to the extraction of rents or 
the inflicting of punishment. There is no essential difference between the 
disciplining or the marshaling of a labor force and an army, although the former 
generally requires less effort because it can rely on the inertia of tradition.507  
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 It seems that Hielbroner’s “tributary” closely resembles the despotic or 
paterfamilias notion of “oikonomia.” In all “tributary” systems there is only one 
“political” order, one realm, in any case because at times in early systems “this aspect of 
domination has not acquired a distinctive association with ‘the state’ and its apparatus, 
as opposed to the mere expression of a single ruler’s will.”508 Indeed, in this model the 
prominent feature is that power, whether exercised by a bureaucracy or a monarch, 
“combines the enforcement of political relations of sub-and super-ordination with the 
economic performance of various tasks.” For Heilbroner, “thus the warlord collecting 
his tribute, part of which will be conveyed to the imperium, is at one and the same time 
manifesting a political relationship of domination and obedience, and carrying out an 
economic function of surplus collection and distribution.”509 As he puts it, in tributary 
systems, it is not really an exaggeration to claim “there is no activity that results in the 
production or the allocation of material wealth that is not also the embodiment of the 
hierarchical principle of the system.”510  
 
 While there could be an interesting investigation into the relationship between a 
tributary state (Roman imperial) model and the sort of imperium by right that Dante 
traces as legitimate Roman power in Monarchia 2, we instead recall Dino Compagni’s 
comment about Florence being a “merchants republic” and say with certainty that the 
system Dante is critiquing in his political realm is defined by the capitalist logic. Both a 
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“political” and “economic” realm are wrapped up into the Florentine state (and its firms 
and banking houses) and in its dealings with other powers such as the papacy and 
French and German monarchs. Heilbroner pivots to define what it means for an 
“economic realm” to emerge: 
 
For an economic realm to emerge, that pervasive and unchallenged rulership 
must yield up some portion of its sovereignty, recognizing, so to speak, the 
existence of an autonomous republic of commerce and production within its own 
territory (and even stretching beyond it). As we know, this momentous internal 
secession was the consequence of the political fragmentation that followed the 
collapse of the Roman empire. Beginning as early as the tenth century, the 
mercantile estate found the protective shelter it needed in the rubble of fiefdoms 
that emerged from that enormous collapse. Very gradually, there arose from the 
widening importance of mercantile dealings, and from the increasing dependence 
of all levels of society on the market mechanism, the foundations of a regime of 
capital itself. On the land, surplus more and more welled up in the form of profits 
accruing to merchant traders, later in merchant guilds. Guildsmen who 
constituted briefly a kind of open society of independent producers in the twelfth 
century were the rich masters of many trades, and the dominant group in all 
cities, by the sixteenth century. Thus even before capitalism emerged in full 
dress, the appearance of a world of business presaged its entrance within late 




In another work, Braudel goes into some of the institutional distinctions, particularly 
important for this study, that show that the main feature of capitalism as pertaining to 
medieval Italy is the embryonic form of the state with the political and economic realms 
intertwined, but clearly defined, in such a way that capital cannot exist without the state 
yet exists as if in an naturally autonomous economic realm. However we try to define 
capitalism, one of its most striking features, which some would call “crony capitalism,” 
is economy’s close interlocking relationship with the state, political systems of clientele 
and patronage, and a “series of ensembles.” Braudel says “the preserve of the few, 
                                                       




capitalism is unthinkable without society’s active complicity. It is of necessity a reality of 
the social order, a reality of the political order, and even a reality of civilization. For in a 
certain manner, society as a whole must more or less consciously accept capitalism’s 
values. But this does not always happen.”512 Indeed, there are multiple layers and 
“ensembles” that define capitalism, and in any case, Braudel realizes the need for 
something like Marx’s framework in the Critique of Political Economy of base and 
superstructure: 
Any highly developed society can be broken down into several “ensembles”: the 
economy, politics, culture, and the social hierarchy. The economy can only be 
understood in terms of the other “ensembles,” for it both spreads itself about 
and opens its own doors to its neighbors. There is action and interaction. That 
rather special and partial form of the economy that is capitalism can only be 
fully explained in the light of these contiguous “ensembles” and their 
encroachments; only then will it reveal its true face.513 
 
 For Braudel, however difficult it may be to put one’s finger on the exact nature of 
these superstructure ensembles with their economic bases, there is no doubt 1) that we 
can find one of the earliest forms of capitalism in medieval Italian city-states of 
Florence, Venice, and Genoa, and 2) that “capitalism only triumphs when it becomes 
identified with the state”:  
 
Thus, the modern state, which did not create capitalism but only inherited it, 
sometimes acts in its favor and at other times acts against it; it sometimes allows 
capitalism to expand and at other times destroys its mainspring. Capitalism only 
triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state. In its first 
great phase, that of the Italian city-states of Venice, Genoa and Florence power 
lay in the hands of the moneyed elite. In seventeenth century Holland the 
aristocracy of the Regents governed for the benefit and even according to the 
directives of the businessmen, merchants, and money lenders. Likewise, in 
England the Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked the accession of business 
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similar to that in Holland. France was more than a century behind; only with the 
July Revolution of 1830 did the commercial bourgeoisie become comfortably 
ensconced in the government.514 
 
 
 Leaving this discussion behind, my contention is that the real way to see 
capitalism as political economy in the time of Dante, without committing a conceptual 
anachronism (here we have shown that there is no anachronism in talking about capital 
or capitalism) by importing modern theories of political economy on to Dante’s time, 
actually requires going back to Arisotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, where we 
shall see that Aristotle already provided such a concept, however in a different form 
from that of modern political economist’s definitions of their own field. The next chapter 
shows that, given the centrality of Aristotelian language for constructing a valid and 
accepted monetary society at the time, we examine Aristotle’s texts to see how Aristotle 
can be said to provide a paradigm of valid and invalid wealth-getting, and how wealth-
getting is linked to political categories and notions of virtuous activity and teloi of the 
household and the state. Having seen Aristotle’s paradigm, the chapter will conclude by 
reading Dante through the lens of this Aristotelian analysis. Having understood the 
historical reality of political economy in his time, I show that Dante is its critic. 
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Chapter 5. Aristotle’s Paradigm and Dante’s Critique of Political Economy 








1. Aristotle as Political Economist 
 
Aristotle has been widely recognized as one of the first major economic thinkers in 
the west.515 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis of contemporary capitalism, 
Aristotle, in fact, has re-emerged in some circles of modern economics as relevant for 
offering a sort of “moral fix” for the contradictions of capitalism.516 In times like ours, in 
which economic decisions so clearly lack moral foundations and the economy is seen as 
something like a force of nature that moves autonomously—to use the words of Adam 
Smith, as if by an “invisible hand” severed from the moral and political decisions of 
human beings—Argentine economist Ricardo Crespo has proposed that to “reinstate 
economics as a moral science is to start by understanding the groundwork laid by its 
primitive founder, Aristotle.”517 Though Aristotle wasn’t an economist in the same ways 
(eg. quantitative, financial-analytical) the modern field of economics now defines itself, 
he conceived of the economy as a “natural human reality with enough universality to 
warrant universal conclusions. The deepest and most relevant knowledge on any 
subject-matter is philosophical, and Aristotle did pave the way for a philosophy of 
                                                       
515 For detailed analysis of Aristotle as an economic thinker in the primary texts of 
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economy.”518 Both Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi acknowledge that Aristotle, to 
use the title of Polanyi’s work, “discovered the economy.”519 Schumpeter, in fact, says 
that Aristotle’s work counts as among the first of “the intellectual efforts that men have 
made in order to understand economic phenomena.”520  
 
As Schumpeter acknowledges, however, the most unique aspect of Aristotle’s 
discovery of the economy is perhaps the too-obvious truth that—if the economy is 
something—it is inseparable from or rather, to be more precise, a natural part of the 
social reality of human life in civilization in which it arises from anthropological 
constants. Aristotle’s sees the “economy” in just this way, as a series of social and 
political phenomena, and thus economic science is inseparable from the moral and the 
political science. For this reason, Aristotle did not make the “economy” the main object 
of his philosophy per se, even if he made substantial contributions to our conception of 
it. As Schumpeter writes: 
 
…only a small part of his analytic performance is concerned with economic 
problems. His main work as well as his main interest, so far as social phenomena 
are concerned, was in the field we have decided to call economic sociology or 
rather it was in the field of political sociology to which he subordinated both 
economic sociology and technical economics. It is as a treatise or textbook on 
state and society that his Politics must be appraised. And his Nicomachean 
Ethics—a comprehensive treatise on human behavior presented from the 
normative angle—also deals so preponderantly with political man, with man in 
the city-state, that it should be considered as a companion volume to the Politics, 
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making up together with the latter the first known systematic presentation of a 
unitary Social Science.521 
 
  
 How, then, does Aristotle present his social scientific categories? Aristotle’s 
economic thought lies within his political thought as does his ethical thought, which as 
Aristotle says in the Ethics is subservient to the architectonic science of politics. 
Whether we are talking about arts—like shipbuilding, strategy, or economics—or 
practical sciences  
if…there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake…and if 
we do not choose everything for the sake of something else…clearly this must be 
the good and the chief good…we must try…to determine what it is…it would seem 
to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master 
art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of 
the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should 
learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most 
highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, eg. strategy, economics, rhetoric; 
now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again it legislates as to 
what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must 
include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if 
the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all 
events something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for 
though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more 
godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These then, are the ends at 
which our inquiry, being concerned with politics, aims.522 
 
 As Crespo puts it, 
…according to Aristotle, if we do not have the economy serve the polis’ common 
good, we cannot judge if economics is fulfilling its mission, and neither can we 
determine if individual economic behaviours are just. For [Aristotle], it would be 
a conceptual error to think of economics aside from politics—in the classical 
sense of the most architectonical moral science. The marriage between economics 
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and politics, indissoluble by nature, went through a divorce in the nineteenth 
century. The time has come for a reconciliation.523 
 
 Indeed, Aristotle’s notion of economics is based on the virtue ethics that grew out 
Platonic school and democratic Athenian age of the 5th century B.C.E: 
 
Aristotle was not an economist, and he did not develop a discipline similar to 
current economic analysis. However, he did provide core ideas about the 
economy and its tie to ethics and politics. While he did not influence the modern 
development of economics, he did have a significant influence on medieval 
economic thinking and some bearing on contemporary economists’ foundations. 
What seems paradoxical, as Polanyi also notes, is that ‘the last word on the nature 
of the economic life should have been spoken by a thinker who hardly saw its 
beginnings.’”524 
 
 Crespo, bringing up the work of Eduoard Will, Karl Polanyi and, Jean Jacques 
Maffre, argues that debates over whether or not the Ancient Greek economy was really 
primitive or modern misses the point: 525 
 
economic reality was not a separate reality for ancient Greeks. Economic 
functions were immersed in social and political tasks. As defined by Aristotle, 
man is a political animal, and all human activities are conditioned by or 
subsumed under political goals, which are moral goals. Therefore, as Werner 
Jaeger explains, ‘[p]oliteia means not only the constitution of the state but the 
entire life of the state […] politeia covers the entire content of private and public 
life: economics, morals, culture and education.’526  
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 Thus, while Aristotle, of course, recognized the complexities of monetary value and 
the danger of unnatural usury and monetary accumulation being against the model of 
justice,527 which is the “bond of men in states,” Aristotle’s conception of wealth-getting 
(chrematistike) was limited in its “natural” teleology to the notion of household 
management or procurement of the things necessary for social life in the city-state.528 As 
Barker points out, the formulation of “political economy” is somewhat of a tautology in 
an Aristotelian conception: 
the polis included everything; and in the same way the theory of the polis 
included studies to which we should now give a separate existence—in particular 
the theory of economics[…] There is much writing on ‘economics’ in the fourth 
century […] Such economic theory, subordinated as it is to political theory, which 
in turn is subordinated to (or, perhaps one should rather say, is the crown of) 
ethics, admits of no isolation of the economic motive, and of no abstraction of 
economic facts as a separate branch of inquiry. It is a theory of the ways in which 
households and cities can properly use the means at their disposal for the better 
living of a good life. Wealth, on this basis, is a means to a moral end.529 
 
 
 This moral end, in the Aristotelian conception, is eudaimonia and human 
flourishing, not for an individual, but for a society and state (the two things being one 
and the same) as a whole. 
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 In order to understand what we mean by political economy, and how to 
conceptualize it in an Aristotelian framework, the first half of this chapter will examine 
Aristotle’s political economic thought and show that Aristotle provides a framework for 
critique of the political economic formations that I have shown in the previous chapters 
of this study to constitute a major phenomenon in the political history of Dante’s time. 
Thus, understanding how Aristotle conceives of the polity and the economy, and their 
linkages, allows us to reexamine Dante’s political thought, as seen in Chapter 1.2, as a 
critique of political economy: a critique of the intertwinement of politics and economics, 
confusion of their proper moral ends, and unnatural wealth-getting driving the 
legislation and constitutional form of a society and state.  
 
 Aristotle’s writings on economics stem mostly from the Politics, where “the 
economy,” as a general topic of discussion as household management and wealth-
getting, is discussed in Pol. 1.3-13. In Pol. 1.1-2, he introduces oikonomike (“the 
economic”) and “oikonomia,” as made up of relationships of authority (ruler and ruled) 
and relationships of need and exchange that aim towards self-sufficiency for the 
household (autarchia).  In Pol. 1.3, Aristotle states that a discussion of oikonomia is a 
prerequisite for speaking about the state (polis) and insists that it will be necessary to 
consider its composite elements, that is, of the family, master and slave, husband and 
wife, father and children. Here he is also very clear that there are two central aspects of 
oikonomia, namely 1) as literally the law of the household and 2) as chrematistics. In its 
literal sense, the household is a unity composed of relationships of authority and 
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subservience, mutual need, and sexual binary, with individuals arranged in social 
divisions of labor under the monarchial or despotic rule of the oldest male member of 
the household for fulfillment of mutual teloi. The household is also an analogue of the 
city. But perhaps more famously, oikonomia presupposes the necessity, but is not the 
exclusive purpose of the economy, of chrematistike (or wealth-getting).  For Aristotle, 
this second realm of oikonomia is particularly problematic because it is not identical 
with household management but appears to be so, and thus requires further 
consideration: “the so-called art of getting wealth…according to some, is identical with 
household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art 
will also have to be considered by us.”530 
 
  In Pol. 1.4, he discusses how property is part of the household and that wealth- 
getting involves the acquisition property necessary for life:  
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of 
the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, 
unless he is provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite 
sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the 
accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now 
instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, 
the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in 
the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an 
instrument for maintaining life.531 
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  In Pol. 1.5-7 Aristotle deals with slavery and the forms of despotic or monarchical 
rule, a topic that also broaches interesting ideas regarding base passions and 
contemplation, and how masterly or slavish sorts of dispositions could impact one’s 
practical wisdom (praxis) or production (poesis). But it is unmistakable that slavery is 
linked to a conception of production and property, as a slave is not only a living tool 
(organon) under the despotic authority of the oikonomos, but given that the second 
aspect of oikonomia is wealth-getting, that a living tool is involved in a social division of 
labor for the procurement of necessaries and potentially the unnecessary and unnatural 
procurement of wealth as an end in itself.  Aristotle’s examination of the economic art 
(oikonomike), wealth-getting (chrematistike), property, and money spans the chapters 
of Pol. 1.8-11, in which he details usury and his judgments about natural and unnatural 
wealth-getting. In Pol. 1.12 and 13, he returns to questions regarding the proper 
relationships that make up household management.  
 
 Thus we see that Aristotle links economics to politics from the beginning, and his 
anthropological and philosophical categories are the strong foundation of their unity. 
Aristotle treats economy in his other writings, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics.532 
Here, as we saw above, Aristotle writes about oikonomike as subordinated to politics, 
and lays the framework for us to understand chrematistike—wealth-getting—as either 
                                                       
532 On Aristotle’s other economic works, see Crespo, A Re-assessment of Aristotle’s 
Economic Thought, 14: “The Oeconomica or Economics (Oikonomikon, literally ‘of the 
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I, VII and VIII) include elements to analyse human action that could be applied to 
economic behaviour, with the most important passages being 




pertaining to productive arts (poesis; techne) or practical wisdom (phronesis; praxis), 
concerned with living well. Book IV of the Ethics treats the virtues and vices related to 
the use of wealth, and, in Book V, Aristotle devotes the majority of the discussion to the 
difference between arithmetical justice and proportional justice, monetary exchange, 
and the vice of the greedy person (or the grasping nature; pleonektes) as a particular 
perversion of justice entire.533 As Spencer Pack points out,534 the venerable scholar of 
medieval Aristotelian economic thought, Odd Langholm, summed it up best when he 
said that “value theory can be read as a history of comments on Ethics, V.5”535 
 
 For Aristotle, economics is a subsection of the practical sciences. In the 
Aristotelian categorization of the sciences, the theoretical sciences are first:  first 
philosophy or theology (metaphysics), mathematics, and the natural sciences. Then 
come the practical sciences: ethics, household management (oikonomia), and 
statesmanship or politics. For Aristotle, “statesmanship is divided into legislative 
science and routine politics (which deals with day-to-day political matters). Routine 
politics is further divided into deliberative science and judicial science. These sciences 
are concerned with action, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term. The third category are 
the “poetic” or “productive sciences (crafts): medicine, housebuilding, etc.”536 Thus how 
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are we to understand the difference between statesmanship, ethics, and household 
management as practical sciences as opposed to theoretical sciences? 
 
 Reeve helps us clear up this confusion from one angle. He notes that we (moderns) 
“distinguish politics from the intellectual study of it, which we call political science or 
political philosophy. The former is a hard-headed, practical matter engaged in by 
politicians; the latter is often a rather speculative and abstract one engaged in by 
professors and intellectuals. This distinction is alien to Aristotle. On his view, 
statesmanship or political science (politike episteme) is the practical science that 
genuine doctors use in treating the sick.”537 He goes on to observe that we (moderns) 
also distinguish to some degree or another, and “not always sharply” between “political 
philosophy and ethics or moral philosophy” in which the “former deals with the nature 
of the just or good society” and the “latter…with individual rights and duties, personal 
good and evil, virtue and vice.”538  However,  
this distinction is too foreign to Aristotle. On his view, ethics pretty much just is 
statesmanship: ethics aims to define the human good, which is happiness or 
eudaimonia, so that aimed with a dialectically clarified conception of our end in 
life we can do a better job of achieving it; statesmanship aims at achieving that 
same good not just for an individual but for an entire community. But because we 
are by nature social or political animals…we can achieve our ends as individuals 
only in the context of a political community or city-state (polis), only in the 
context of a life with others. Hence ethics and statesmanship coincide, and the 
practical wisdom that enables an individual to attain happiness is more or less 
the same thing as the statesmanship that enables a ruler to achieve happiness for 
a community. A certain conception of ethics, then together with a certain 
conception of human nature, leads to a certain conception of statesmanship.539 
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 We can draw two important conclusions from the intertwinement of ethics and 
politics according to Aristotle’s eudaemonist teleology.  From a theoretical point of view, 
ethics (moral philosophy), politics, and economics are all intertwined as practical 
sciences. “Political economy” for Aristotle then is somewhat of a strange notion to begin 
with, undoubtedly since it comes from the age of modern thought, but on the other hand 
is perfectly intelligible within Aristotle’s own philosophy without being an anachronism 
in the sense that it is a tautology. When Aristotle says that ethics (and economics) is 
governed by the architectonic science of politics—once we understand Aristotle’s 
condemnation of bad wealth-getting and that he conceives of economic tasks (esp. 
productive/poetic) as exercised either well or badly in practical science for the well-
being of households and states, for self-sufficiency (and we understand that 
“statesmanship aims at achieving” the good for an entire community)—we get closer to 
understanding how Dante will ground his argument for universal imperium or temporal 
monarchy as the most just system. For Aristotle, the best or worst political regime 
comes about through a combination of  “certain conception of ethics” and a certain 
conception of “statesmanship.” Ideal statesmanship in a pleonexic society of medieval 
Italy, for Dante, is one that turns the polis from organization centered around 
acquisitive wealth-getting (and its requisite forms of power) and turns it to man’s 
highest (intellectual) good by stopping the regressive power of greed.   
 
 More on this point in the second half of this chapter. Here it only needs to be 
pointed out that with Aristotle’s ethical and political categories we can begin to see that 
Dante’s insistence on the end of the multitude and his belief that politics must serve the 
intellectual development of all of humanity (however much it may be related to an 
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Averroism on that point) are also firmly rooted in an Aristotelian conception of the 
hierarchy of the sciences. Dante believes in the primacy of the good oriented to scientific 
development which is also parallel to and concomitant with man’s highest good as 
organized in the polis. Neither can exist without the other. For Dante, as for Aristotle, 
this highest good is either severely undermined or moved closer to realization because of 
the ethical, i.e. virtuous or vicious, mode in which politics is conducted, and thus 
depends on a correct view of what the political science actually is. If, as we are showing 
here, politics is conceived of as a particular type of authority in a state combined with 
the prime goal of unnatural wealth-getting, the polis is in jeopardy, and the soul of the 
polis (so to speak), or its regime/form of state, will reflect the priorities of 
acquisitiveness and the more base part of the soul.540 If the ruling elements of the state, 
in other words, are properly virtuous and seeking the right teloi—for example, the state 
is ruled by a virtuous (philosophical) monarch or legislator in the highest degree, as 
Aristotle sees it, then it will be oriented through the craft of lawgiving to make men 
good: 
…the man who is to be good must be well trained and habituated, and go on to 
spend his time in worthy occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do 
bad actions, and if this can be brought about if men live in accordance with a sort 
of intellect and right order, provided this has force—if this be so, the paternal 
command indeed has not the required force or compulsive power (nor in general 
has the command of one man, unless he be a king or something similar), but the 
law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time an account proceeding 
from a sort of practical wisdom and intellect…now it is best that there should be a 
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public and proper care for such matters… for public care is plainly effected by 
laws, and good care by good laws; whether written or unwritten would seem to 
make no difference, nor whether they are laws providing for the education of 
individuals or groups….for as in cities laws and character have force, so in 
households do the injunctions and the habits of the father…541 
 
  The good for Aristotle, the human good, “consists in rational activity expressing 
virtue. This activity…can be either practical or theoretical or some mix of the two,”542 
but the point is that as in a household and as in a state, good comes about through 
proper habituation and politics based on the correct ethical conceptions about human 
goods, and good habits, the prerequisites, in other words, of justice. This must be 
effectuated through a legal regime and exercise of authority.  
 
 Thus, the reason chrematistic wealth-getting is bad is because it is, for Aristotle, a 
case in which the common appetite is directed towards goods, but not in the right way. 
Some people (virtuous, self-controlled, and strong-willed) have true conceptions of the 
good, while others (vicious people) have false conceptions, though there may be a 
spectrum of degree of falsity and viciousness (malicious or incontinent). For Aristotle, 
appetite for these goods is determined by habits developed early in life, though nature 
and reason also play a role.543 There are three broad patterns of lives that emerge in 
relation to habits, 1) lives of gratification, 2) lives of political activity, and, 3) lives of 
study and contemplation, and through these kinds of lives people reach their conception 
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of the good, ie. happiness.544 A political constitution oriented towards pleonexic wealth 
getting, which as we will see shortly, we might call a political economy, “wishes for the 
good, but…mistakenly believes that the good consists (say) in gratifying…appetites.”545 
The habits formed by the state thus play a definitive role in the way people are formed in 
their appetites, and the kinds of laws that are set up in the state can either adhere to 
justice or violate proper justice, though for Aristotle, it is not easy to alter bad ethical 
conceptions that have been formed through habit.546 Therefore it is crucial for Aristotle 
that the laws and constitution are well arranged, so that it forms good habits in citizens. 
As he writes in the Ethics: 
it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for excellence if one has not 
been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not 
pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason their 
nurture and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when 
they have become customary. But it is surely not enough that when they are 
young they should get the right nurture and attention; since they must, even 
when they are grown up, practice and be habituated to them, we shall need laws 
for this as well and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people 




 The political significance of virtues is therefore a quite marked aspect of Aristotle’s 
thought. But again, following Reeve, we must return to the problem of how, according to 
Aristotle, we properly conceive of the good. The doctrine of the mean is so important 
here because often our moral relationship to external goods (of which we do have a 
necessity in many cases) is relative to our particular dispositions and can be very closely 
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influenced by feelings of pleasure or pain. If we conceive of the good as the mere 
fulfillment of bodily goods or other kinds of external goods outside of moderation 
(linked with pleasure), this could be lead to a warped and damaging conception of a 
good qua pleasure. Likewise, it can be problematic if the form of state has bad laws or is 
skewed towards bad wealth-getting or—because the good is conceived of as wealth-
getting— is ruled by laws which benefit the translation of the polis into a household 
model in which citizens are sorts of living tools or slaves organized into labor for the 
purpose of pleasurable acquisitiveness, pleasure consisting in the unlimited acquisition, 
possession, and potential exchangeability of monetary wealth. A person or people, or 
even multitude could mistakenly conceive of the good as gratifying appetites, specifically 
through pursuit of money, rather than as pursuing them in accordance with the mean 
relative to their needs and conception of eudaimonia as living well.  
 
As Reeve explains  
 
feelings are concerned with external goods; that is to say, with "goods of 
competition," which include money, honor, bodily pleasure, and in general goods 
that people tend to fight over; and with having friends, which "seems to be the 
greatest external good.” We would expect, therefore, that the virtues of character 
would be particularly concerned with external goods. And indeed they are. The 
vast majority are concerned with the goods of competition. Courage is concerned 
with painful feelings of fear and pleasant feelings of confidence; temperance, with 
the pleasures of taste and touch; generosity and magnificence, with wealth; 
magnanimity, with honor; special justice, with acquisitiveness (pleonexia), with 
wanting more and more without limit of the external goods of competition. 
General justice is especially concerned with friendship and community. It is our 
needs for these goods that lead us to form communities that are characterized as 
much by mutuality of interest as by competition. But it is these same needs that 
often bring us into conflict with one another. The single major cause of political 
instability, indeed, is competition, especially between the rich and the poor, for 
external goods such as wealth and honor. The political significance of the virtues 
is therefore assured; without them no constitution can long be stable. For "the 
law has no power to secure obedience except habit.”548 
                                                       




 Thus there is a serious problem if the statesman thinks that wealth, for example, 
confers nobility—the topic of Le dolci rime: it shows an idea that the highest good is 
wealth and could sanction competitive wealth-getting as a primary focus of the political 
process otherwise often concerned with getting honors. Thus it also is in tune with 
oligarchy. All the competitive impulses without virtue can very quickly pervert the state. 
The mistaken statesman would see politics as an extension of the economic art of 
pursuing wealth. But for Aristotle and Dante, the good statesman ought to be armed 
with virtue and wisdom, and what the virtues of character are, and a correct 
understanding of politics as practical wisdom. This will look very different from a 
chrematistic and pleonexic regime: 
 
So far we have been focusing primarily on practical wisdom as it is manifested in 
the life of an individual, in order to understand what practical wisdom and the 
virtues of character are, and how they guarantee a correct conception of 
happiness. Armed with that understanding, we are in a position to understand 
why, when practical wisdom assumes the role of statesmanship… Its primary task 
is to study the best constitution: Pol. II, VII, and VIII are devoted to this task. To 
carry it out successfully a statesman must know what happiness is. For happiness 
is the same thing for a city-state or constitution as for an individual, and the ideal 





 At the beginning of his Politics, Aristotle begins to describe the constituent parts of 
the state as a way of defining the best constitution, which he calls polity and is not a 
mixed constitution, but rather one with a stable mode of authority, with a largely equal 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 




distribution of property and honors. In any case, in Politics 1, Aristotle starts by 
describing oikonomike along with the various “modes of authority”: 
 
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established 
with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which 
they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political 
community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at 
good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. Some people 
think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are 
the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their 
subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the 
manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if 
there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The 
distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: 
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the 
rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is 
called a statesman.  But all this is a mistake, as will be evident to any one who 
considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in 
other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be 
resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore 
look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in 
what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any 
scientific result can be attained about each one of them.550  
 
 
 Thus we see that from the beginning Aristotle intends to make several important 
distinctions. Aristotle asserts, to start, that the polis is the highest form of all human 
communities and he does so on grounds familiar based on his moral philosophy, as we 
shall see shortly. As is the hallmark of Aristotelian thought, Aristotle is also thinking 
teleologically: the state/polis exists as the prior natural end of any sort of human 
associations, starting with the relationship between man and woman, master and slave, 
etc., and it comes about, specifically to attain some “good.” In this case, for Aristotle this 
good is the state itself, that is, the active political life of free people in interdependent 
relationhips—which is the living well required for human actualization of capacities and 
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eudaimonia. Anyone outside the state is either a beast or a god, there is no such thing as 
a solitary individual outside the state.551 But Aristotle also wants, at the outset, to 
disassociate a theory of political rule, or government, from a theory of one of the 
composite relationships and community associations that make up the city and the 
thing, the good, for the sake of which it exists abstracted from the composite. In other 
words, as seen in the passage above, with which Aristotle opens the Politics, the 
philosopher recognizes the risk that by confusing a certain aspect of human sociality and 
relationships, for example the economic relationship, with the state, we might then 
confuse the teleology of the part with the teleology of the whole—all of society as a 
state—which is the more important and prior end.  
 
 Aristotle goes to great pains in his political thought to resolve this issue of 
mistaking the household for the state, and it runs throughout the first book’s discussion 
of wealth-getting. Specifically dangerous is confusing the “economic” mode of authority 
(which also includes despotic, regal etc.) and one of the activities concomitant with it, 
namely acquiring external goods, the necessary things (chremata) or wealth, for life. 
Aristotle sees that that is there is a danger in confusing the theory and practice of 
rulership and government generally with a composite part of the state at the family or 
household level, and especially if wealth-getting is taken to be “economics” entire, in 
making the household analogically merely a smaller scale of a form which is political 
society. As a result, one might come to see the art of household or state management as 
analogous to despotic rule and think that the prime function within it is merely wealth-
getting and consider it natural. From the start, as in the passage cited above at the very 
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beginning of the Politics, Aristotle goes to pains to disambiguate these concepts, as they 
directly have a moral impact on the potential for the most sovereign political 
association, the state to aim at the most supreme good: “those then who think that the 
natures of the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate (oikonomos), and the 
master of a family are the same are mistaken; they imagine that the difference between 
these various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller numbers, not a difference 
in kind—that is, that the ruler over a few people is a master, over more the head of an 
estate, over more still a statesman or royal ruler, as if there were no difference between 
a large household and a small city.”552  Aristotle insists that the notion that the 
difference between kingly rule and that of a statesman is equal to the difference between 
sole rule and that of “political science,” where the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, is a 
mistake.553 He criticizes the fact that “some thinkers hold the function of the master to 
be a definitive science, and moreover think that household management, mastership, 
statesmanship and monarchy are the same thing, as we said at the beginning of the 
treatise.”  
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  Dante’s own association of the “imperial” majesty in Convivio directly hints both 
to this overlap and its dangers, and is unmistakably close to the natural teleology and 
priority of the state over and above the household. Dante declares the real function of 
political authority as rooted in “need” and shows that the social and political forms are 
from the ground up—the household, family, and village—organized in terms of need and 
the anthropological schemata of Aristotle, but also oriented towards the end of 
friendship and flourishing. We shall return to Dante soon, but it’s useful to take a look at 
this passage from the Convivio here as well:  
 
Lo fondamento radicale de la imperiale maiestade, secondo lo vero, è la necessità 
de la umana civilitade, che a uno fine è ordinata, cioè a vita felice; a la quale nullo 
per sé è sufficiente a venire sanza l'aiutorio d'alcuno, con ciò sia cosa che l'uomo 
abbisogna di molte cose, a le quali uno solo satisfare non può. E però dice lo 
Filosofo che l'uomo naturalmente è compagnevole animale. E sì come un uomo a 
sua sufficienza richiede compagnia dimestica di famiglia, così una casa a sua 
sufficienza richiede una vicinanza; altrimenti molti difetti sosterrebbe che 
sarebbero impedimento di felicitade. E però che una vicinanza non può sé in 
tutto satisfare, conviene a satisfacimento di quella essere la cittade. Ancora: la 
cittade richiede a le sue arti e a le sue difensioni vicenda avere e fratellanza con le 
circavicine cittadi; e però fu fatto lo regno. (The root foundation underlying the 
Imperial Majesty is, in truth, man’s need for human society, which is established 
for a single end: namely, a life of happiness, which no one is able to attain by 
himself without the aid of someone else, since one has need of many things which 
no single individual is able to provide. Therefore the Philosopher says that man is 
by nature a social animal. And just as for his well-being an individual requires the 
domestic companionship provided by family, so for its well-being a household 
requires a community, for otherwise it would suffer many defects that would 
hinder happiness. And since a community could not provide for its own well-
being completely by itself, it is necessary for this well-being that there be a city. 
Moreover, a city requires for the sake of its culture and its defense mutual 
relations and brotherhood with the surrounding cities, and for this reason 
kingdoms were created.)554 
 
 Thus for Aristotle, in order to show that oikonomia is not the same as the state, 
that is against the Platonists, who, as Crespo writes, “did not make any distinctions 
                                                       




among the roles of slave master, the manager of a house and the ruler of a polis. For 
Plato, the difference between them was only a matter of degree—number of 
subordinates—and not of different kinds of authorities,” Aristotle will set out to show 
their key differences by breaking down as we have shown in the passage above, the “core 
components” of the city.555 For Aristotle, the city is formed following this composition 
and with certain ends in mind (and conditions for ends). We notice his anthropology 
aligns closely with Dante’s. Thinking about ends inherently involves thinking about the 
reason human beings do things. To bring the “political economy” to its anthropological 
roots, the most basic reason that people associate, according to Aristotle,  is because of 
necessity: “there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely 
that of male and female, that the race may continue.”556 For Aristotle the household is 
composed of “these two partnerships” namely, male and female and master and slave, 
biological and sexual need (perpetuation of species; coupling) and need for security:557 
“The partnership therefore that comes about in the course of nature for everyday 
purposes is the ‘house’….” This is how Aristotle defines the first level of association at 
the level of the family, of the household. We see here that “the family is the association 
established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday wants, and the members of it are 
called by Charondas, ‘companions of the cupboard,’ and by Epimenides the Cretan, 
‘companions of the manger’.”558 
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 At this point it is important to note that for Aristotle here we start to see that 
human association is from the beginning, anthropologically, so to speak, linked to 
needs, wants and desires. Before we even discuss the individual or money at all, for 
Aristotle, at the level of the family, “economic motives,” far from the modern capitalist 
profit mindset, are there when men and women and other associates united to supply 
wants and needs. As Aristotle puts it himself, this is because “the individual, when 
isolated, is not self-sufficing.”559 Thus for Aristotle, the progression is first the 
household, then “several villages,”560 and “when several villages are united in a single 
community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing (autarcheia), the state 
comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence 
for the sake of a good life. And therefore if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is 
the state, for it is the end of them and the nature of the thing is its end. For what each 
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature…”561  Aristotle’s major point here, as 
Crespo writes, is that 
man’s end goes beyond the necessary, beyond simply living (tou zen), which is 
done at home, as men should strive to live well (tou eu zen), which is only 
possible at the polis. Living well is a lofty ideal — a life of virtue. Men need to live 
in the polis to manage to live well. Hence, Aristotle concluded that man is by 
nature a ‘political animal’. In other words, men are called by their own nature to a 
level of perfection that exceeds the possibilities of the house and requires the 
polis. Indeed, Aristotle provided an additional argument for the natural priority 
of the polis: 'the reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior [in nature] to 
the part’.562  
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Thus, for Aristotle, there is a meaningful difference between merely living (which 
is the association of the household), economics, and living well, politics: economics is 
purely subordinate to ethics and politics as an instrument to provide sufficiency for 
communities to attain other higher ends, the highest being contemplation and 
intellectual fulfillment. Whether this happens or not depends on the kind of justice that 
exists between free human beings and virtuous human beings in the polis. In order to 
understand what justice is, which is “the bond of men in states” we will need to 
understand virtues, and how humans use their desires and live well or badly. A life 
dictated by lust and gluttony, if it infects the state, can infect justice. As Aristotle puts it, 
connecting the ethical dimensions of politics with the social nature of man, 
 
the proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that 
the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part 
in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no 
need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no 
part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who 
first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, 
is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of 
all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with 
arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the 
worst ends. That is why, if he has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the 
most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the 
bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the 
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.563  
 
 Therefore, Aristotle sees the imminent importance of discussing household 
management (oikonomia) and the other aspect of it, “the art of getting wealth” and 
property, as a prerequisite to understanding the particular forms of state—which he will 
analyze largely as characterized by how property is managed and distributed. As we 
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said, for Aristotle, “property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property 
is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at 
all, unless he is provided with necessaries.”564  In any case for Aristotle, “the amount of 
property which is needed for the good life is not unlimited” and he instructs us that 
riches “can be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or a 
state.”565 In other words, natural property are teleological use values, not exchange 
values.  
 
 So, to understand chrematistics we need to understand how Aristotle views wealth 
and property within his ethical framework, the framework without which we would fail 
to understand Aristotle’s thought entirely. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle opens 
by explaining that “every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice is 
thought to aim at some good.”566 He explains that the end of oikonomia, which appears 
to be a practical science, is wealth: “now as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, 
their ends are also many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a 
vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth.”567 For Aristotle chrematistics 
is a subordinated part of oikonomia, it is the art of providing useful things, ta chremata. 
Properly speaking, oikonomike as a practical science, uses things for the good life: 
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the 
management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must 
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either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and 
useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the 
elements of true riches.568  
 
 For Aristotle, then, “true riches” will be opposed to something else. The object of 
household management, the acquisition of things necessary for life, is possible to be 
analogous between the state and the household; the things that are true riches in so far 
as they are use values and instrumental commodities that provide the sustenance for 
life. Such things can be stored and provisioned, and money as such is the storing up of 
value that is exchangeable, but Aristotle writes, continuing, “the amount of property 
which is needed for a good life” however “is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his 
poems says that no bound for riches has been fixed for man.”569 In other words, 
“natural” (kata physein) chrematistics is limited:  
…there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments 
of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be 
defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And 
so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers 
of households and by statesmen, and the reason for this.570 
 
This notion of “limited means” appears also in Politics 7 where it is linked to moral 
dangers inherent to the attachment to and desire for external goods: 
certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which 
separates them into three classes, viz. external goods, goods of the body, and 
goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three…some think 
that a very moderate amount of excellence is enough, but set no limit to their 
desires for wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To them we shall 
reply by appeal to facts, which easily prove that mankind does not acquire or 
preserve the excellences by the help of external goods, but external goods by the 
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help of the excellences, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or 
excellence, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated 
in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external 
goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are 
deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only a matter of experience, but, if 
reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas 
external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are 
useful for a purpose, and where there is too much of them they must either do 
harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the 
greater it is, is also of greater use…571 
 
  In Politics 1.9 we find Aristotle’ seminal discussion of the other kind of 
acquisitiveness (yenos ktetikes) also called chrematistike, but chrematistike in malo. 
This kind trespasses acquisition of use values (as means), which are merely external 
goods for the instrumental use of the telos of the flourishing of human life. As Aristotle 
says: 
There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly 
called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches 
and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often 
identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the 
same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by 
experience and art. 
 
 This second kind of chrematistics is unnatural—because it makes an inappropriate 
use of objects meant for use and consumption— and has no limits.  It also allows money 
to be used not as mere token of equalization in the exchange of commodities or labor, 
but for the storing up of money itself as a useful thing, as something that holds all 
potential value in exchange. This second definition is what is mostly understood as 
chrematistics or wealth-getting after Aristotle, the acquisition, possession, and 
accumulation of money as an end and good in itself. To understand wealth-getting 
(chrematistics) depends on understanding how use and exchange are natural or 
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unnatural. The origin of money is indeed natural, but sets the stage for unnatural 
wealth-getting: 
 
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations. Of 
everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, 
but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper use 
of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses 
of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants 
one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper use, for a shoe is 
not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for 
the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is 
natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence 
we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had 
it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first 
community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it 
begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family 
originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the 
parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they 
had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still 
practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the 
necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in 
exchange for corn, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-
getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of 
men’s natural wants.572 
 
 In other words, Aristotle is not against trade—when he talks about barter trade— 
(it can be natural, since this arises from unequal storing of useful things) but definitely 
casts it as a second form of wealth-getting that arises when things are used as tokens of 
exchange. This he calls retail trade: using objects against their nature not as use values 
but as exchange values. In Marxian terms, it is the inversion of the C-M-C to M-C-M 
(commodity-money-commodity to money-commodity-money). This inversion happens 
in the context of an explicitly monetary economy. In other words, trade (or barter) is not 
unnatural, that is part of general social intercourse, and as we shall see is firmly linked 
to the idea of justice as contrapassum, or proportional exchange based on need. In 
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Ethics 5, proportional exchange based on need is the model for exchange between 
unequal parties, their inequality being equalized in regards to the need, dictated by the 
usefulness to the person. Retail trade however, for Aristotle, arises from the use of 
money, where money’s usefulness as a token of exchange becomes the foundation for 
money to become a “useful” thing itself.  
 
 Let us examine how this sort of retail trade is unnatural, and then we can circle 
back to the crucial question of the modes of authority and how the overlap between a 
function of the housekeeping, or economic mode, anthropologically as wealth-getting 
with the governance of the state (which we have just seen Aristotle says are somewhat 
analogous in terms of the “ community of the family or state”) can conduce to a 
completely different idea of what politics is or should be.  
Aristotle explains:  
 
The other form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of this one. 
When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of 
another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too 
much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are 
not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with 
each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the 
purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at 
first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp 
upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.573  
 
 This is a sort of anthropology and genealogy of money. Aristotle does not object to 
this, but the entire problem is related to using money itself to produce unnecessary, 
unlimited wealth: “When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of 
necessary articles arose the other art of wealth-getting, namely retail trade.” Aristotle 
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says that, while this was at first a “simple matter” quickly it became problematic, “as 
soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit 
might be made.”574  Aristotle is pointing to one of the most abiding features of 
capitalism, especially articulated by Marx, who of course derives it from Aristotle: the 
money-commodity-money’ (repeat) chain: 
 
Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be 
chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth, 
having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by 
many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail 
trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere 
sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute 
another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means 
to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in 
want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a 
great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose 
insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?575  
 
 
 For Aristotle, one of the biggest problems is that people come to believe that wealth 
getting consists in the procurement of wealth qua coin, qua money, and that the basic 
economic function is not exchange of goods between diverse and unequally needy 
individuals, houses, families in a division of labor or social intercourse, and their 
exhaustion and use, but actually that the basic and primary economic function is 
actually the accumulation of wealth as money. As he points out, there is a basic 
difference between “natural riches” and “the natural art of getting wealth” for use value, 
to fulfill needs for human life, while “retail trade” is the “art of producing wealth, not in 
every way, but by exchange,” the exchange of commodities and money for the sake of 
making money. This second kind of wealth-getting 
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is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the limit 
of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth-
getting. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as 
in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim 
at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for 
the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit 
of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But 
the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other 
hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, 
therefore, from one point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a 
matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth 
increase their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is the near 
connexion between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in both, the instrument is the 
same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is 
a use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the 
one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to 
believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole 
idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, 
or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they are 
intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are 
unlimited, they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without 
limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily 
pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they 
are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealth-
getting.576 
 
 This passage is key: “hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is 
the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought 
either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it.” We have now 
arrived at the point at which we departed: political economy, i.e. the confusion of a 
notion of wealth-getting and a mode of authority. For Aristotle this wealth-getting 
brings about the ruin of states.  
 
 In his section “Consumption, chrematistics, choice, and character,” Spencer Pack 
notes that this kind of wealth-getting severely impacts the character of individuals and 
                                                       




ultimately that of society. The primary goal of human life is living well. We do need 
wealth to care for the body, and thus the procurement of useful things is necessary to 
care for the body, but we also must realize that while in this sense the care of the body is 
prior to the care for the soul, in Aristotle’s ethical framework the most godly capacity in 
human beings is the intellectual development, reason, and living out virtues of which 
friendship is one of the highest.577 In order to do this, though  
 
we need to train our appetites (or ‘tastes’), and not follow them blindly as most 
animals do, and as most neoclassical models of ‘economic man’ assume. Thus, 
humans need leisure and education and control of our base appetites so that we 
can develop our minds, ‘for deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek 
to fill up.’ Consequently, it is not easy to be a good consumer or to make the right 
consumption choices…578 
 
 But chrematistic culture, of this second kind, looks a lot like capitalist ethics in 
which rational calculation for profit is considered natural and even praiseworthy. The 
common opinion being that more riches, as in more money, is equivalent to great 
wealth, nobility, and status. This perspective has a lot in common with the social and 
political culture of Dante’s Florence, where the entire organization of the political 
regime was geared to accumulation of money and the consolidation of power in the 
hands of the wealthy few—which does not minimize base desires. In fact, the 
chrematisically-geared state not only fails to mimimize desires, it maximizes base 
desires and uncontrolled pleonexia (desire to accumulate wealth). It makes a virtue out 
of non-virtuous deviations of the mean in giving and taking of money (avarice and 
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prodigality). In the chrematistic state, greed is good. But, as we see from the beginning 
of the Convivio, and in Dante’s canzone Doglia mi reca, greed has bad social 
consequences as well. Chrematistic impulses have a self-reinforcing habit-forming effect 
on the character of the state that is directly related to Aristotle’s characterization of 
regimes,579 as well as influencing and defining the way people see justice, and how 
justice works. The pleonexic character will be more tyrannical and will use the power to 
find itself more opportunities to accumulate—which in fact involves seeing others as 
living tools and maintaining hierarchies of authority that do in fact resemble the basic 
wealth getting authority of a commanding pater familias, and not an association of free 
citizens pursuing higher ends.  
 
 It is in the nature of a chrematistic and monetized society that people come to 
believe that they ought develop bodily and animal needs almost exclusively and prior to 
the intellectual ones (we see how passionate Dante is on this point). As Spencer Pack 
summarizes:  
 Mistakes in how to live and what to consume are exacerbated by the monetized 
or commercialized sectors of society. Because money can purchase most 
anything, people are led to believe that their internal and external bodily needs 
are infinite. People misled by the power of money to accumulate more money 
spend their days trying to acquire money and more money to satisfy their internal 
and external bodily desires, rather than using the money to aid in the 
development of their uniquely human capabilities and powers. For Aristotle, ‘the 
life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is 
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of 
something else’. Thus wealth is not an end, it is a means to an end, and the 
‘instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or in size, and 
riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in 
a state. Therefore riches or wealth should be mere means towards the living of 
the good life. However, when the accumulation of money, wealth and riches 
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becomes an end in itself, people become ruled by their desires and passions. 
People seek to get a hold of money so they can purchase more and more goods for 
the body. Unfortunately, this use of money to acquire more money may lead to 
the corruption of all aspects of society: “For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they 
seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to 
supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other causes, using in 
turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for 
example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this 
the aim of the general’s or of the physician’s art; but the one aims at victory and 
the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a 
means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of 
the end they think all things must contribute. Thus, then, we have considered the 
art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the 
necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the 
other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned 
with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but 
having a limit.”580 
 
 
 This phenomenon is aplty desrcribed by Dante in Convivio as stemming from a 
lack of philosophical grounding in the pursuit of true goods: 
Onde vedemo li parvuli desiderare massimamente un pomo; e poi, più 
procedendo, desiderare uno augellino; e poi, più oltre, desiderare bel vestimento; 
e poi lo cavallo; e poi una donna; e poi ricchezza non grande, e poi grande, e poi 
più. E questo incontra perché in nulla di queste cose truova quella che va 
cercando, e credela trovare più oltre. (Because its knowledge is at first imperfect 
through lack of experience and instruction, small goods appear great, and so from 
these it conceives its first desires. Thus we see little children setting their desire 
first of all on an apple, and then growing older desiring to possess a little bird, 
and then still later desiring to possess fine clothes, then a horse, and then a 
woman, and then modest wealth, then greater riches, and then still more. This 
comes about because in none of these things does one find what one is searching 
after, but hopes to find it further on).581 
 
The best way to describe the vicious and unregulated desire for wealth, however, 
requires only one word: greed.  
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3. Dante vs. Greed: Wealth, Virtue, and Incontinenza in Doglia mi reca and 
Inferno  
 
Nobility and Beauty, the topics Dante declares as the objects of his canzoni in Doglia 
mi reca and Le dolci rime, both go to the heart of the Aristotelian question of virtue, and 
set up the current exploration of Dante as a critic of political economy.582 Indeed, the 
Nicomachean Ethics can give us an interesting perspective on these poems as their 
topics correspond to the foundational objects of choice and avoidance in Aristotle’s 
attempt to define virtues as “concerned with actions and passions, and every passion 
and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain:”  
 
There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the 
advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the 
painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go 
wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also 
it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous 
appear pleasant.583   
 
Aristotle goes on to say, echoing his statement from Nicomachean Ethics 1, that 
ethics is integral to political science and that “legislators make the citizens good by 
forming habits in them…and it is in this good that a good constitution differs from a bad 
one”584 and that “the whole concern of both excellence and of political science is with 
pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them 
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badly bad.”585 In book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle articulates this further. 
We learn that there are two kinds of excellence (virtù), intellectual and moral, one that 
results from teaching (theoretical instruction) and requires “experience and time” and 
another, moral excellence, that “comes about as a result of habit.”586  For Aristotle, 
“actuality precedes potentiality”: it is by doing activities that excellences are produced 
and destroyed.587 Specifically, Aristotle puts a social emphasis on this, it is by “doing the 
acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust.”588 
Therefore we see that virtue has to do not only with pursuing the good and external 
goods correctly, but in doing good or bad actions in regards to and embedded in 
transactions with other men in such pursuits of pleasure, goods, and happiness. Thus 
the relationship of virtue to our actions regarding the pursuit of external goods will be 
central to book 5 of the Ethics, and Dante’s conception of justice (equitade or 
distributiva giustiza) both in Book IV of Convivio and throughout the Monarchia. In 
book 4 of the Ethics, Aristotle speaks of “liberality,” in connection with the proper 
ethical relationship to wealth, which he defines as “the mean with regard to wealth.”589  
The liberal man, he says, is “praised not in respect of military matters, nor of those in 
respect of which the temperate man is praised, nor of judicial decisions, but with regard 
to the giving and taking of wealth, and especially in respect of giving. Now by wealth we 
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mean all the things whose value is measured by money.”590 In short, Aristotle’s teaching 
on virtuous use of money depends on the chrematistic analysis he articulates in Politics 
and the ethical one examined throughout the Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
 Dante takes this ethical paradigm from Aristotle and takes on greed as the major 
topic of his two poems Doglia mi reca and Le dolci rime.  Le dolci rime, which will be 
the main focus of my analysis below—as it is Dante’s object of commentary in the 
political book 4 of Convivio—was written in the 1290s amidst the bitter conflicts 
involving the anti-magnate legislation and the contestation of political power by rival 
groups of wealthy bankers and businessmen, notorious for vicious public misbehavior, 
and as Barolini points out, the “Aristotelian template allows for an easy turn on Dante’s 
part from ethics in the moral and philosophical sphere to ethics in the social and 
historical sphere.”591 In Le dolci rime, which deals with nobility, but essentially a 
conception of nobility that hinges upon possession of wealth and a validation of greed as 
virtue, Dante gives up “the pleasant style / which I’ve sustained in writing poems of 
love” (soave stile/ ch’i’ ho tenuto nel trattar d’amore) to speak “with harsh and subtle 
rhyme” (rima aspr’e sottile) about the value—with ringing overlap with the idea of 
monetary value (valor)— “which makes a person truly noble” (veramente omo è 
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gentile).592 Dismissing the “belief” (giudicio) that  “wealth” (richezza) is the origin of 
nobility as false, Dante’s canzone moves towards an Aristotelian model of nobility based 
on the proper selection and performance of good actions according to the mean: 
Dico ch'ogni vertù principalmente 
vien da una radice:  
vertute, dico, che fa l'uom felice  
in sua operazione. Questo è, secondo che l'Etica dice,  
un abito eligente, 
lo qual dimora in mezzo solamente,  
e tai parole pone. 
(I affirm that every virtue stems ultimately from one root, meaning by virtue that which 
makes a man happy in his actions. This is, as the Ethics states, a ‘habit of choosing which 
keeps steadily to the mean’—those are the very words.) 593 
 
Where Le dolci rime deals with virtue as the ability to conceive of and follow goods 
properly and denounces the mistaking of virtue for acquisition, possession, and 
accumulation of wealth (which we will examine in more detail in terms of Dante’s 
commentary in Convivio 4 below), within the equation of nobility, gentility, and the 
status of being rich, Doglia mi reca deals with the debilitating vice of avarice in the 
courtly context.594 As such, Doglia mi reca is a poem about wealth, a reflection on the 
social consequences of the lack of the virtue of liberality, and a denunciation of the vice 
of greed. Foster and Boyde put its composition, along with “Tre donne” as written 
around 1304-1305 at the time of Dante’s exile.595 It is clearly a social and political 
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commentary at root, and in any case, regardless of the time of its composition, fits in a 
pattern in Dante’s oeuvre demonstrating a longstanding focus on greed as the locus of 
such commentary. 
 
The poem starts off with Dante declaring that “grief brings boldness to my heart on 
behalf of a desire that is friend to truth” (doglia mi reca ne lo core ardire / a voler ch’è di 
veritate amico) invoking the Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’ reference to preferring the 
truth over his friends (the Platonists) that “piety requires us to honour truth above our 
friends.”596 In the second half of the poem, Dante goes directly into a social critique of 
greed, showing his debt to the Aristotelian notion of natural and unnatural wealth-
getting and the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a situational mean in controlling 
dispositions between extremes, in this case moderation between giving and taking of 
wealth that must be linked to true goods and ends.  The greedy man is a slave to a base 
desire: 
 
Chi è servo è come quello ch’è seguace 
ratto a segnore, e non sa dove vada,               
per dolorosa strada; 
come l’avaro seguitando avere, 
ch’a tutti segnoreggia. 
Corre l’avaro, ma più fugge pace: 
oh mente cieca, che non pò vedere                
lo suo folle volere 
che ‘l numero, ch’ognora a passar bada, 
che ‘nfinito vaneggia! 
Ecco giunta colei che ne pareggia: 
dimmi, che hai tu fatto,                                 
cieco avaro disfatto? 
Rispondimi, se puoi, altro che “Nulla”. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 




Maladetta tua culla, 
che lusingò cotanti sonni invano! 
Maladetto lo tuo perduto pane,                       
che non si perde al cane! 
ché da sera e da mane 
hai raunato e stretto ad ambo mano 
ciò che sì tosto si rifà lontano. 
(a man so enslaved is like someone following headlong after his master along a 
painful road without knowing where he goes; like a miser following riches, the 
master of all. The miser runs, only to be ever further away from peace. O blinded 
mind, for its insane desire cannot see that the sum which every moment it strives 
to pass stretches on to empty infinity! See, the one who makes us all equal has 
come. Tell me, what have you done, blind, undone miser? Answer me—if you 
can—other than ‘Nothing’. Cursed be your cradle which beguiled so many dreams 
in vain; cursed be the bread you’ve wasted, that’s not wasted on a dog; for 
evening and morning you have gathered and hoarded with both hands that which 
so quickly slips from your grasp.)597 
 
 
 Like Aristotle in Politics 1, Dante sees that there is no limit to the pursuit of money: 
there is no amount that can satisfy the greedy man who gives himself up to the second, 
bad kind of chrematistics. Such greed is particularly pernicious because, as Aristotle 
says in book 5 of the Ethics, it is the vice most opposed to justice generally. Dante 
concurs with this in Monarchia: 
Ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut 
innuit Aristotiles in quinto ad Nicomacum. Remota cupiditate onmino, nichil 
iustitie restate adversum (To clarify the first of these it must be noted that the 
thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the 
Ethics, when greed is entirely eliminated, nothing remains which is opposed to 
justice).598 
 
 Greed is so opposed to justice because the greedy man not only never satisfies his 
desire, but through his all consumptive and ceaseless gathering and hoarding of money, 
only wastes resources that could be used to actually feed and care for himself and others. 
Here bread—with perhaps an allusion to the Midas fable, where Midas ultimately cannot 
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eat the gold that he has touched and transformed into gold —becomes a metaphor for 
the potential use value in accumulated riches, that could be socially useful or consumed, 
but are cursed because the greedy man’s own greed prevents him from even “wasting” 
riches on the dogs, and also makes him, in other words, deficient in giving to the extent 
he is also deficient in taking.  The desire for riches is thus a bestial “undoing” (disfare) of 
the “greedy man” (avaro) and converts everything in his life to “following riches” 
(seguitando avere), showing that greed is opposed to justice too because everything, 
including other people, becomes merely instrumental to his wealth-getting. For Dante, 
then, greed as bad wealth-getting is thus completely contrary to reason, and the greedy 
man has failed to use his reason to correct the vice: 
    Come con dismisura si rauna,                       
così con dismisura si distringe: 
questo è quello che pinge 
molti in servaggio; e s’alcun si difende, 
non è sanza gran briga. 
Morte, che fai? che fai, fera Fortuna,               
che non solvete quel che non si spende? 
se ‘l fate, a cui si rende? 
Non so, poscia che tal cerchio ne cinge 
che di là su ne riga. 
Colpa è de la ragion che nol gastiga.              
Se vol dire “I’ son presa”, 
ah com poca difesa 
mostra segnore, a cui servo sormonta 
 
(Just as they gather immoderately, so they hoard immoderately: this is what 
drives many into slavery; and if any put up resistance, it is not without a great 
struggle. What are you doing, Death? Unfeeling Fortune, what are you doing—
that you don’t disperse what is left unspent? And if you were to, to whom should 
it go? I don’t know—for there’s a circle enclosing us that marks our limits from 
above. It’s reason’s fault for not correcting this: and if reason says “I am 
captive”—of how paltry a defence a master puts up, who is overpowered by a 
slave!)599 
 
                                                       




Lamenting the fact that accumulation happens with as much “dismisura”—that is 
lack of moderation—as the hoarding of the wealth, Dante in this stanza thus moves his 
critique back to the domain of reason with “moderation” (misura) as a foil for 
“immoderation” (dismisura). He also associates greed, as the all consuming pursuit of 
wealth, with the courtly love tradition’s self-justifying notion of seizeure by love and 
rejects it:  ‘I’ son presa’, / ah com poca difesa/ mostra segnore, a cui servo sormonta.” In 
other words, Dante’s critique of the greedy man consists of his insistence that such 
greed is a violation of natural law and contrary to moderation, hence either a purely 
malicious vice or incontinence, as the weak-willed or incontinent person thinks he ought 
not to do something, but eventually gives in to the desire because of the pain of 
deprivation. When Dante refers to the “cerchio” above that specifies our limits (tal 
cerchio ne cinge/ che di là su ne riga) which I read as the natural order of things, he 
suggests that nature gives reason ample example through the self-evident natural law to 
see that a defense of wealth-getting premised on the idea that the wealth-getting was 
done under compulsion by the objects of desire—“the riches made me pursue them” (I’ 
son presa) –is invalid, and that instead should be seen as a fallacious defense for lack of 
moderation by reason as “incontinenza.” Dante also wants to show too that works of 
nature (death, fortune etc.) cannot correct a socially instantiated and morally deformed 
situation by redistributing wealth perfectly. Only people can choose to give and take 
wealth moderately and virtuously in accordance with rational justice: nature only does 
so haphazardly.  On the other hand, this stanza overlaps with Inferno 11, where Dante’s 
reliance on Aristotelian virtue ethics and philosophical categories for the structuring of 




In Inferno 11, Virgil teaches Dante that injustice is the coercion of something in such 
a way that violates nature and is form of a violence against order or proportion through 
harming others: “Of every malice that earns hate in Heaven/ injustice is the end; and 
each such end / by force or fraud brings harm to other men” (d’ogne malizia, ch’odio in 
cielo acquista/ ingiura è ‘l fine, ed ogne fin cotale / o con forza o con frode altrui 
contrista).600  We learn from Virgil that the culpability of the various sins in upper and 
lower hell varies according to the degree that they stem from “incontinzena,” “malizia,” 
or “matta bestialitade.” Thus the incontinent sins in upper hell depart from a more 
involuntary defect rooted in bodily desire (love of money which departs from love of 
external goods stemming from natural bodoliy needs) moving, as across a spectrum, to 
sins of violence, then fraud and malice in lower hell (like simony, barratry, falsifiers, 
thieves, and pandering), all of which share a deliberate and calculated destruction of the 
just order of community—the bond of love that nature forges(lo vinco d'amor che fa 
natura) —and are hence ‘unnatural’ but supremely so because of their willful nature.601  
The sins of violence, fraud, and betrayal, the sins that offend God the most, form the 
seventh, eigth, and ninth circles of hell. While it is not my intention to go into a detailed 
analysis of the comedy on the complex motivation of the deployment of sins within the 
Inferno, I only mean to point out that for Dante a sin is worse because the sinner 
willingly destroys natural social bonds. Virgil’s discussion of Aristotle takes place in 
relation to the circle of the violent, where we learn that besides doing violence against 
others and oneself, violence takes the form of harm against the possessions of others 
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(adumbrating fraud in the eigth circle), 602 because following nature’s model in the 
Aristotelian sense all possessions, property, and wealth are to be used for the good of 
individuals and communities for human ends, not the ends of accumulating wealth itself 
or for any other improper end, and takes advantage of otherwise good social 
relationships for this end: “fraud…/ is practiced by a man against another/ who trusts in 
him, or one who has no trust/ This latter way seems only to cut off / the bond of love 
that nature forges” (frode…/ puo l’omo usare in colui che ‘n lui fida/ e in quell che 
fidanza non imborsa/ Questo modo di retro par ch’incida/ pur lo vinco d’amor che fa la 
natura).603 The point is that when Dante asks why “those the dense marsh holds” (quei 
de la palude pingue; the fifth circle, Inf. 7-8’s angry and wrathful), “those driven before 
the wind”  (che mena il vento; the second circle, Inf. 5’s lustful), “those on whom rain 
falls” (che batte la pioggia; the third circle, Inf. 6’s gluttonous),  “those who clash with 
such harsh tongues” (che s’incontran con si’ aspre lingue; the fourth circle, Inf. 7’s 
avaricious and prodigal), are not “not all punished in the city of flaming red if God is 
angry with them?” (dentro de la città roggia sono ei puniti, se Dio li ha in ira?...), Virgil’s 
response gives us the specific invocation of the Ethics in reference to the incontinent, 
                                                       
602 Barolini astutely remarks in her commentary on Inferno 11, Columbia University 
Digital Dante, http://digitaldante.columbia.edu/dante/divine-
comedy/inferno/inferno-11/ (accessed January 29, 2016), “The first two kinds of 
violence, violence against others and violence against the self, place a significant stress 
on possessions and material goods, very apparent in Dante’s language: “in lor cose” (in 
their things [Inf. 11.32]), “nel suo avere” (in his possessions [35]), and “ne’ suoi beni” (in 
his goods [41]). Both violence against others and violence against the self feature the 
abuse of material goods, which need to be protected from violent depredation. Material 
goods, in other words, are here viewed not as objects of disdain and reprehension, but 
rather as objects of human violence, and it is that violence that must be curtailed and 
punished.” 
 




explaining that it is really a matter of its degree of willful choosing.604  Hence Virgil:  
 
Non ti rimembra di quelle parole 
con le quai la tua Etica pertratta 
le tre disposizion che ’l ciel non vole,  
 
incontenenza, malizia e la matta 
bestialitade? e come incontenenza 
men Dio offende e men biasimo accatta?  
 
Se tu riguardi ben questa sentenza, 
e rechiti a la mente chi son quelli 
che sù di fuor sostegnon penitenza,  
 
tu vedrai ben perché da questi felli 
sien dipartiti, e perché men crucciata 
la divina vendetta li martelli 
 
 
(Have you forgotten, then, the words with which / your Ethics treats of those 
three dispositions/ that strike at Heaven’s will: incontinence/ and malice and 
mad bestiality? / And how the fault that is the least condemned / and least 
offends God is incontinence?/ If you consider carefully this judgment/ and call to 
mind the souls of upper Hell/ who bear their penalties outside this city/ you’ll see 
why they have been set off from these / unrighteous ones, and why, when 
heaven’s vengeance / hammers at them, it carries lesser anger.)605 
 
This ‘road map’ to the Inferno is Aristotelian. It explicitly comes from Ethics 7, 
where Aristotle says that  
…of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds—vice, incontinence, 
brutishness. The contraries of two of these are evident—one we call excellence, 
the other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose 
superhuman excellence, something heroic and divine, as Homer has represented 
Priam [Iliad, XXIV, 258] saying of Hector that he was very good, For he seemed 
not, he, The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God’s seed came. Therefore 
if, as they say, men become gods by excess of excellence, of this kind must 
evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or 
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excellence, so neither has a god; his state is higher than excellence, and that of a 
brute is a different kind of state from vice.606  
 
Following these chains of Aristotle, we see that the structuring principle of Inferno is 
consistent with Aristotle’s view that all “folle volere” starts in lust and gluttony, or 
incontinent desire.  It helps us understand, furthermore, why the origin of the 
perversion of order quickly moves into grasping (avarice proper), and then a intellectual 
and deliberate perversion of nature that takes the form of chrematistics (usury) that 
offends divine goodness, this latter condemned as a subversion of nature in Inferno 11 – 
basically represented as the antithesis of the ‘minister’ of goods –Fortuna—in Inferno 7.  
 
To bring it back to Aristotle again, in an ancillary passage of the Politics, from book 1 
–in the context of how we might conceive of political science, chrematistics, and 
ultimately define just rulers as well as think about cases that demonstrate just orders—
Aristotle will call our minds to the passages in Dante, in so far as he reminds us that 
incontinent cupidity is the root of all forms of inordinate desire which leads to greed, the 
ultimate destroyer of social order and justice: 
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that 
the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part 
in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no 
need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no 
part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who 
first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, 
is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of 
all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with 
arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the 
worst ends. That is why, if he has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the 
most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the 
                                                       




bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the 
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.607  
 
 
Returning to Doglia mi reca, the idea of the “cerchio”—the “a circle enclosing us that 
marks our limits from above” that guides us through natural law to virtue and justice 
(refraining from avarice and prodigality), is reflected in the structure of hell and the 
maxim that one must properly imitate nature. The transformation of the art of securing 
good things for the purpose of higher ends (social needs/contemplative) into vicious 
wealth-getting is thus the transformation of all goods into the proliferation of tools—and 
hence is like chrematistics, usury. Nature, in its inherent order, clearly provides self-
sufficiency for human beings, which they actualize with language, expression, etc. in the 
meeting of unequal needs with each other. This is why Dante relates Virgil’s lesson on 
the Aristotelian philosophical conception of virtuous and natural acts in such crystal 
clear moral terms:  
«Filosofia», mi disse, «a chi la 'ntende, 
nota, non pure in una sola parte, 
come natura lo suo corso prende 
dal divino 'ntelletto e da sua arte; 
e se tu ben la tua Fisica note, 
tu troverai, non dopo molte carte 
che l'arte vostra quella, quanto pote, 
segue, come 'l maestro fa 'l discente; 
sì che vostr'arte a Dio qu608asi è nepote. 
Da queste due, se tu ti rechi a mente 
lo Genesì dal principio, convene 
prender sua vita e avanzar la gente; 
e perché l'usuriere altra via tene, 
per sé natura e per la sua seguace 
dispregia, poi ch'in altro pon la spene.  
 
                                                       
607 Pol. 1.1253a19-1253a39 (emphasis mine) 
 
608 Inf. 11.97-111 
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(Philosophy, for one who understands/ points out, and not in just one place…/ 
how nature follows as she takes her course/ the Divine Intellect and Divine Art/ 
and if you read your Physics carefully/ not many pages from the start, you’ll see/ 
that when it can, your art would follow nature/ just as a pupil imitates his 
master/ so that your art is almost God’s grandchild/ From these two, art and 
nature, it is fitting/ if you recall how Genesis begins/ for men to make their way, 
to gain their living/ and since the usurer prefers another/ pathway, he scorns 




 Thus, bringing this back to Doglia mi reca, we can clearly see that the force of 
Dante’s critique of greed leads directly to the manifestly political concerns of Convivio 
and Monarchia. In the sixth and seventh stanzas of the canzone, Dante accentuates the 
social consequences of greed as injustices against society:  “some by delaying, some by 
their look of complacency / others by sullen looks / turn the gift into a sale, and at a 
price so high/ as only he knows who pays for such a purchase” (chi con tardare, e chi con 
vana vista / chi con sembianza trista / volge il donare in vender tanto caro / quanto sa 
sol chi tal compera paga).610 For Dante, greed is the reason that “mutual love in the 
world is all in confusion” (amistà nel mondo si confonde) and one should not give the 
name of love to the incontinent and bestial appetite for riches, but one should seek love 
and beauty within the garden of reason.611 
 
 Dante contrasts this greed with the idea of  “complete generosity” (pronta 
liberalitade) that his philosophical reflection of the Convivio seeks to mirror: 
Puotesi adunque la pronta liberalitate in tre cose notare, le quali seguitano questo 
volgare, e lo latino non averebbero seguitato. La prima è dare a molti; la seconda 
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610 Doglia mi reca, 119-122 
 




è dare utili cose; la terza è, sanza essere domandato lo dono, dare quello. Ché 
dare a uno e giovare a uno è bene; ma dare a molti e giovare a molti è pronto 
bene, in quanto prende simiglianza da li benefici di Dio, che è universalissimo 
benefattore. E ancora, dare a molti è impossibile sanza dare a uno, acciò che uno 
in molti sia inchiuso; ma dare a uno si può bene, sanza dare a molti. Però chi 
giova a molti fa l’uno bene e l’altro; chi giova a uno, fa pur un bene: onde vedemo 
li ponitori de le leggi massimamente pur a li più comuni beni tenere confisi li 
occhi, quelle componendo. Ancora, dare cose non utili al prenditore pure è bene, 
in quanto colui che dà mostra almeno sé essere amico; ma non è perfetto bene, e 
così non è pronto: come quando uno cavaliere donasse ad uno medico uno scudo, 
e quando uno medico donasse a uno cavaliere inscritti li Aphorismi d’Ipocras 
ovvero li Tegni di Galieno. Per che li savi dicono che la faccia del dono dee essere 
simigliante a quella del ricevente, cioè a dire che si convegna con lui, e che sia 
utile: e in quello è detta pronta liberalitade di colui che così dicerne donando 
(Now complete generosity may be observed in three things which are a 
consequence of using the vernacular and which would not have been a 
consequence of using Latin. The first is giving to many; the second is giving 
useful things; the third is giving a gift without its being asked. It is good to give to 
and to help one, but it is complete goodness to give to and to help many in that it 
resembles the beneficence of God, who is the most universal benefactor. 
Moreover, to give to many without giving to one is impossible, since the one is 
included in the many; however, it is quite possible to give to one without giving to 
many. Therefore he who helps many does the one good and the other as well; he 
who helps one does only the one good; and hence we see that lawmakers keep 
their eyes fixed chiefly on the common good when making laws. Moreover, to give 
things that are not useful to the recipient is also good, in that he who gives knows 
at least that he is a friend; but it is not perfectly good, and so it is not complete, 
as, for example, if a knight were to give a shield to a doctor, or a doctor were to 
give a knight a copy of Hippocrates’ Aphorisms or Galen’s Art. Therefore the wise 
say that the face of a gift must resemble that of the recipient, that is to say, it 
should be appropriate and useful to him; and in this the generosity of him who is 
discerning in his gifts is called complete).612 
 
  
                                                       





4. Dante’s Critique of Political Economy in Convivio and Monarchia 
 
Convivio 4 is an extended commentary on his poem Le dolci rime d’amor, ch’io 
solìa, but also follows many of Aristotle’s key arguments and conceptions closely, as in 
other places of Dante’s oevre. Le dolci rime really opens up what I call Dante’s 
Aristotelian based critique of medieval Italian and Florentine political economy, which 
has been the focus of this study, in a more overt and explicit manner. In Conv. 4.1, 
Dante begins his commentary on the poem. Chapter one is political at heart in that it 
brings the courtly thematic of love, as in Doglia mi reca, deftly into the realm of 
reflection on social bonds and friendship which, though perhaps more aggressively 
made explicit in Monarchia, is here already shaped both by an Averroist conception of 
the unity of the human multitude in intellect and the corollary notion of friendship in 
book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics. But here particularly, Dante really re-capitulates 
some of the core arguments of Politics 1, where we originally find them.  
 
Dante opens with the Pythagorean remark that “friendship binds many into one” (ne 
l’amistà si fa uno di più),613 and articulates a view of society whose core foundation is 
based on love. For Dante, the linguistic capacity of human beings is one of the key 
vehicles for the exchange of emotions, communication of needs, and desires between 
people, echoing Aristotle’s placement of man and woman, then the household, and the 
fact of human language as original evidence of the natural teleological priority of the 
polis in the Politics. 
                                                       




E però che le cose congiunte comunicano naturalmente intra sé le loro qualitadi, 
in tanto che talvolta è che l’una torna del tutto ne la natura de l’altra, incontra che 
le passioni de la persona amata entrano ne la persona amante, sì che l’amore de 
l’una si comunica ne l’altra, e così l’odio e lo desiderio e ogni passione. Per che li 
amici de l’uno sono d[a] l’altr[o] amati, e li neminic odiati; per che in greco 
proverbio è detto: «de li amici essere deono tutte le cose comuni». (Since things 
that are joined by nature have their qualities in common with one another, to the 
extent that one is at times completely transformed into the nature of the other, it 
follows that the passions of the person loved enter into the person who loves, so 
that the love of the one is communicated to the other, as are hatred and desire 
and all other passions. Consequently the friends of the one are loved by the other, 
and the enemies hated; hence the Greek proverb says: “Among friends all things 
must be shared.”) 614 
 
Dante here is already making a prelude to his argument that humanity is, or ought to 
be, connected in friendship and that at all levels of human relationships the linguistic 
sign (as in DVE) is a bearer of exchange between persons naturally connected and 
mutually dependent. Part of this argument has a moral and political aim in setting up 
the rest of the content of this very rich and eclectic commentary on Le dolci rime, which 
though seemingly banal when viewed in the context of the history Dante is writing, 
redoubles on his insistence that all human beings are naturalmente bound together. In 
the quote, “de li amici essere deono tutte le cose comuni,”615 articulated in Cicero’s De 
                                                       
614 Dante goes back here at Conv. 4.2.6-10 “This is why great discretion must be shown 
in using or in avoiding the use of words–which are, as it were, the seed of our activity–so 
that they may be well received and fruitful in effect, so as to avoid any defect of sterility 
on their part. The right moment must therefore be predetermined, both for the one who 
speaks as well as the one who must listen; because if the speaker is ill disposed his 
words are often harmful, and if the hearer is ill disposed even good words will be poorly 
received. And therefore Solomon says in the book of Ecclesiastes that ‘there is a time to 
speak and a time to keep silence.’” 
 
615 We also find this statement in Aristotle, Pol. 2.5.263a21-30: “These, then, and others 
are the difficulties involved in the common ownership of property. The present practice, 
provided it was enhanced by virtuous character and a system of correct laws, would be 
much superior. For it would have the good of both-by "of both" I mean of the common 
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officiis—Cicero’s magisterial treatise on the common good—we find not a mere 
commonplace, but a definitive normative statement about the nature of property and 
exchange that links into Dante’s later arguments, and in particular the argument for 
imperial authority in Convivio 4.4, in which Dante invokes human need 
(bisogno/necessità) and the fact that human beings are not self-sufficient as individuals 
as the “the root foundation underlying the Imperial Majesty” (fondamento radicale de la 
imperiale maistade). As we shall see shortly, Dante’s recognition that people are 
necessarily social and political, and that such a society must be modeled on friendship 
and commonly shared goods necessary for this life in common, shows that the question 
of economics and wealth-getting will be absolutely essential to the question of justice 
and, hence, the achievement of that common good of living in friendship. Thus at root, 
according to the Aristotelian paradigm, Convivio 4 can also be said to be fundamentally 
concerned with the major questions of political economy as seen in Convivio 4.4:  
 
lo fondamento radicale de la imperiale maistade, secondo lo vero, è la necessità 
de la umana civiltade, che a uno fine è ordinata, cioè a vita felice; a la quale nullo 
per sé è sufficente a venire sanza l’auitorio d’alcuno, con ciò sià cosa che l’uomo 
abbisogna di molte cose, a le quali uno solo satisfare non può. E però dice lo 
Filosofo che l’uomo naturalmente è compagnevole animale. E sì come un uomo a 
sua sufficienza richiede compagnia dimestica di famiglia, così una casa a sua 
sufficienza richiede una vicinanza; altrimenti molti difetti sosterrebbe che 
sarebbero impedimento di felicitade. E però che una vicinanza non può sé in 
tutto satisfare, conviene a satisfacimento di quella essere la cittade(The root 
foundation underlying the Imperial Majesty is, in truth, man’s need for human 
society, which is established for a single end: namely, a life of happiness, which 
no one is able to attain by himself without the aid of someone else, since one has 
need of many things which no single individual is able to provide. Therefore the 
Philosopher says that man is by nature a social animal. And just as for his well-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ownership of property and of private ownership. For while property should be in some 
way communal, in general it should be private. For when care for property is divided up, 
it leads not to those mutual accusations, but rather to greater care being given, as each 
will be attending to what is his own. But where use is concerned, virtue will ensure that 
it is governed by the proverb "friends share everything in common.” 
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being an individual requires the domestic companionship provided by family, so 
for its well-being a household requires a community, for otherwise it would suffer 
many defects that would hinder happiness. And since a community could not 
provide for its own well-being completely by itself, it is necessary for this well-
being that there be a city).616 
 
 
In any case, Dante clearly hooks onto the Aristotelian anthropological principles of 
what an inherently natural human society looks like, and sees mutual dependence and a 
division of labor.  As seen in the virtue ethics analysis of the previous section, the 
problem Dante identifies, as Aristotle does, is not with nature, but with moral behavior 
that diverges from and thwarts the proper fulfillment of the ends of our social nature. In 
Convivio 1, human beings have needs both material and intellectual that can be left 
unfulfilled either because of a lack of virtue or a wrong emphasis on the pursuit of 
certain goods, on the one hand, or otherwise involuntarily by circumstance and various 
“domestic and civic responsibilities” (read, economic and political responsibilities) on 
the other.  Thus in framing his discussion here in terms of his conversion to “lady 
philosophy” (Convivio 3), Dante focuses his social critique not as a critique of society 
per se, but as we saw in Doglia mi reca and Inferno 11, as a social critique of flawed 
behavior and actions because of a defect of virtue. Dante’s love for the truth, brought 
through his conversion to philosophy, leads him to hate  “not the things themselves but 
the malice within them” (non le cose, ma le malizie de le cose). 617  Similarly, Dante sees 
people as blinded under a spell of false values, “errors” in judgment related to what the 
good is, and he wants to set out to correct and “biasimare” a perversion of “human 
goodness” (l’umana bondade) by hating the error and not those who err — the “erranti.” 
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Dante explicitly states that an error of human “bontade” is fatal in no uncertain terms, 
and we shall have to explore exactly what he means by that (it might be said that in 
Conv. 3 one of the moral defects he discusses at length is a defect of desire): 
 
Intra li quali errori uno io massimamente riprendea, lo quale non solamente è 
dannoso e pericoloso a coloro che in esso stanno, ma eziando a li altri, che lui 
riprendano, p[o]rt[a] d[o]lor[e] e danno. Questo è l’errore de l’umana bontade, in 
quanto in noi è da la natura seminata, e che «nobilitade» chiamare si dee; che 
[per] mala consuetudine e per poco intelletto era tanto fortificato, che 
[l']oppinione quasi di tutti n'era falsificata; e de la falsa oppinione nascevano li 
falsi giudicii, e de' falsi giudicii nascevano le non giuste reverenze e vilipensioni; 
per che li buoni erano in villano dispetto tenuti, e li malvagi onorati ed essaltati. 
La qual cosa era pessima confusione del mondo; sì come veder puote chi mira 
quello che di ciò può seguitare, sottilmente (Among these errors was one that I 
condemned more than any other, one which is harmful and dangerous not only to 
those who are caught up in it but also to those who condemn it, to whom it brings 
pain and suffering. This is the error concerning human goodness insofar as it is 
sown in us by nature, and which should be called “nobility,” an error that was so 
entrenched as a result of evil habit and lack of intelligence that the opinion of 
almost everyone was thereby rendered fallacious. From this fallacious opinion 
sprang fallacious judgments, and from fallacious judgments sprang unjust 
reverence and disdain, with the result that the good were held in base contempt 
and the bad were honored and exalted. This constituted the worst confusion in 
the world, as is apparent to anyone who carefully considers what the 
consequences of such confusion might be). 618 
 
In Le dolci rime, Dante literally wants to “bring men back to the right way regarding 
the proper conception of true nobility” (riducer la gente in diritta via sopra la propia 
conoscenza de la verace nobilitade), to rectify the social and political situation he sees.619 
In Le dolci rime, as in Doglia mi reca, this means, in a strictly Aristotelian vein, 
reasserting virtue and reason as the prime categories by which one should understand 
proper ethical categories, and as we will see below, the proper governance of a state.  
Let’s read the poem taking Dante’s suggestion that the only allegorical piece is that the 
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lady means philosophy, or truth, but that otherwise it has literal meanings. First of all, 
the poem is framed as an acerbic moral criticism: he departs the love poetry genre that 
he is accustomed to (com’io solia),  “not that I do not hope / To return to them anew/ 
But because the proud and scornful manner /That my lady bears /Has barred my 
access/ To my customary speech” (non perch'io non speri ad esse ritornare, ma perché li 
atti disdegnosi e feri, che ne la donna mia sono appariti, m'han chiusa la via de l'usato 
parlare). My suggestion is that given the historicizing of Dante’s time that has been done 
in the preceding chapters, and Dante’s continual insistence here that we take him 
literally, that what he is referring to are real historical “atti disgegnosi e feri,” especially 
when fiero (fero, lat. ferum) is also taken to mean violent and/or bold—which we have 
seen in chapter 3—that he has been able to see through the prism of the philosophical 
and moral erudition that came out of his “conversion” to philosophy (che ne la donna 
mia sono appariti). In other words, if one refuses the double entendre, whether the 
“acts” are the scornful and violent or his lady’s acts/manner are scornful and proud, it 
seems his point is to depart his courtly genre to talk specifics about political and social 
values and in reference to specific actions and social facts, about which “usato parlare” 
of the courtly love lyric in usual mode is insufficient. He does this similarly in Doglia mi 
reca, as seen above. Given his identification of lady philosophy with peripatetic 
philosophy represented above all by Aristotle, what has appeared in the eyes of his lady 
is thus arguably through the lens of Aristotelian categories. 
 
He explicitly states too that in putting aside his “pleasant style”  (lo mio soave stile) 
he will speak “about the quality/ Which makes a person truly noble/ By refuting the 
false and base beliefs of those who claim that riches/ Are the source of true nobility” (del 
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valore per lo qual veramente omo è gentile, con rima aspr'e sottile; riprovando ‘l giudicio 
falso e vile di quei che voglion che di gentilezza sia principio ricchezza).620  Thus we 
clearly see here that there is an ethical critique related to a conception of “value” and 
“wealth.” Dante has linked this to refuting not only the lady’s “atti disdegnosi e feri” but 
notes too that these are clearly tied up with 1) ideas of social nobility (nobilta e 
gentilezza) and class 2) the link between that and the accumulation, use, and, in sum, 
whole range of activities related to wealth. With the word “quality” or value (valore) too, 
Dante means “a natural capacity, or a goodness conferred by nature” (quasi potenza di 
natura, o vero bontade da quella data), suggesting that Dante is thinking about human 
capacity for action, potentiality in regards to action which is another way of saying the 
good or bad decisions we can make, either in bono or in malo, which as we will see are 
rooted in his discussion of wealth.621  Specifically, Dante here veers into what appears at 
first to be a social critique of those who claim that wealth is the origin of nobility, which 
we see quickly in the text, also goes into a critique of the idea that there is a legitimate 
claim of the rich to rule society or that social station of nobility in addition to wealth has 
anything to do with what he sees as true value. The identification of nobility with riches 
unmistakably reflects the historical reality of the composition of the canzone. 
 
The next stanza opens with the formulation, “one ruler held that nobility, According 
to his view, Consisted of ancestral wealth together with fine manners” (Tale imperò che 
gentilezza volse, secondo ‘l suo parere, che fosse antica possession d'avere con 
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reggimenti belli).622 Beginning with “tale imperò,” here Dante, in an Aristotelian 
fashion, begins with refuting the errors of others before defining true nobility, and 
Dante also cites this Aristotelian definition from the Politics, also repeated in book 2.3.4 
of Monarchia: “For 'nobility is virtue and ancient wealth' as Aristotle says in the Politics  
and according to Juvenal: nobility of mind is the sole and only virtue” (est enim nobiltas 
virtus et divitie antique, iuxta Phylosophum in Politiciis; et iuxta Iuvenalem: Nobilitas 
animi sola est atqua unica virtus).623 It is worth citing this passage and then returning to 
it, because it will be central for our understanding of Dante’s political conceptions later: 
 
The distribution of offices according to excellence is a special characteristic 
of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is excellence, as wealth is of 
an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy. In all of them there of course exists 
the right of the majority, and whatever seems good to the majority of those who 
share in the government has authority, whether in an oligarchy, an aristocracy or 
a democracy. Now in most states the form called polity exists, for the fusion 
goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth 
of the rich, who commonly take the place of the noble. But as there are three 
grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government, freedom, wealth, 
and excellence (for the fourth, what is called good birth, is the result of the two 
last, being only ancient wealth and excellence), it is clear that the admixture of 
the two elements, that is to say, of the rich and poor, is to be called a polity or 
constitutional government; and the union of the three is to be called aristocracy, 
and more than any other form of government, except the true and ideal, has a 
right to this name. Thus far I have shown the existence of forms of states other 
than monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, and what they are, and in what 
aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracies—that the 
two latter are not very unlike is obvious.624 
 
 The point for now is that this goes to the heart of the question of how wealth and 
its use effects the relationships within the polity, as Dante asserts in Monarchia that his 
polity saves men from all the bad regimes, especially democracy, oligarchies, and 
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tyrannies, the main defects of which are related to inequities and bad habits in wealth. 
In any case, Dante here in the next part of the canzone goes on to explicitly link this 
“errore” to problems with wealth.  
Tale imperò che gentilezza volse, 
secondo ‘l suo parere, 
che fosse antica possession d’avere  
con reggimenti belli 
e altri fu di più lieve savere,  
che tal detto rivolse, 
e l’ultima particula ne tolse,  
ché non l’avea fors’elli!  
Di retro da costui van tutti quelli 
che fan gentile per ischiatta altrui  
che lungiamente in gran ricchezza è stata;  
ed è tanto durata la così falsa oppinïon tra nui,  
che l’uom chiama colui  
omo gentil che può dicere: “io fui  
nepote, o figlio, di cotal valente,” 
benché sia da nïente.  
Ma vilissimo sembra, a chi ‘l ver guata, 
cui è scorto ‘l cammino e poscia l’erra,  
e tocca a tal, ch’è morto e va per terra!  
(One ruler held that nobility / According to his view/ Consisted of ancestral 
wealth/ Together with fine manners/ And someone else of lesser wit / Recast this 
saying/ Dispensing with the second half / Since he himself was likely lacking! / 
There follow in his wake all those /Who count a man as noble if his stock / Has 
had great wealth for quite some time. And so ingrained/ Has this false view 
become among us / That one calls another noble/ If he can say /`I am the son/ 
Or grandson, of such and such / A famous man,’ despite his lack of worth/ But he 
appears the basest, to those who see the truth / Who having been shown the way 
still goes astray / And walks the earth like one who’s dead.)625 
 
 This sets up the next section as an unmistakable critique of political economy 
because here Dante challenges directly the linkage of political imperium and the 
possession of wealth, as well as the linkage between political rule and a conception of 
wealth-getting that sharply diverges with friendship and common possession of money 
and property, recognizing that the root of imperial authority is the provision of needs for 
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people in a state so that they can achieve their highest perfections.  If the oligarchs or 
ruler of the state make the ideological argument (or embody it as justification for vicious 
or incontinent wealth-getting) that nobility consists in pursuit and possession of wealth, 
according to the emperor’s opinion that “gentilezza” is “antica possession d’avere con 
reggimenti belli,” this is an opinion that reduces nobility to long held richness.626 In 
other words: the opinion of the Emperor goes astray. A “second way” 0f going astray is 
the one “in which the opinion of the common people, which is devoid of reason, goes 
astray” (e dico che questa oppinione è quasi di tutti, dicendo che dietro da costui vanno 
tutti coloro che fanno altrui gentile per essere di progenie lungamente stata ricca, con 
ciò sia cosa che quasi tutti così latrano).627 The masses follow the Emperor in his error. 
This is the reason Dante makes these two opinions the topic of his investigation: to 
prepare his critique of chrematistic states that combine a mode of authority with a bad 
sort of wealth-getting, to be able to correct the bad ideas of the masses: 
 
Queste due oppinioni – avvegna che l’una, come detto è, del tutto sia da non 
curare – due gravissime ragioni pare che abbiano in aiuto: la prima è che dice lo 
Filosofo che quello che pare a li più, impossibile è del tutto essere falso; la 
seconda ragione è l’autoritade de la diffinizione de lo imperadore. E perché 
meglio si veggia poi la vertude de la veritade, che ogni autoritade convince, 
ragionare intendo quanto l’una e l’altra di queste ragioni aiutatrice e possente è. E 
prima, [poi che] de la imperiale autoritade sapere non si può se non si ritruovano 
le sue radici, di quelle per intenzione in capitolo speziale è da trattare.(These two 
opinions–although one, as has been said, is of no concern to us–seem to have two 
very weighty reasons to support them. The first is the Philosopher’s belief that 
what appears true to the majority cannot be entirely false; the second reasoning 
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stems from the most excellent authority of the Imperial Majesty. In order that the 
power of truth, which outweighs all authority, may be more clearly seen, I intend 
to discuss to what extent each of these reasons is useful and valid. Since nothing 
can be known about the imperial authority unless its roots are found, it is first 
necessary to discuss them expressly in a special chapter.)628 
 
 So Dante is going here to treat two different issues. First of all, he is going to re-
elaborate what are the true roots of imperial authority based on his Aristotelian 
conception of the properly governed city-state. Secondly, this will depend on debunking 
commonly held views about the idea that accumulating wealth is virtuous, which he 
treats in the stanza of Le dolci rime, specifically in verses 41-60. In short, Dante is 
challenging a definition of nobility which ties nobility to wealth and is framed by the 
authority of the ruler of the state—according to imperial fiat—which is no small 
authority, as well as challenging the common opinion, which appears to most, in an 
unexamined state, to be true, namely that nobility is in fact related to long held wealth. 
The important thing regarding Dante’s attempt to rebuke these opinions is that they 
both hinge on an understanding on bad or good relations to wealth in the Aristotelian 
vein discussed in 5.2. 
 
 Here Dante is also seeking to illustrate (ne la prima si pongono le oppinioni altrui) 
a class configuration and class definition of nobility as a link of wealth and “reggimenti 
belli” and even the idea that “richezza” itself defines social standing and nobility 
generally.629 For Aristotle, if the constitution becomes oligarchical and the mode of 
authority appropriate to the household “oikonomia” is mixed with political authority, as 
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we have seen, and the bad form of wealth getting, the configuration and conduct of the 
state will reflect such values.  Dante does in fact seem to be lamenting a habitual and 
ingrained state of affairs. From an Aristotelian point of view the laws and form of the 
regime will influence the people, as we saw in 5.2, and this is a major source of the error 
which will come through really clearly in the next stanza. Here Dante asserts (ne la 
seconda si ripruovano)630 that the organization of the state—in this case a state form in 
which people believe that accumulation and possession of wealth defines nobility—not 
only influences the citizens’ habits but that the values that form that organization are in 
error, thus also contributing to the common error which makes people have “la falsa 
oppinion tra noi” that wealth or long possession of wealth is a definition of nobility. 
Dante is beginning to critique one of the fundamental things that makes political 
economy problematic: the conflation of public honors and political organization around 
the bad sort of chrematistic wealth-getting; the naturalization of greed. This has moral 
consequences for the polis and encourages a pursuit of wealth that can never end, and as 
language and values in a community actually have an effect on everyone else, the entire 
state is infected with greed and incontinence (if not calculatingly malicious desires) to 
acquire, possess, and accumulate money. 
 
 For this reason, Dante’s critique of greed is a central aspect of the more 
normatively political content of Monarchia and Convivio, where Dante shows his deeply 
Aristotelian critique of the capitalist political economy of his time both in his normative 
political treatise (examined in 1.2) and in his commentary on the poem about the 
equation of nobility and riches, Le dolci rime. He repeatedly argues in Monarchia (using 




the word cupiditas sixteen times), and harking back to the Aristotelian virtue ethics 
framework we have examined so extensively, that greed destroys justice and that there 
needs to be one world monarch to stop it. In fact, stopping the destructive power of 
greed is the central argument of Dante’s entire political thought.631 The main way one 
stops greed, and its deleterious effects, depends on not confounding the purpose of a 
polity writ large and according to proper ends with mere wealth-getting which—in 
Aristotelian terms—appears sometimes analogous to the purpose of the polity.  
 
 Dante goes to great trouble to make this point in the fourth book of Convivio, 
where in his commentary on Le dolci rime, he challenges —while referring to Aristotle’s 
Politics 4.8—the linking of imperial authority with the possession of “ancestral wealth 
and fine manners” (antica ricchezza e belli costumi). As we have seen, he vigorously 
disputes the notion that the wealthy have some implicit or natural nobility (accentuated 
by time)— “riches cannot, as others believe, confer nobility” (le divizie, sì come si 
crede…non possono causare nobilitade)—and therefore authority to rule because of their 
capital holdings (reflected in Florentine political reality).632  He argues, moreover, that 
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the first function of the state is to meet actual social needs, based on the Aristotelian 
idea that reciprocal exchange and distributive (proportional) justice binds the city 
together, and that therefore the state must prevent greed and the “glory of acquiring” 
(gloria d’aquistare) as it operates against justice. In the later chapters of Convivio 4, 
particularly chapters 11-14, he links the need for this sort of governance to stopping the 
deleterious and vicious mania for monetary accumulation, which goes beyond any social 
or individual need, and in fact generates injustice.  
 
Riches, he says, are “base” (vili) and “imperfect” (imperfette).633 Their defect lies 
“in the lack of discretion attending their appropriation; second, in the danger that 
accompanies their increment; thirdly, in the ruin resulting from their possession” (ne lo 
indiscreto loro avvenimento; secondamente, nel pericoloso loro accresimento; 
terziamente, ne la dannosa loro possessione).634 In this section, after clarifying that gold 
and pearls as objects have no actual use value, but as money only social or exchange 
value— “that insofar as they are considered in themselves, they are perfect things, and 
are not riches but gold or pearls; but insofar as they are conceived as a possession of 
man, they are riches” (quanto è per esse in loro considerate, cose pefette sono, ma non 
sono richezze, ma oro e margherite; ma in quanto sono ordinate a la possessione de 
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l’uomo, sono richezze)—an insight which would much later be central to Marx’s notion 
of commodity fetishism, Dante says that their appropriation lacks discretion.635  Why? 
Because through various kinds of business and most of the “ways in which riches are 
acquired” (modi per li quali esse vegnono) of an either licit or illicit nature—that is 
wealth getting—“no distributive justice is present, while injustice…almost always is” 
(nulla distributiva giustiza risplende, ma tutta iniquitade…)636  Thus, for Dante, the 
radical position is that all wealth-getting, of money for its own sake, understood here as 
Aristotle’s unnatural type of chrematistics— “the appropriation of these riches in 
whatever way results in injustice” (in ciascuno modo quelle ricchezze iniquamente 
avvenire)—violates Aristotle’s definition of the kind of distributive justice that binds 
political communities in friendship, one in which just distribution of property and 
resources, and settlements of disputes are done proportionally according to need of 
individuals and through virtue.637 
 
 
Dante’s arguments about the accumulation of wealth in Convivio 4.12-13 are 
clearly indebted to Aristotle because he sees that there is one kind of wealth-getting that 
is natural, and another that lies in a habit of greed (chrematistic wealth-getting) and 
specifically is related to monetary accumulation. Speaking of the accumulation of 
riches and their possession, Dante says that they are “dangerous” (pericolose) because 
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“these false traitresses always promise to bring complete satisfaction to the person who 
gathers them in sufficient quantity, and by this promise they lead the human will into 
the vice of avarice” (promettono le false traditrici sempre, in certo numero adunate, 
rendere lo raunatore pieno d’ogni appagamento; e con questa promissione conducono 
l’umana voluntade in vizio d’avarizia).638 But, their promises are always illusory: though 
they promise “fulfillment of this promise when they have increased to a certain 
amount…in place of sufficiency they set up a new goal: that is, a greater quantity to be 
desired, and once this has been realized, they instill a great fear and concern for what 
has been acquired” (certa quantità di loro accrescimento…in loco di bastanza recando 
nuovo termine, cioè maggiore quantitade a desiderio, e, conquesta, paura grande e 
sollicitudine sopra l’acquisto).639  
Citing a canon of authorities denouncing greed from Cicero and Boethius, to the 
Scriptures and Roman poets, Dante links this acquisition, accumulation, and possession 
of capital to destructive political and social consequences: to use a stronger word, 
“injustice” (iniquitade)640. In short, in this mania of wealth-getting, all means are taken 
to get, accumulate more, and hold on to riches without any limit or ethical consideration 
because of the common error about what constitutes the human good. Dante challenges 
his readers to consider the lives of those who chase after and accumulate riches and to 
think about the consequences of run-away wealth-getting: “And what imperils and 
destroys cities, territories, and individuals day by day more than the accumulation of 
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wealth by some new person? Such an accumulation uncovers new desires which cannot 
be satiated without causing injury to someone” (E che altro cotidianamente pericola e 
uccide le cittadi, le contrade, le singulari persone, tanto quanto lo nuovo raunamento 
d’avere appo alcuno? Lo quale raunamento nuovi desiderii discuopre, a lo fine de li quali 
sanza ingiuria d’alcuno venire non si può).641 
 
 Dante, for this reason, puts a great deal of emphasis in Monarchia and Convivio 
on the issue of just lawmaking: to prevent injury to all. Just laws are the foundation of a 
just political order that can stop the disastrous effects of greed, as he will say repeatedly 
in Monarchia. For Dante the laws were founded to curb the effects of greed: “What else 
were the two categories of Law, namely Canon Law and Civil Law, intended to curb if 
not the surge of greed brought about by the amassing of wealth? Certainly both 
categories of Law make this quite evident if we read their beginnings, that is, the 
beginnings of their written record” (E che altro intende di meditare l’una e l’altra 
Ragione, Canonica dico e Civile, tanto quanto a riparare a la cupiditade che, raunando 
richezze, cresce? Certo assai lo manifesta, e l’una e l’altra Ragione, se li loro 
cominciamente, dico de la loro scrittura, si leggono).642 It is thus necessary to have one 
world authority, one monarch,  
lo quale, tutto possedendo e più desiderare non possendo, li regi tegna contenti 
ne li termini de li regni, sì che pace intra loro sia, ne la quale si posino le cittadi, e 
in questa posa le vicinanze s’amino, in questo amore le case prendano ogni loro 
bisogno, lo qual preso, l’uomo viva felicemente; che è quello per che esso è nato. 
E a queste ragioni si possono reducere parole del Filosofo ch’egli ne la Politica 
dice, che quando più cose ad uno fine sono ordinate, una di quelle conviene 
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essere regolante, o vero reggente, e tutte l’altre rette e regolate. Sì come vedemo 
una nave, che diversi offici e diversi fini di quella a uno solo fine sono ordinati, 
cioè a prendere loro desiderato porto per salutevole via: dove, sì come ciascuno 
officiale ordina la propria operazione nel proprio fine, così è uno che tutti questi 
fini considera, e ordina quelli ne l’ultimo di tutti; e questo è lo nocchiero, a la cui 
voce tutti obedire deono. Questo vedemo ne le religioni, ne li esserciti, in tutte 
quelle cose che sono, come detto è, a fine ordinate. Per che manifestamente 
vedere si può che a perfezione de la universale religione de la umana spezie 
conviene essere uno, quasi nocchiero, che considerando le diverse condizioni del 
mondo, a li diversi e necessari offici ordinare abbia del tutto universale e 
inrepugnabile officio di comandare. E questo officio per eccellenza Imperio è 
chiamato, sanza nulla addizione, però che esso è di tutti li altri comandamenti 
comandamento. (who, possessing all things and being unable to desire anything 
else, would keep the kings content within the boundaries of their kingdoms and 
preserve among them the peace in which the cities might rest. Through this peace 
the communities would come to love one another, and by this love all households 
would provide for their needs, which when provided would bring man happiness, 
for this is the end for which he is born. In regard to this argument we may refer to 
the words of the Philosopher when he says in the Politics that when many are 
directed to a single end, one of them should be a governor or a ruler, and all the 
rest should be ruled or governed. This is what we observe on a ship, where the 
different offices and objectives are directed to a single end: namely, that of 
reaching the desired port by a safe route. Just as each officer directs his own 
activity to its own end, so there is one individual who takes account of all these 
ends and directs them to their final end: and this is the captain, whose commands 
all must obey. We see this in religious orders, in armies, and in all things, as has 
been said, which are directed to an end. Consequently it is evident that, in order 
to bring to perfection the universal social order of the human species, it is 
necessary to have a single individual who, like a captain, upon considering the 
different conditions in the world, should have, in order to direct the different and 
necessary offices, the universal and indisputable office of complete command.)643 
 
 Significant here, besides the monarch’s role as being directly involved in 
stopping monetary greed, and his exaltation of the very secular notion of a “universal 
social order of the human species”—where for social order in Lansing’s rendering, Dante 
is using the word “religion”—is that Dante is speaking of “need” (bisogno), since bisogno 
goes to the idea of meeting economic needs in a state (the first, natural type of wealth-
getting according to Aristotle), rather than a state merely being a platform in which 
                                                       




individuals, entities, or groups set about acquiring, amassing, and possessing riches. 
Good economy is using and providing riches—true riches as wealth, that is, as use 
values—while bad economic wealth-getting is merely acquiring, amassing, and 
possessing money.644  
 
In the Aristoteles latinus, Moerbeke translates the passage that Dante alludes to 
here in Convivio 4.4, from Politics 1 as “the rule of a household is a monarchy” 
(yconomica quidem monarchia).645  We need to understand right political rule as 
involving distribution and regulation of property for self-sufficiency, social need, and 
the good life while preventing greed from turning the laws to bad ends. Invoking 
Aristotle’s maxim that “man is a political animal,”646 Dante says, as we examined above, 
that the root of “imperial majesty” (la imperial maistade) is “the need for human society, 
which is established for a single end: namely, a life of happiness, which no one is able to 
attain by himself without the aid of someone else, since one has need of many things 
which no single individual is able to provide” (la necessità de la umana civiltade, che a 
uno fine è ordinata, cioè a vita felice; a la quale nullo per sé è sufficiente a venire sanza 
l’aiutorio d’alcuno, con ciò sia cosa che l’uomo abbisogna di molte cose, a le quali uno 
solo satisfare non può).647 The authority of imperium is to regulate dominium, the 
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distribution of property, and regulating just exchange according to Aristotelian moral 
ends.648  
  
 What does Dante have in mind, then, if the “yconomica” is like a “monarchia”? 
First of all, as we have seen, Aristotle in the beginning of the Politics goes to great 
lengths to clarify that oikonomia is not the exact same thing as the art of politics.649 This 
distinction is important in so far as it rejects the equation of politics—the attainment of 
human social ends—to mere wealth-getting, while also placing economy squarely 
underneath political authority as a subsidiary role of the latter’s regulation. Secondly, if 
Dante intends to suggest that a single monarch is necessary to prevent uncontrollable 
greed in the world, as he does in the above passages of Convivio and in Monarchia 1.5 
and 1.11, then in regards to the political role over economics, it would inherently involve 
the idea that the polity has to exert a single authority over wealth-getting, as Dante 
argues, for the sake of the proper ends and good life of the entire human race. The 
Monarch will be of superior intellect and able to rule in so far as he thinks in proper 
ethical political categories—that is, “in conformity with the teachings of philosophy” 
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(secundum phylosophica documenta)–as a law giver, or “oikonomos” over the state, and 
he does so because “none...or few...can reach this harbour…unless the waves of 
seductive greed are calmed and the human race rests free in the tranquility of peace” 
(…ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci…pervenire possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande 
cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pacis tranquilitate possit).650 
 
 
 For Aristotle, one of the biggest problems for the health of the state is that people 
come to believe that wealth getting consists in the procurement of wealth qua coin, qua 
money (the second, bad chrematistics). The consequence of this belief is that they thus 
take the basic economic function not to be exchange of goods between diverse and 
unequally needy individuals, houses, families in a division of labor or social intercourse, 
of the sort Dante describes in Convivio 4.4, again we could call it friendship bound by 
proportional equality or distributive justice,651 but rather the mere procurement and 
accumulation of monetary wealth. Some people are led, Aristotle says, in a passage that 
shows Dante’s debt to the philosopher’s economic thought in Convivio, “to believe that 
getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives 
is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose 
it.”652 We have now arrived at the point at which we started: political economy, in other 
words, is the confusion of a notion of wealth-getting and a mode of authority. Bad 
chrematistics happens in the context of an explicitly monetary economy, where money’s 
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651 Pol. 2.1261a29-31; Eth. 5.5.1132b30-1133a15 
 




usefulness as a token of exchange becomes the foundation for money to become a 
“useful” thing itself qua exchange and to breed more money, starting the infamous 
Money-Commodity-Money chain that Marx identifies in Capital on the basis of 
Aristotle’s very discussion here in Politics 1.9. And it is on these grounds that Marx, 
Aristotle, and Dante all coincide.653 In Dante’s time monetary exchange of this second 
sort was fully developed, as we have seen above.  
 
 As Dante puts it in Monarchia, referring directly to the above noted passages in 
Aristotle on distributive/proportional justice and monetary exchange “it must be noted 
that the thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the 
Ethics” (ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut 
innuit Aristotiles in quinto ad Nicomacum).654 Dante goes, as has been seen, to great 
lengths to make clear that the Monarchy is necessary, through law and state power,655  
to stop greed and install “universal peace” (pax universalis)656  and, as a corollary of this 
argument, that the purpose of the state is not wealth-getting because it obstructs 
mankind from engaging in the activities most proper to humanity.657 At the outset of the 
treatise, we can observe that Dante desires to bear fruit for public benefit, which is 
                                                       
653 See Karl Marx, Capital, 248; In fact, one of Marx’s earliest attempts Karl Marx, 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: International Publishers, 
1981 [1859]) to articulate a “critique” of political economy, in the Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, starts with a discussion of Aristotle’s Politics 1.9.1257a. 
 
654 Mon. 1.11.11 
 
655 Mon. 1.11.11 
 
656 Mon. 1.4 
 




contrasted with the individual who does not care for the common good, like “a 
destructive whirlpool which forever swallows things down” (perniciosa vorago semper 
ingurgitans).658 He also says that temporal monarchy has not been investigated “on 
account of its not leading directly to material gain” (propter se non habere ad lucrum), 
thus immediately opening the book by opposing his idea of monarchy to a chrematistic 
state in which the exercise of politics is linked to profit. It was, after all, his Ser 
Brunetto, as Cary Nederman has shown, who advocated for a conception of politics in 
his Tresor, based upon a totally perverse reading of Aristotle, that supports the idea that 
“increasing wealth may serve as a positive blessing to the city” and that politics and 
justice in the city are concomitant with the good desire for personal profit.659 As 
Brunetto writes, adumbrating classical political economists like Adam Smith, 
commercial exchange and market relationship is real friendship, and seeking money and 
personal advantage is a natural thing to do: “Among them […citizens…], there is a 
common thing that is loved, through which they arrange and conform their business, 
and that is gold and silver.”660 
 
 Thus, if one does not like Brunetto’s inversion of the Aristotelian teleology—that is 
that merely living as market exchange actors in a political economy pursuing sterile 
                                                       
658 Mon. 1.3 
 
659 Cary J. Nederman, "Brunetto Latini's Commercial Republicanism," in Lineages of 
European Political Thought: Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide From 
John of Salisbury to Hegel (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
2009), 143 
 
660  Brunetto Latini, Tresor 2.5.2, as quoted in Cary J. Nederman, "Brunetto Latini's 




monetary accumulation is truly living well—Dante argues that we can choose to reject 
such a situation as ‘unnatural’ and change it. In Monarchia 1, he asserts clearly that the 
political realm is under our deliberative control: “now since our present subject is 
political, indeed is the source and starting-point of just forms of government, and 
everything in the political sphere comes under human control, it is clear that the present 
subject is not directed primarily towards theoretical understanding but towards action” 
(cum ergo materia prasens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, 
et omne politicum nostre potestati subiaceat, manifestum est quod materia presens non 
ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur).661 Dante is here 
adumbrating Marx’s aphorism on theory and praxis, from the Theses on Feurbach, that 
“the Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world...the point is to change it.”662 
Since it is changeable and under our control, Dante’s argument develops in Monarchia 
1.3-7, that we can change it for the good only by understanding humanity’s real political 
and moral ends as distinct from the ceaseless activity and damage of the ends of wealth-
getting.  
 
For Dante, this end of humanity is intellectual development and fulfillment 
(which is ultimately the end of the human political community), and a core component 
of that is freedom. This is why he says that living under the monarch the human race is 
“supremely free” (potissime liberum), because it exists “for its own sake and not for the 
sake of something else,’ as Aristotle states in the Metaphysics” (‘sui met et non alterius 
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662 Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction 
to the Critique of Political Economy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 571. 
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gratia[…] ut Pylosopho placet in hiis que De simpliciter ente).663 It is fairly clear now 
that “something else” is perverted authority’s desire to accumulate wealth and hence the 
deployment of all the organs of the polis in all its diversity as instruments to its ends; 
wealth-getting. Freedom from this, for Dante, meditating on later books of the Politics 
(where Aristotle discusses the role of money in the form of just and unjust regimes), 
comes about only under the rule of the monarch as only in that form of government is 
man secure from bad forms of government—democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies— 
“which force mankind into slavery” (que in servitutem cogunt genus humanum).664 For 
Dante, just governments seek freedom so that “men should exist for their own sake. For 
citizens do not exist for the sake of consuls, nor the people for the sake of the king” 
(homines propter se sint. Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed 
e converso consules propter cives et rex propter gentem).665 The laws are there for the 
sake of the common good, not for the disordered ends of the authorities. Given the 
Aristotelian conception that politics is among free men and that slaves are living-tools 
under a purely household (oikonomical-regal) despotism, Dante’s is an unmistakably 
political-economic critique.666 
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664 Mon. 1.12.9 
 
665 Mon. 1.12.10-12 
 




For Dante, under the monarch the laws are framed for the benefit of the 
community, which must, as we understand now, have basic economic needs met.667 
Justice is, then, fulfilling unequal needs in community not according to money, but 
according to the actual need of persons, and with a view to the intellectual fulfillment of 
all men, which has often been called Dante’s “Averroism.”668 For Dante this simply 
doesn’t come about in chrematistic states—namely because people (especially the 
popolo minuto) are treated like living tools for wealth-getting, pure labor commodities 
which involves them in extraordinary “domestic and civic responsibilities” (cura 
familiare e civile),669 not to mention the other myriad social ills that come about related 
to the mania for monetary wealth, which Dante illustrates, for example, in his poem 
Doglia mi reca.  
 
 But at the world level, there is no doubt that the monarch is necessary so that, as 
Dante puts it in Mon. 1.10, there is no regression of conflict between the interests of 
parties, motivated by greed—as was so obviously the case in the expansive political and 
social troubles of his time that unfolded under the guise of conflicts between city-states, 
                                                       
667 For an eridute conceptual framing of Dante’s juridical conceptions, see Vittorio 
Russo, Impero e stato di diritto: studio su «Monarchia» ed «Epistole» politiche di 
Dante (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1987); also see Claudia di Fonzo, "Dante tra diritto, 
letteratura e politica," Forum Italicum: A Journal of Italian Studies 41, no. 1 (2007): 5-
22 and Piero Fiorelli, "Sul senso del diritto nella Monarchia," Letture classensi 16 
(1987): 79-97; for a reading of Dante and the law in the literature of the Comedy, see 
Justin Steinberg, Dante and the Limits of the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013).   
 
668  For a discussion of Dante’s “Averroism,” see Richard Kay’s discussion in the notes of 
Dante's Monarchia, written by Dante Alighieri (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 21-24.  
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the church, and empire—the institutional, political, and social history of which we have 
examined extensively in this study. He writes “either this situation will continue ad 
infinitum… or else we must come to a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves 
all disputes either directly or indirectly, and this man will be the monarch or emperor” 
(et sic aut erit processus in infinitum, quod esse non potest, aut oportebit devenire ad 
iudicem primum et summum de cuius iudicio cuncta litigia dirimantur sive mediate sive 
inmediate: et hic erit Monarcha sive Imperator). Dante undoubtedly has in mind 
stopping the sort of disputes such as the one between Boniface and Charles of Valois, 
and the playing out of claims to authority, such as we saw in the example of Charles of 
Anjou, the Florentine bankers, and Urban IV and Clement IV. Dante also has in mind 
calling into question, certainly, the Florentine political institutions that had throughout 
his lifetime become solidly oligarchical and the greedy citizens lining up behind these 
powers for profit. A just state can only come about with a monarch who understands 
that chrematistic accumulation is not the end of the polity and who is willing to use 
universal authority or imperium, that trumps dominium, to stop the fires, regressive 
conflict, and destruction of greed. In other words, without having a modern 
anticapitalist vocabulary, Dante was addressing just this sort of a problem in his 
Monarchia.   
 
 We are in a position now to conclude: Dante’s political thought involves other 
elements, but at its root it is a searing “critique of political economy.” In the situation we 
have historicized of a capitalist church/imperial/city-state superstructure and economic 
base underlying the traditional claims to authority, we now can better understand why 
Dante says that only under the monarch can we have true justice: Dante’s monarch 
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subverts not only the traditional city-state, imperial, and church claims to power, but 
also rejects the capitalist wealth-getting value structure inhering in all of them ethically 
and politically. Dante’s ideal monarch, perhaps “utopian,” at least in his normative 
political theory, is a figure who is supposed to be a good economist, in the right way, 
which leads me back to Aristotle’s observation that “the rule of a household is a 
monarchy”—“yconomica quidem monarchia.” Dante’s monarchy is to be a polity ruled 
like a just household, in which the monarch exercises all imperium over wealth-getting, 
and at the world-wide level—an idea that would be vigorously taken up again by Trotsky. 
All wealth-getting and exchange ought to be according to proportional justice, or the 
contrapassum, as in Aristotle’s Ethics 5, which is based on need and with the end of 
making good citizens, not better claimants to church or empire all of which are 
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